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Author: Jonathan Gruber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
On April 7, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the "Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000," which eliminated the unpopular earnings test that applied to those over the Social Security normal age of retirement (currently age 65). The earnings test, a version of which still applies to those ages 62-64, reduces immediate payments to beneficiaries whose labor income exceeds a given threshold. Although benefits are subsequently increased to compensate for any such reduction, the earnings test is typically viewed as a tax on working. As a result, it is commonly viewed as an important disincentive to paid work for older Americans. For example, when President Clinton signed the legislation that removed the earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retirement age, he noted, "because of the Social Security retirement earnings test, the system withholds benefits from over 800,000 older working Americans and discourages countless more - no one knows how many - from actually seeking work." Similarly, Alan Greenspan recently stated that with the elimination of the earning test, "the presumption, of course, is that you'll get an increase in the number of retired people coming back into the work force."
Author: Jonathan Gruber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
On April 7, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the "Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000," which eliminated the unpopular earnings test that applied to those over the Social Security normal age of retirement (currently age 65). The earnings test, a version of which still applies to those ages 62-64, reduces immediate payments to beneficiaries whose labor income exceeds a given threshold. Although benefits are subsequently increased to compensate for any such reduction, the earnings test is typically viewed as a tax on working. As a result, it is commonly viewed as an important disincentive to paid work for older Americans. For example, when President Clinton signed the legislation that removed the earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retirement age, he noted, "because of the Social Security retirement earnings test, the system withholds benefits from over 800,000 older working Americans and discourages countless more - no one knows how many - from actually seeking work." Similarly, Alan Greenspan recently stated that with the elimination of the earning test, "the presumption, of course, is that you'll get an increase in the number of retired people coming back into the work force."
Author: Leora Friedberg Publisher: ISBN: Category : Old age pensions Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
The Social Security earnings test reduces benefits at a 33-50% rate once earnings pass a threshold amount - among the highest marginal tax rates in the economy. Previous research dismissed the importance of the earnings test but failed to take advantage of three changes in the earnings test rules in order to identify its impact. Each change applied to some age groups and not others - which make them useful for identifying the effect of tax rules on the labor supply of working beneficiaries. Beneficiaries in the Current Population Survey satisfy the strongest prediction: many keep their earnings just below the exempt amount, and this bunching shifts with the earnings test rule changes. The rule changes are then incorporated into an econometric model of labor supply to identify income and substitution elasticities. The resulting elasticity estimates suggest considerable deadweight loss suffered by working beneficiaries. Simulations predict a substantial boost to labor supply from eliminating the earnings test, and at a minimal fiscal cost. However, a slight decrease in labor supply is predicted from the recently legislated increase in the exempt amount
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Older men Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In this study the social security earnings test is shown to have a significant effect empirically on the labor supply of retirement aged men. A rich data file from the Social Security Administration containing accurate benefit information provides a cross- section sample of 65-70 year old married men who worked some amount for empirical investigation. The data pertain to 1972. The results indicate that eliminating the earnings test would increase labor supply by 151 annual hours and payroll tax revenue by $31 per individual in the sample. The way in which the earnings test is relaxed is important also. Raising the exempt amount increased labor supply while lowering the tax rate did not. This follows from analyzing labor supply decisions over a nonlinear earnings-tested budget constraint. An econometric technique was developed for consistently estimating labor supply over nonlinear budget constraints. This technique conveniently summarized the budget constraint in an expected value calculation.
Author: Hugo Benitez-Silva Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The labor supply and benefit claiming incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, the labor force participation of Older Americans rises, and a variety of reforms to the Social Security system are considered. Any reform needs to take into account the effects and rationale of the Social Security Earnings Test and the Actuarial Adjustment Factor. We describe these incentives, and analyze benefit withholding patterns using data from the Master Beneficiary Files of the Social Security Administration, and present descriptive and exploratory evidence on the determinants of benefit withholding using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. We then investigate the importance of the Earnings Test limits for work and claiming behavior using a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply, benefit claiming, and withholding. We use the latter framework to compare the consequences of a number of changes to the Earnings Test provision for the labor supply behavior and earnings of older Americans.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Aging. Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment Publisher: ISBN: Category : Old age pensions Languages : en Pages : 200
Author: Jonathan Gruber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Labor supply Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
The Social Security earnings test, a version of which still applies to those ages 62-64, reduces immediate payments to beneficiaries whose labor income exceeds a given threshold. Although benefits are subsequently increased to compensate for any such reduction, the earnings test is typically perceived as a tax on working. As a result, it is considered by many to be an important disincentive to paid work for older Americans. Yet there is little evidence to suggest an economically significant effect of the earnings test on hours of work, and almost no research on the effect of the test on the decision to work at all. We investigate these issues using the significant changes in the structure of the earnings test over the past 25 years, using data over the past 25 years, using data over the 1973-1998 period from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which provide large samples of observations on the elderly. Our analysis suggests two major conclusions. First, the earnings test exerts no robust influence on the labor supply decisions of men. Neither graphical analyses of breaks in labor supply trends, nor regression estimates that control for underlying trends in labor supply by age group, reveal any significant impact of changes in earnings test parameters on aggregate employment, hours of work, or earnings for men. For women, there is more suggestive evidence that the earnings test is affecting labor supply decisions. Second, loosening the earnings test appears to accelerate benefits receipt among the eligible population, lowering benefits levels, and heightening concerns about the standard of living of these elderly at very advanced ages. Our findings suggest some cause for caution before rushing to remove the earnings test at younger ages.
Author: Jeffrey B. Liebman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Labor supply Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
A key question for Social Security reform is whether workers currently perceive the link on the margin between the Social Security taxes they pay and the Social Security benefits they will receive. We estimate the effects of the marginal Social Security benefits that accrue with additional earnings on three measures of labor supply: retirement, hours, and labor earnings. We develop a new approach to identifying these incentive effects by exploiting five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules that generate discontinuities in marginal benefits or non-linearities in marginal benefits that converge to discontinuities as uncertainty about the future is resolved. We find clear evidence that individuals approaching retirement (age 52 and older) respond to the Social Security tax-benefit link on the extensive margin of their labor supply decisions: we estimate that a 10 percent increase in the net-of-tax share reduces the two-year retirement hazard by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage points from a base rate of 15 percent. The evidence with regards to labor supply responses on the intensive margin is more mixed: we estimate that the elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax share is 0.41 and statistically significant, but we do not find a statistically significant earnings elasticity.
Author: Jonathan Gruber Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0226309983 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 752
Book Description
Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World represents the second stage of an ongoing research project studying the relationship between social security and labor. In the first volume, Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise revealed enormous disincentives to continued work at older ages in developed countries. Provisions of many social security programs typically encourage retirement by reducing pay for work, inducing older employees to leave the labor force early and magnifying the financial burden caused by an aging population. At a certain age there is simply no financial benefit to continuing to work. In this volume, the authors turn to a country-by-country analysis of retirement behavior based on micro-data. The result of research compiled by teams in twelve countries, the volume shows an almost uniform correlation between levels of social security incentives and retirement behavior in each country. The estimates also show that the effect is strikingly uniform in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other social characteristics.
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Author: 
Author: Leora Friedberg
Author: Anthony J. Pellechio
Author: 
Author: Hugo Benitez-Silva
Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Aging. Subcommittee on Retirement Income and Employment
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Author: Jeffrey B. Liebman
Author: Jonathan Gruber