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Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers?

Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? PDF Author: Joshua D. Wright
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description


Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers?

Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? PDF Author: Joshua D. Wright
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description


Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?

Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized? PDF Author: Dennis W. Carlton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 30

Book Description


Innovation Matters

Innovation Matters PDF Author: Richard J. Gilbert
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026235862X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337

Book Description
A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and available evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters.

The Antitrust Paradigm

The Antitrust Paradigm PDF Author: Jonathan B. Baker
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674238958
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 369

Book Description
A new and urgently needed guide to making the American economy more competitive at a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power. The U.S. economy is growing less competitive. Large businesses increasingly profit by taking advantage of their customers and suppliers. These firms can also use sophisticated pricing algorithms and customer data to secure substantial and persistent advantages over smaller players. In our new Gilded Age, the likes of Google and Amazon fill the roles of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. Jonathan Baker shows how business practices harming competition manage to go unchecked. The law has fallen behind technology, but that is not the only problem. Inspired by Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and the “Chicago school,” the Supreme Court has, since the Reagan years, steadily eroded the protections of antitrust. The Antitrust Paradigm demonstrates that Chicago-style reforms intended to unleash competitive enterprise have instead inflated market power, harming the welfare of workers and consumers, squelching innovation, and reducing overall economic growth. Baker identifies the errors in economic arguments for staying the course and advocates for a middle path between laissez-faire and forced deconcentration: the revival of pro-competitive economic regulation, of which antitrust has long been the backbone. Drawing on the latest in empirical and theoretical economics to defend the benefits of antitrust, Baker shows how enforcement and jurisprudence can be updated for the high-tech economy. His prescription is straightforward. The sooner courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.

The Antitrust Paradox

The Antitrust Paradox PDF Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536

Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech

The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech PDF Author: Roger D. Blair
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108211178
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 873

Book Description
This Cambridge Handbook, edited by Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, brings together a group of world-renowned professors in the fields of law and economics to assess the theory and practice of antitrust, intellectual property, and high tech. With the increased globalization of antitrust, a better understanding of how law and economics shape this interface will help academics, policymakers, and practitioners to understand the existing state of academic literature, its limits, and its relevance to real-world antitrust. The book will be an essential resource for anyone seeking to understand academic and policy considerations shaping the world of antitrust, intellectual property, and high tech.

Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer

Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 16

Book Description


The Microsoft Case

The Microsoft Case PDF Author: William H. Page
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226644650
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 363

Book Description
In 1998, the United States Department of Justice and state antitrust agencies charged that Microsoft was monopolizing the market for personal computer operating systems. More than ten years later, the case is still the defining antitrust litigation of our era. William H. Page and John E. Lopatka’s The Microsoft Case contributes to the debate over the future of antitrust policy by examining the implications of the litigation from the perspective of consumer welfare. The authors trace the development of the case from its conceptual origins through the trial and the key decisions on both liability and remedies. They argue that, at critical points, the legal system failed consumers by overrating government’s ability to influence outcomes in a dynamic market. This ambitious book is essential reading for business, law, and economics scholars as well as anyone else interested in the ways that technology, economics, and antitrust law have interacted in the digital age. “This book will become the gold standard for analysis of the monopolization cases against Microsoft. . . . No serious student of law or economic policy should go without reading it.”—Thomas C. Arthur, Emory University

Winners, Losers & Microsoft

Winners, Losers & Microsoft PDF Author: S. J. Liebowitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 358

Book Description
Few issues in high technology are as divisive as the raging debate over competition, innovation, and antitrust. Why do certain products and technologies become dominant while others fail? Is there something about high technology that makes markets less dependable at choosing goods and services? Will the robust competition and technological advances of the past two decades continue? Or, will they be suffocated by larger firms employing monopolistic practices? Is antitrust primarily employed against monopolies to increase competition for the benefit of consumers, or is it actually a vehicle that firms use against their rivals to restrict the competitive process? This book examines these and other questions confronting high-technology markets.

Antitrust for High-Tech and Low

Antitrust for High-Tech and Low PDF Author: Ronald A. Cass
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Severe limitations on antitrust enforcement officials' knowledge and the potential impact of ill-advised investigations and prosecutions on markets suggest that officials should exercise extraordinary caution in enforcement of restraints on single-firm conduct. Although it is common to depict antitrust enforcement as protecting market competition while other forms of regulation are seen as intrusions (justifiable or not) into market operation, antitrust enforcement has characteristics and risks similar to other forms of regulation. Indeed, government antitrust enforcement can be especially problematic, as it requires discretionary selection among an extraordinary range of possible targets, imposes significant burdens on companies that are under investigation or subject to suit, invites efforts by individual firms to motivate officials to deploy resources against rivals, and can seriously disrupt competition among firms. Antitrust authorities need to exercise special care in making enforcement decisions respecting conduct of individual dominant firms in high-technology industries, where antitrust enforcers' abilities to understand and predict industry evolution are most limited and where enforcement actions are most likely to rest on debatable predicates about the effects of specific conduct. Critically, market boundaries that so often are taken for granted as setting the proper framework for evaluating effects of a leading firm's conduct frequently fail to capture the most important sources of competition for the firm, which in many industries (including many high-technology industries with strong network effects) are dynamic and involve potential replacement of the technology that is associated with the government's market definition. This has led to ill-advised enforcement initiatives which have dramatically burdened the target companies (even at the formal investigation stage) and has prejudiced market development without compensating benefits to consumers. Further, while network effects can establish or sustain dominance within a narrowly defined market, network effects also can have just the opposite effect: they can be the reason that a firm's dominance comes to an end, as the success of a dominant firm is a spur to investment in competing technologies, including technologies that can replace the currently successful product or service. At a time when companies publicly identified as potential antitrust enforcement targets include a very large number of leading high-technology firms (among them, Facebook, Apple, Google, IBM, AT&T, Microsoft, and Intel), it is important to look critically at prior enforcement efforts predicated on similar theories. This article examines government enforcement decisions respecting four prior targets and draws lessons for enforcement going forward.