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Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?

Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition? PDF Author: Dirk Hackbarth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
We study anti-competitive mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge, which trades off benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. There are three results. First, mergers are optimal when collusion fails (i.e., firms sufficiently deviate from a collusive regime). Second, long periods of collusion are likely, because colluding is dynamically stable. Therefore, mergers are rare. Third, mergers (and, in particular, lower merger costs) decrease pre-merger collusion, as punishments by price wars are weakened. Thus, although anti-competitive mergers harm competition ex-post, barriers and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition ex-ante.

Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?

Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition? PDF Author: Dirk Hackbarth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
We study anti-competitive mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge, which trades off benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. There are three results. First, mergers are optimal when collusion fails (i.e., firms sufficiently deviate from a collusive regime). Second, long periods of collusion are likely, because colluding is dynamically stable. Therefore, mergers are rare. Third, mergers (and, in particular, lower merger costs) decrease pre-merger collusion, as punishments by price wars are weakened. Thus, although anti-competitive mergers harm competition ex-post, barriers and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition ex-ante.

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law PDF Author: Daniel Gore
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559

Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.

The Effect of Mergers on Potential Competition Under Economies Or Diseconomies of Joint Production

The Effect of Mergers on Potential Competition Under Economies Or Diseconomies of Joint Production PDF Author: Nikolaos Georgantzis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 60

Book Description


Mergers and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry

Mergers and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry PDF Author: Orrin G. Hatch
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788188593
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 135

Book Description
Examines recent developments in the telecommunications industry. Witnesses: James Young, v.p. & general counsel, Bell Atlantic Corp.; James Ellis, Sr. exec. v.p. & gen. counsel, SBC Commun., Inc.; Bernard Ebbers, pres. & ceo, LDDS WorldCom; Michael Salsbury, exec. v.p. & gen. counsel, MCI Commun. Corp.; William Barr, sr. v.p. & gen. counsel, GTE Corp.; Robert Atkinson, sr. v.p., legal regulatory & exernal affairs, Teleport Communications Group, Inc.; Peter Huber, sr. fellow, Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research; Robert Crandall, Sr. fellow, Brookings Institution; Ronald Binz, pres., Competition Policy Inst.; & Dale Hatfield, ceo, Hatfield Assoc., Inc.

Handbook of Antitrust Economics

Handbook of Antitrust Economics PDF Author: Paolo Buccirossi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 716

Book Description
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden

U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines

U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines PDF Author: United States. Department of Justice. Antitrust Division
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description


Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis

Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis PDF Author: Richard J. Gilbert
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Clayton Act
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description


The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited

The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited PDF Author: Josh Lerner
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226473031
Category : Art
Languages : en
Pages : 715

Book Description
This volume offers contributions to questions relating to the economics of innovation and technological change. Central to the development of new technologies are institutional environments and among the topics discussed are the roles played by universities and the ways in which the allocation of funds affects innovation.

Innovation Matters

Innovation Matters PDF Author: Richard J. Gilbert
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026235862X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337

Book Description
A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and available evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters.

Beyond Competition

Beyond Competition PDF Author: Thomas Mark Karier
Publisher: M.E. Sharpe
ISBN: 9780765608956
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 256

Book Description