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Author: Thomas C. Omer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that, after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality.
Author: Thomas C. Omer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that, after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality.
Author: Stella Fearnley Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 1119973759 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 471
Book Description
The regulatory framework for financial reporting, auditing and governance has changed radically in recent years, as a result of problems identified from the Enron scandal and more recently from the drive to implement global standards. In a key regulatory change, a company audit committee is now expected to play a significant role in agreeing the contents of the financial statements and overseeing the activities of the auditors. Finance Directors, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners are required to discuss and negotiate financial reporting and auditing issues, a significant process leading to the agreement of the published numbers and disclosures, and to the issuing of the auditor's report which accompanies them, but which is entirely unobservable by third parties. Reaching Key Financial Reporting Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact is a fascinating, behind-the-scenes examination of this closed process. The authors draw on the results of face to face interviews, and an extensive survey of finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit partners, and present nine company case studies highlighting the process of discussion and negotiation and the methods by which the agreed financial reporting outcome was reached. Detailed analysis of the case studies: Allows those involved in the process to benchmark their behaviours against those of others Enables a comparison between the previous and current regulatory environments to see what has changed, and sheds light on the sorts of behaviours the current regulatory framework encourages Evaluates the effectiveness of the changed regulatory regime, providing evidence relevant to current policy debates concerning the value of audit, IFRS and the relative merit of rules-based versus principles-based accounting standards in relation to professional judgement and compliance The unprecedented access and unique insights offered by this book make it invaluable for audit firm staff and partners, audit committee chairs and company directors involved in agreeing the published financial statements, as well as those who have an interest in the financial statements, but do not have access to the negotiation process.
Author: Krista Fiolleau Publisher: Business Expert Press ISBN: 1606491326 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 120
Book Description
This book is designed for corporate directors and senior executives who want to gain a better understanding of accounting. Corporate directors and managers are under pressure from recent changes in the law (especially The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) and demands by shareholders and the public to be more informed, vigilant and involved in the governance of business organizations.
Author: Vincent Intintoli Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 68
Book Description
We examine a specific channel through which director connectedness may improve monitoring: financial reporting quality. We find that the connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members has a positive effect on financial reporting quality and accounting conservatism. The effect is not significant for non-audit committee or co-opted audit committee members. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate self-selection. Consistent with connected directors being valuable, the market reacts more negatively to the death of highly connected directors than less connected directors. Better connected directors also have better career prospects, suggesting that they have greater incentives to monitor.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Publisher: ISBN: Category : Commercial crimes Languages : en Pages : 364
Author: Diane E. Ambler Publisher: Wolters Kluwer ISBN: 0735558736 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 1519
Book Description
Only one resource provides practical guidance to help ensure compliance with all Sarbanes-Oxley rules and regulations. Introducing the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Planning and& Compliance - the first resource providing practical, step-by-step guidance to help you navigate the Sarbanes-Oxley maze and ensure compliance. Written by two well-respected authorities, this unique and invaluable compendium: Fully reflects the current body of SEC rules, regulations and interpretations, PCAOB rules and standards, and Sarbanes-Oxley related court decisions Covers a wide range of compliance-related issues and areas - from SEC disclosure rules and certification of financial documents, to the treatment of pension plans and loans to officers Includes regular updates to keep you current as the regulatory environment continues to expand and evolve Provides exhaustive details on the compliance responsibilities of corporate CEOs, CFOs, directors, audit committees and attorneys Most importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Planning and& Compliance provides a veritable andquot;blueprintandquot; for an effective corporate compliance program. For each area covered, you'll find a detailed summary of key subject matters to be addressed; step-by-step guidance on practical planning and implementation issues; recommended compliance procedures; and specific compliance actions to be taken by the company and its key officers. You'll also have access to best practices and policies designed to ensure good corporate governance, transparency and accurate financial reporting. Why settle for andquot;information and explanationandquot; when you can have step-by-step guidance and advice?
Author: Gregory W. Martin Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Research in information economics seeks to understand how the actions of one individual affect the decisions of related individuals. We examine this issue in the context of information contagion between audit offices in the same locality. Specifically, we investigate whether contagion among Big N audit offices in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) causes their client firms' financial reporting quality to correlate. We document a relation between overstatement of earnings for one firm (as evidenced by a subsequent restatement) and higher abnormal accruals for another firm in that same year, where both firms' auditors are located in the same MSA. The correlation in reporting quality is consistent with contagion in practices between auditors. We also find evidence that auditor competition is one channel through which information contagion occurs. The between-audit office contagion we document is incremental to within-audit office contagion documented by prior research. Our evidence is important in understanding additional factors related to the quality of auditing and financial reporting and thus should be relevant to audit committees, regulators attempting to improve audit quality, and stakeholders in general.
Author: Ik Seon Suh Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 194
Book Description
The present study examines and finds that internal auditors, particularly Chief Audit Executives, recognize financial accounting expertise as a significant base of audit committee (AC) power in the financial reporting process. However, such an AC expertise (i.e., financial accounting expertise) does not "counterbalance" internal auditors' perceived dependency on management or influence their decisions to monitor financial reporting quality. Instead, the cost-benefit analysis affects their decisions: (1) benefits of staying resolute to monitor financial reporting quality (i.e., "psychological empowerment"), and (2) costs of potential adverse reactions of management who exerts power over the internal audit.
Author: Thomas C. Omer
Author: Thomas C. Omer
Author: Stella Fearnley
Author: Arthur Levitt
Author: Krista Fiolleau
Author: Jill Peperone Giles
Author: Vincent Intintoli
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Author: Diane E. Ambler
Author: Gregory W. Martin
Author: Ik Seon Suh