Do Critical Audit Matter Disclosures Impact Investor Behavior? PDF Download

Author: Qian Huang
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Languages : en
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has recently required auditors to disclose critical audit matters (CAMs), which are financial statement matters that involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgments. The PCAOB contends that CAMs will increase the decision usefulness of the auditor's report and indirectly benefit investors by increasing audit and financial reporting quality. I examine whether investors react to CAM disclosures and whether they perceive any change in adopting firms' financial reporting quality. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that (1) while there is no significant stock price reaction to CAMs on average, investors react negatively to CAMs disclosed by firms with high levels of short interest; (2) there is a significant increase in the quarterly earnings response coefficient for adopting firms. The effect is driven by big-N audit firms, and increases with the number of CAMs reported. Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors use CAMs to confirm their pre-existing opinions about a firm, and that they perceive an improvement in audit quality and financial reporting reliability due to the CAM disclosure requirement.

Author: Rebecca Files
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Languages : en
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As of June 30, 2019, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) requires that the new auditor's report for large accelerated filers include a discussion of Critical Audit Matters (CAMs). The communication of CAMs is intended to increase the relevance of the auditor's report for investors by disclosing accounts that require especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment. This study examines investor response to CAM disclosures for the first large accelerated filers in the United States. We find no statistically significant price or volume response around the CAM release dates in 2019. In additional tests, we explore and find variation in the semantic similarity between the CAMs disclosed in the auditor's report and the risk factors disclosed by the firm in the same 10-K; however, we continue to find no statistically significant price or volume response for the CAMs containing more novel information compared to the firm's own risk disclosures. Next, we consider the possibility that the information communicated in CAMs is disclosed by the firm in the prior year's risk factor disclosure or financial statement footnotes. To test this, we analyze the semantic similarity between CAMs disclosed in 2019 and the risk factors and footnotes disclosed by the firm in both 2018 and 2017. We find relatively high similarly in disclosure content across years, verifying that many of the firms in our sample appear to have disclosed the same information that is communicated in CAMs in the prior year(s). However, even for those firms with very dissimilar disclosures, we continue to find an insignificant price and volume response in 2019. Overall, our results suggest that CAM disclosures for large accelerated filers do not communicate incremental information to investors. The information content of CAMs for smaller firms (e.g., non-accelerated filers) remains to be seen.

Author: Katharine D. Drake
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Languages : en
Pages : 50

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Book Description
Prior research indicates that expanded audit reports, which disclose financial statement matters that involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment (known as critical audit matters [CAMs] in the U.S.), have fallen short of their objective to provide investors with useful information. In this study, we investigate whether the disclosure of tax-related CAMs indirectly benefits investors by constraining tax-related earnings management. Such a finding would indicate that CAM disclosure has increased auditor and/or management scrutiny of the underlying financial statement areas. We find that tax-related CAM disclosures are associated with (1) a lower likelihood that the audited company uses tax expense to meet analysts' consensus forecasts, and (2) increases in the reported reserve for prior-period unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs). Our findings should assist the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) with their post-implementation review of the new U.S. auditor reporting requirement.

Author: Peter Kipp
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ISBN:
Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 160

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I investigate how nonprofessional investors confidence in the financial statements and the audit report is influenced by the firm specific details of a critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure in conjunction with the description of the audit procedures engaged to address the CAM in the audit report. Using participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk as a proxy for nonprofessional investors in a 2x2 +1 (control) between-participants experiment manipulating CAM disclosure detail (Detailed/Generic) and the description of the audit procedures engaged to address the CAM (Detail/Generic) I find that greater detail in the description of the CAM results in higher confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the financial statements than a generic description of the CAM, consistent with boundary condition of Support Theory. Further, I find that greater detail in the description of the related audit procedures engaged to address the CAM increases nonprofessional investors perceptions of audit quality. Evidence of an effect of CAM and audit procedure disclosure language on investment judgments is also presented. These results have implications for researchers, practitioners, and regulators to carefully consider the language used to disclose CAMs in the auditors report.

Author: Lawrence Abbott
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Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
PCAOB AS 3101 requires the auditor to communicate any critical audit matters (CAMs), identified during the planning or performance of the audit, in the audit report. Prior research has investigated the informativeness of CAM disclosures using short window, event study methodologies centered around the initial CAM disclosure in the 10-K and finds minimal evidence that CAMs alter investors' decisions. We depart from the extant research to investigate whether and to what extent a specific CAM - the business combination CAM - influences investors' perceptions of mergers and acquisition news. We predict and find that investors react more negatively to merger and acquisition announcements when the audit report preceding the announcement contains a business combination CAM. Our results suggest that CAMs provide decision-relevant information to investors about the risks involved in the acquisition, which is used to value subsequent transactions.

Author: Steven J. Kachelmeier
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Languages : en
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We present experimental evidence suggesting that critical audit matter (CAM) disclosures in the auditor's report involving areas of high measurement uncertainty forewarn users of misstatement risk. Specifically, in our first study with MBA students, financial analysts, and attorneys, we find that CAMs (1) lower pre-misstatement assessments of confidence in the financial statement area disclosed as a CAM, and (2) lower assessments of auditor responsibility for a subsequently revealed misstatement in a CAM-related area. In our second study with student participants proxying as mock jurors, we find that the responsibility-mitigating effect of CAM disclosure is driven by CAM disclosures involving measurement uncertainty, as opposed to CAM disclosures involving categorical determinations. Combined, our findings help reconcile mixed evidence from prior research, supporting the view that the forewarning effect of CAM disclosures involving measurement uncertainty could mitigate perceived auditor responsibility for CAM-related material misstatements.

Author: Kelsey Brasel
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Languages : en
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Audit practitioners, academics, and attorneys have expressed concern that disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) will increase jurors' auditor liability judgments when auditors fail to detect misstatements. In contrast, this study provides theory and experimental evidence that CAM disclosures, under certain conditions, reduce auditor liability judgments as jurors perceive that undetected fraudulent misstatements were more foreseeable to the plaintiff (i.e., the financial statement user suing the auditor). However, we find that CAM disclosures only reduce auditor liability for undetected misstatements that, absent CAM disclosure, are relatively difficult to foresee. Finally, CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent misstatements neither increase nor reduce auditor liability judgments relative to the current regime (i.e., where CAMs are not disclosed), but reduce liability judgments relative to reporting that there were no CAMs. As such, we find that, relative to stating there were no CAMs, disclosure of any CAM (i.e., related or unrelated) provides litigation protection in cases of undetected fraud. Consequently, the CAM requirement could incentivize auditors to disclose innocuous boilerplate CAMs, thereby diluting the impact of more warranted CAM disclosures.

Author: Christine Gimbar
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Languages : en
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently proposed amendments to the standard audit report that would require the disclosure of critical audit matters (CAMs), and the Securities and Exchange Commission continues to evaluate the use of principles-based (imprecise) accounting standards within U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. We assert that precise accounting standards are perceived by jurors to constrain auditors' control over financial reporting outcomes, resulting in a lower propensity for negligence verdicts when the accounting treatment conforms to the precise standard. However, we hypothesize that the use of either imprecise standards or CAMs removes this constraint, leading to increased auditor liability. We present experimental evidence, including a mediation analysis, supporting this argument. Our results highlight the similarities between the effects of imprecise accounting standards and CAMs on negligence assessments. The results provide insight for regulators and the profession about the potential interactive consequences of the proposed regulatory changes.

Author: Hun-Tong Tan
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Languages : en
Pages : 0

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We examine how managers' accounting estimates are affected by whether they are informed about an impending critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure from a close or distant auditor. A close (distant) auditor is one who has a smaller (greater) social distance from the client in terms of their working relationship. We predict and find that being informed about an impending CAM by a close (distant) auditor leads to more (less) aggressive estimates than if managers are not informed. With a close auditor-client relationship, managers perceive a CAM disclosure as forewarning investors about estimate subjectivity, thus providing a moral license to report more aggressively. With a distant relationship, a CAM disclosure does not provide a moral license but signals greater auditor scrutiny, which leads to less aggressive reporting. Our results inform regulators and standard setters about the effects of CAM on managers' reporting decisions in the presence of a close auditor-client relationship.

Author: Amanuel Fekade Tadesse
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Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages :

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This study investigates whether the current lack of structure of internal control weakness disclosures (a narrative about the reliability of the financial reporting system) leads nonprofessional investors to make differential investment decisions. Using the non-accelerated filer (smaller public company) setting, where nonprofessional investors are likely to consume unaudited internal control reports in their investing judgments and decisions, I examine two facets of internal control disclosure formats: presentation salience and disaggregation of material weaknesses. A 2 x 2 between-participants behavioral experiment was conducted with internal control presentation salience (bulleted vs. in-text) and disaggregation level (a single material weakness vs. a combination of multiple control deficiencies that is a material weakness). I find that nonprofessional investors reward companies that disclose internal control weaknesses more saliently. The results also indicate that disaggregation interacts with salience in that it increases the effect of salience on investing judgments such that salient (stealth) disclosure of a combination of control deficiencies is viewed more positively (negatively) than salient (stealth) disclosure of a material weakness. These findings are contrary to Rennekamp (2012) who finds that processing fluency in bad news leads to more negative investment judgements. Additional analyses indicated that the results related to management trust and credibility are consistent with prior literature. The findings contribute to academia and practice by shedding light on the importance that needs to be placed on the presentation format of internal control disclosures.