Disclosure of Information Under Competition PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Disclosure of Information Under Competition PDF full book. Access full book title Disclosure of Information Under Competition by Jesal Sheth. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Jesal Sheth Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition between senders when receivers strongly prefer disclosed over nondisclosed information increases unravelling. We further examine whether receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information decreases with competition between senders. We find that complete unravelling fails to occur without competition. However, with competition, there is significantly higher unravelling such that it increases receivers' overall welfare. Interestingly, receivers' welfare increases despite no significant difference in their guesses or beliefs about non-disclosed information relative to the treatment without competition. We conclude that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare.
Author: Jesal Sheth Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition between senders when receivers strongly prefer disclosed over nondisclosed information increases unravelling. We further examine whether receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information decreases with competition between senders. We find that complete unravelling fails to occur without competition. However, with competition, there is significantly higher unravelling such that it increases receivers' overall welfare. Interestingly, receivers' welfare increases despite no significant difference in their guesses or beliefs about non-disclosed information relative to the treatment without competition. We conclude that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare.
Author: Stefan Penczynski Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This study investigates experimentally the disclosure of verifiable information in settings with and without seller competition. Sellers often choose to report a selected set of information and buyers account for this - even though not fully - by bidding skeptically. As expected, competition increases sellers' information disclosure but leads, surprisingly and replicably, to more buyer naivety, which offsets the welfare benefits from improved disclosure. We can rule out a number of plausible explanations and find that a framing effect generates this result: merely describing a situation as competitive rather than monopolistic changes buyers' approach to the situation fundamentally. Akin to the so-called Peltzman effect, buyers seemingly perceive competition as a safer environment to which they behaviorally adapt by abandoning their skepticism. In comparison, faced with the sellers' option to unobservedly purchase additional information, buyers react - as expected - by increasing their skepticism.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 5
Book Description
This document is a general statement of practice, articulating how the Bureau of Competition Policy treats the information it acquires in enforcing & administering the Competition Act. Topics covered include the private nature of Bureau investigations, confidentiality, relationships with law enforcement agencies, international mutual legal assistance, initiation of private actions, and disclosure under the Access to Information Act.
Author: Oliver J. Board Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
There are many laws which require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms may undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why only high quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.
Author: Qiang Yu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Software interoperability information is indispensable in establishing connections among the parts of a program and to applications and users. According to the concepts of copyright and expression dichotomy and to the prevailing consideration that the function of software interoperability information has a bottleneck effect in restricting competition, the conceptual portions of software interoperability information are not protected under copyright, and software interoperability interfaces are subject to reverse engineering. This scope of copyright protection and the actual restriction on competition due to the refusal to disclose software interoperability information have convinced authorities and courts to grant a duty to disclose. However, in examining the compulsory disclosure of interoperability information and the competition situation in the software market, this study perceived that although the compulsory disclosure of software interoperability information is alleged to have certain benefits, it harms the copyright holder and, as a competition remedy, helps secondary market players at the expense of primary market players. This remedy in effect protects competitors, not competition throughout the entire market. Further, this study observes that when enlarging the scope of the compulsory disclosure of software interoperability information acts to create competition, it exceeds the function of competition law as an ex post remedy.
Author: Pranvera Këllezi Publisher: Springer ISBN: 331946891X Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 637
Book Description
This publication provides an unparalleled comparative analysis of two "hot topics" in the field of antitrust and unfair competition law with regard to a number of key countries. The first part of the book examines the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position and globalization in relation to two broad questions: first, whether there is consistency between the approaches of different jurisdictions to the notion of abuse, and, second, whether there are too many restrictions on legal rights and business opportunities resulting from the prohibition of abuse of dominance. The international report drafted by Professor Pinar Akman reveals that there are as many similarities as differences between the approaches of the twenty-one jurisdictions studied and presented in this book. This is an invitation to read the excellent international report as well as the reports on specific jurisdictions in order to grasp the variety of arguments and approaches of this antitrust area, which may, on the surface, appear alike. The second part gathers contributions on the question of protection and disclosure of trade secrets and know-how from various jurisdictions. The need for adequate protection of trade secrets has increased due to digitalization and the ease with which large volumes of misappropriated information can be reproduced. The comprehensive international report, prepared by Henrik Bengtsson, brings together these reflections by comparing various national positions. The book also discusses the resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the International League of Competition Law (LIDC) following a debate on each of these topics, and includes proposed solutions and recommendations.
Author: Kung-Cheng Ho Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 57
Book Description
This study examines the relationship between information disclosures and firm value under different levels of product market competition. Using a unique information rating scheme that draws from 114 measures over five dimensions of information disclosure from 2005 to 2013, we find that firms with higher levels of information disclosure (better information transparency) are related to higher industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. We also find that the levels of information disclosure and product market competition interact in affecting firm value. This relationship is robust after controlling for a number of firm-specific factors and agency-based measures. Our paper brings two streams of research that aim to explain the variation in firms' value together, and suggests that information disclosure and product market competition complement each other in enhancing a firm's value.
Author: Jesal Sheth
Author: Jesal Sheth
Author: Stefan Penczynski
Author: 
Author: 
Author: Oliver J. Board
Author: Qiang Yu
Author: Pranvera Këllezi
Author: Great Britain. Competition Commission
Author: Lucy F. Ackert
Author: Kung-Cheng Ho