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Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law PDF Author: Keith N. Hylton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21

Book Description
This is a paper about “big data” and antitrust law. For my purposes, big data refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of data on those consumers by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to economies of scale. I discuss three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. Amex, should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law PDF Author: Keith N. Hylton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21

Book Description
This is a paper about “big data” and antitrust law. For my purposes, big data refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of data on those consumers by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct but to economies of scale. I discuss three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v. Amex, should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.

The Case for the Digital Platform Act

The Case for the Digital Platform Act PDF Author: Harold Feld
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781075250798
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216

Book Description
"The Case for the Digital Platform Act" is a new book from Harold Feld, Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge and longtime communications industry advocate, in collaboration with Public Knowledge and the Roosevelt Institute. This book aims to guide policymakers on what government can do to preserve competition and empower individual users in the huge swath of our economy now referred to as "Big Tech." Many Americans now wonder how they can reassert control over their lives after ceding so many decisions about our economy and our public discourse to private actors like Facebook, Google, and Amazon. But as Feld points out, we have faced similar challenges from new technologies before. Looking at more than a century of disruptive communications technologies from the telegraph to television to Twitter, Feld picks out patterns of what approaches have worked (and what hasn't) to promote competition, empower consumers and protect democracy. "The Case for the Digital Platform Act" provides a deep dive for policymakers on everything from specific recommendations on how to promote competition to a "First Amendment checklist" for content moderation, while remaining accessible to the general reader looking to participate in the debate over our digital future. Feld explains the need for a "Digital Platform Act" and for an agency specifically charged to regulate digital platforms on an ongoing basis. He proposes a new method of assessing a platform's dominance for purposes of new regulation. He also addresses questions around content moderation rights and responsibilities for companies that have found themselves policing the new public square, all while preserving the best things about digital platforms for their users. Praise for "The Case for the Digital Platform Act": "[...] a tour de force of the issues raised by the digital economy and internet capitalism. Whether you agree or disagree with Harold, these thoughts will stretch your intellect and stimulate your thinking." -Tom Wheeler, Former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Visiting Fellow at The Brooking Institution "You'd be shortchanging yourself by not reading the book of such a principled advocate." -Hal Singer, Managing Director at Econ One Research, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business, Senior Fellow at George Washington's Institute of Public Policy "I'd bet you can't listen to Harold Feld talk about the Digital Platform Act and not think we need it as law right now. I'm glad Harold Feld and Public Knowledge are making the case for government to do the job Silicon Valley won't." -Chris Savage, Eclectablog

The Evolution of Antitrust in the Digital Era

The Evolution of Antitrust in the Digital Era PDF Author: Allan Fels
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781950769612
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 304

Book Description
This collection of essays represents the first in a series of two volumes that set out to reflect the state of the art of antitrust thinking in digital markets in jurisdictions around the world. The issues it tackles are many: the role of innovation, the conundrum of big data, the evolution of media markets, and the question of whether existing antitrust tools are sufficient to deal with the challenges of digital markets. Each author tackles the overarching themes from their unique national perspective. The resulting tapestry reflects the challenges and opportunities presented by the modern digital era, viewed through the lens of competition enforcement.

Market Investigations

Market Investigations PDF Author: Massimo Motta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009081462
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 411

Book Description
In many economic sectors – the digital industries being first and foremost – the market power of dominant firms has been steadily increasing and is rarely challenged by competitors. Existing competition laws and regulations have been unable to make markets more contestable. The book argues that a new competition tool is needed: market investigations. This tool allows authorities to intervene in markets which do not function as they should, due to market features such as network effects, scale economies, switching costs, and behavioural biases. The book explains the role of market investigations, assesses their use in the few jurisdictions where they exist, and discusses how they should be designed. In so doing, it provides an invaluable and timely instrument to both practitioners and academics.

Competition Law and Big Data

Competition Law and Big Data PDF Author: Beata Mäihäniemi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1788974263
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 336

Book Description
In this timely book, Beata Mäihäniemi analyses and evaluates how the characteristics of information as a good, as well as the characteristics of digital platforms, affect the application of competition law in both theory and practice.

Digital markets and online platforms: new perspectives on regulation and competition law

Digital markets and online platforms: new perspectives on regulation and competition law PDF Author: Jan Krämer
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 104

Book Description
Across the world, regulators and policy makers are grappling with how to establish a competitive, safe and fair online environment that also safeguards users’ fundamental rights as citizens. Ahead of the European Commission’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), this book “Digital markets and online platforms: new perspectives on regulation and competition law“, presents CERRE’s latest contribution to the debate with concrete policy recommendations. Together, the policy recommendations in this book present a roadmap that should be pursued for EU policy makers to safeguard competition and innovation in digital platform markets. They can be organised into three key areas for action: (i) More effective enforcement, (ii) increased transparency and switching easiness, and (iii) providing access to key innovation capabilities. “The need to safeguard fair and vibrant competition, which is also seen as an important driving factor for innovation, is nothing new for policy makers. However, the characteristics and complexities of digital markets have challenged some of the traditional approaches.” – Jan Krämer, editor of the book and CERRE Academic Co-Director The book’s recommendations highlight that platform transparency and associated data collection by authorities, as well as data sharing by platforms (initiated through consumers or authorities), are the two most important overarching policy measures for platform markets in the near future. They facilitate enforcement, consumer choice, and innovation capabilities in the digital economy. The contents of this book were presented and debated during a CERRE live debate with guest speakers Anne Yvrande-Billon (Arcep’s Director of Economic, Market and Digital Affairs), MEP Stéphanie Yon-Courtin (Vice-President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs) and Javier Espinoza (Financial Times’ EU Correspondent covering competition and digital policy).

Digital Platforms, Competition Law, and Regulation

Digital Platforms, Competition Law, and Regulation PDF Author: Kalpana Tyagi
Publisher: Hart Publishing
ISBN: 1509969373
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
This open access book offers a comparative and inter-disciplinary perspective on the unique competition law challenges presented by the converged digital markets. Following the digitalisation of even the most traditional bricks-and-mortar sectors of the economy, a well-functioning internal market can only be guaranteed by ensuring the competitiveness of the digital markets. What role do intellectual property law and competition law play in this digital world? How can a more economic analysis strengthen innovation policies to achieve a truly competitive digital single market? The book provides a rigorous discussion of the many reasons why the regulatory responses, not just in Europe but in other jurisdictions too, may fall short. It addresses an array of procedural, substantive and other issues that are generating intense debate across the antitrust community. This includes the scope and objectives of digital regulation, whether the application of ex-ante rules would result in fragmentation and inconsistencies, and whether such regulatory regimes are an appropriate tool for substantive assessment. The book explores whether the application of these rules would effectively tackle the competition enforcement challenges seen under the competition laws, whether they can be applied without undermining other rights such as privacy, and whether they are appropriate for this digital age as well as the new digital era ahead of us. Part 1 offers a detailed inter-disciplinary perspective on the most recent legislative solutions in the European Union, namely, the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the Data Act. Part 2 offers competition and regulatory responses to these ever-emerging digital challenges by the UK, Latin American, Indian and Chinese regulators. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

Antitrust for Dominant Digital Platforms

Antitrust for Dominant Digital Platforms PDF Author: Jordan Ramsey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit technological innovation and the economy, American technological leadership, and the free flow of information.

Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets

Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets PDF Author: Francesco Ducci
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108491146
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 203

Book Description
Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.

Market definition and market power in the platform economy

Market definition and market power in the platform economy PDF Author: Jens-Uwe Franck
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 96

Book Description
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.