Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Northwest Africa, World War II PDF Download

Author: Major Mark T. Calhoun
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250306
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 130

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Book Description
The 1st Armored Division was the first American armored unit to enter combat against German panzer divisions in World War II. A product of the contentious mechanization process between the First and Second World Wars, the division soon found itself to be outmatched by its German foe. Following a relatively easy victory against the Vichy French after the amphibious landings of Operation Torch, the division lost a series of battles to the Germans, culminating in a decisive defeat at Kasserine Pass. Doctrine (both institutional and equipment), training, and battle command all proved to be problematic for the division. The central question is: Did the 1st Armored Division lose the battle of Kasserine Pass because of deficiencies in American armor doctrine, training, or battle command? An analysis of the Tunisian campaign focusing on these three areas demonstrates that faulty training and inept battle command were partially responsible for the division’s defeat; however, the primary reason the 1st Armored Division lost the battle of Kasserine Pass was that it operated in accordance with flawed institutional doctrine and utilized inferior equipment.

Author: Jeffrey Frank Jones
Publisher: Jeffrey Frank Jones
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 251

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OVERVIEW: During World War II, the primary US Army tank was the M4 Sherman. Weighing approximately 35 tons, it mounted a 75mm general-purpose gun firing high explosive armor-piercing and white phosphorus rounds. The tank had a reputation for mechanical reliability, which was its best attribute. The Sherman was designed as an infantry support tank. To deal with enemy armor, the Americans later developed the M10 tank destroyer, which was based on the M4 chassis but mounted a 75mm high-velocity gun. This gun could penetrate most German armor and was adept at dealing with thick walls and fortifications. Its armor was even thinner than the Sherman’s armor though, so it could dish out far more than it could take. Both of these armored vehicles were nine feet wide and able to maneuver in most of the narrow streets of Europe. When American armor was employed, it was evident to the crews that they were heavily outgunned by the German panzers, which also had superior armor protection. Both the M4 Sherman and M10 tank destroyer were extremely vulnerable to German tank fire and to the wide assortment of enemy antitank weapons, including the Panzerfaust, which was a hand-held single-shot recoilless weapon firing a shaped charge. Although the Panzerfaust had a very short range of 30 meters, it could devastate American armor. The Germans produced huge numbers of these cheap and effective weapons, and American tank crews learned quickly to avoid both the German panzers and infantrymen armed with the dreaded Panzerfausts. The Americans generally overcame the deficiencies of their armor by fielding a large number of tanks and by using massed artillery and aerial firepower. After the breakout from the Normandy hedgerows from August to September, the Allied armies raced across France after the retreating Germans.

Author: The United States Military Academy
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1476782784
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 392

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Book Description
The definitive, must-have military history of World War II—spanning 1942 until the end of the war—packed with the same expert analysis, exclusive tactical maps, unique graphics, and historical images used by The United States Military Academy at West Point to teach the art of war to its own cadets. Since its founding, West Point has taught its cadets the history of warfare, and since 1847 it has done so through a singular text, The West Point History of Warfare. That text has been updated repeatedly, and now through a unique partnership with West Point graduates, The West Point History of Warfare has been completely rewritten. Volume 1 concluded with the midpoint of World War II in 1942, which is where this latest edition begins, covering all aspects of the war in chapters such as “Strategic Seapower and Airpower” by Richard J. Overy, “The Defeat of Japan” by Robert W. Love, Jr., “The Allies Turn the Tide” by Robert M. Citino, and “Occupation, Demobilization, and Assessing Victory” by Steve R. Waddell. As with previous volumes, The West Point History of World War II, Volume 2 boasts rich, full-color illustrations with unique tactical maps created by expert cartographers in collaboration with West Point’s military historians, as well as dozens of graphics uniquely created for this volume and hundreds of historical images, many of which are from the West Point archives. Authoritative, compelling, a goldmine for history lovers, this essential resource belongs in the library of every serious student of World War II.

Author: Peter J. Schifferle
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700625275
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 310

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Book Description
When the United States entered World War II, it took more than industrial might to transform its tiny army—smaller than even Portugal's—into an overseas fighting force of more than eight and a half million. Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. Crucial to that preparation were the army schools at Fort Leavenworth. Interwar Army officers, haunted by the bloodshed of World War I's Meuse-Argonne Offensive, fully expected to return to Europe to conclude the "unfinished business" of that conflict, and they prepared well. Schifferle examines for the first time precisely how they accomplished this through a close and illuminating look at the students, faculty, curriculum, and essential methods of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. He describes how the interwar officer corps there translated the experiences of World War I into effective doctrine, engaged in intellectual debate on professional issues, conducted experiments to determine the viability of new concepts, and used military professional education courses to substitute for the experience of commanding properly organized and resourced units. Schifferle highlights essential elements of war preparation that only the Fort Leavenworth education could provide, including intensive instruction in general staff procedures, hands-on experience with the principles and techniques of combined arms, and the handling of large division-sized formations in combat. This readied army officers for an emerging new era of global warfare and enabled them to develop the leadership decision making they would need to be successful on the battlefield. But Schifferle offers more than a recitation of curriculum development through the skillful interweaving of personal stories about both school experiences and combat operations, collectively recounting the human and professional development of the officer corps from 1918 to 1945. Well crafted and insightful, Schifferle's meticulously researched study shows how and why the Fort Leavenworth experience was instrumental in producing that impressive contingent of military officers who led the U.S. Army to final victory in World War II. By the end of the book, the attentive reader will also fully comprehend why the military professionals at Fort Leavenworth have come to think of it as the "Intellectual Center of the Army."

Author: David Campbell
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1472828178
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 81

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Book Description
Operation Torch, launched on 8 November 1942, landed Anglo-American forces in Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria to create a second front against the Axis forces in North Africa, catching Rommel's German and Italian forces in the claws of a giant pincer. The US Army was powerfully well armoured and equipped, but fresh to war, and it showed. Organization suffered from a surfeit of peacetime theories and training was insufficient and ill-applied. Despite such failings the US GIs and their commanders learned very quickly, adapting to German tactics and the realities of mechanized warfare. The Axis forces in North Africa were seasoned by years of fighting against increasingly powerful British and Commonwealth forces, and were led by one of the Reich's most capable generals. The German doctrine of mechanized warfare had proved itself time and again, but ever-growing logistical and supply problems were blunting its effectiveness. From Sidi Bou Zid to El Guettar, this fully illustrated study pits the US Army against the best that the Axis forces in Africa had to offer.

Author: Steven Thomas Barry
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700618996
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 272

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Book Description
Most histories of the U.S. Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops, ineffective leadership at higher levels, and deficiencies in equipment, organization, and mobilization. Barry portrays these officers as highly trained, adaptable, and courageous in their first combat experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Their leadership, he argues, brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality, and thus contributed significantly to battlefield success in North Africa and Sicily in 1942-1943. To explain how this happened, he examines their prewar experiences, including professional military education and unit training exercises; personal factors such as calmness and physical resilience under fire; and the ability to draw upon doctrine, creatively apply the resources at their disposal, and clearly define and communicate mission goals and means. He also reveals how battalion leaders incorporated technological innovations into combined arms maneuvers by employing tank capabilities and close air support doctrine. As Barry's assessment shows, these battalion commanders were not the sole reason for the Allied triumph in North Africa and Sicily, but victory would not have been possible without the special brand of military leadership they exhibited throughout those campaigns. Under their leadership, even inexperienced units were able to deliver credible combat performance, and without the regular army battalion leaders, U.S. units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. One of the few studies to focus on tactical adaptation at the battalion level in conventional warfare, Barry's book attests to the pivotal value of professional military education-and makes an important contribution to today's "organizational learning" debate-while providing an in-depth view of adaptation of U.S. infantry and armored forces in 1942-1943.

Author: Eric V. McDonald
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1493934295
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 373

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Book Description
This book is a collection of papers presented at the 9th International Conference of Military Geoscience that was held in 2011. The conference included discussion on a diverse range of geosciences, including military history, military geology, teaching geology from a military prospective, geological influence on the battlefield, and environmental and cultural issues related to management of military lands. Geology and geography have played a significant role in military history, from providing the stone for primitive tools and weapons, to the utilization of terrain in offensive and defensive strategies. Specific to this volume, deserts comprise nearly a third of the Earth’s surface and have been the site of numerous battles where the dust, heat, and a lack of food and water have provided challenges to military leaders and warriors. This book examines the role of deserts in past and modern warfare, the problems and challenges in managing military lands in desert regions, and how desert environmental conditions can impact military equipment and personnel. This proceedings volume should be of interest to scholars, professionals, and those interested in military history, warfare, geology, geography, cultural resources, general science, and military operations.

Author: Christopher M. Rein
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700618783
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 302

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In the summer of 1942, Axis forces controlled almost the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean. Less than a year later, they had been swept from the African continent-thanks in no small part to efforts of the fledgling U.S. Army Air Force. Indeed, USAAF in North Africa emerged as a senior partner in the Alliance, supplying aircraft and crews at a rate the other partners were unable to match. Going beyond the spare analysis of North African air operations in previous accounts, Christopher Rein shows how American fighter planes and heavy bombers, employed in almost exclusively tactical and operational roles, played a pivotal role in the Alliance's successful ground campaigns. This aerial armada also had a significant negative impact on enemy logistics through its bombing raids on Axis ports, shipping, and airfields. In the process, USAAF helped foster and develop a pattern of inter-service cooperation that remains at the foundation of American close-air-support doctrine today. Rein chronicles the emergence of USAAF in the late interwar and early WWII periods as a more heterogeneous and creative fighting force than earlier works have led us to believe. He then analyzes little-known aspects of the war, including early air operations in the eastern Mediterranean and in the TORCH landings. He explores some of the key issues confronting Eisenhower, such as how to establish USAAF priorities and how to deploy long-range bombers, fighters, and attack forces. In describing the struggle for balance in the employment of air assets between strategic bombing and interdiction in a time fraught with inter-service rivalry, he shows how, despite occasional mistakes such as the heavy losses involved in the Ploesti raids, USAAF struck a suitable balance and even invested more assets in interdiction than traditional accounts of strategic bombardment would suggest. A virtual operational-level history of the USAAF during the formative period of American airpower, Rein's account pulls together material from diverse sources to demonstrate that today's Air Force emphasis on mobility, intelligence, reconnaissance, and close support for ground forces have deep roots. By showing that the Army Air Force in World War II did not neglect support for ground and naval forces in order to concentrate exclusively on strategic bombing, it suggests lessons for military and civilian leaders in the employment of air forces in current and future conflicts.

Author: David Campbell
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1472841166
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 81

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Book Description
Few weapons developed a more deadly reputation than the German '88' in the role of anti-tank gun, its long reach and lethal hitting power making it a significant problem for every type of British and later American armour. Despite its individual potency, it was almost always utilized as part of a comprehensive system of defences that relied on a mix of weapons carefully deployed in anticipation of the enemy's likely avenue and method of attack. Used in this way, the 88 became a particularly deadly part of the Afrika Korps' attempts to shatter British armoured power in the Western Desert. Initially extremely successful over the course of 1941 and 1942 in Operations Battleaxe and Crusader, the Allies' tactics and vehicles (such as the American-made M3 and the Crusader III) eventually evolved to deal with the 88's awesome power. This detailed new book tells the story of that evolution and provides an in-depth treatment of this key weapon of World War II.

Author: Edward G. Miller
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612514359
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 370

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Book Description
At the onset of World War II, the U.S. Army was a third-rate ground force of 145,000 with some generals who still believed in the relevance of horse cavalry. Its soldiers were untrained, its doctrine out of date, and its weapons hopelessly obsolete. Four years later, the U.S. Army was engaged in a global war with a force of more than 8 million men armed with modern weapons and equipment. Nothing Less than Full Victory is the story of how American ground troops in Europe managed to defeat one of the most proficient armies in history. The author, a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, draws on his twenty years of experience in military logistics and eight years of scholarly research to examine the Army s remarkable transformation. Focusing on areas rarely considered in other books on World War II, Edward G. Miller analyzes the performance of American soldiers in the 1944 45 campaign in western Europe against a background of logistics, organization, training, and deployment. In doing so, this groundbreaking work refutes decades of assumptions to reset the historical framework for comparison of U.S. and German performance over the course of the campaign. Lieutenant Colonel Miller s skillful melding of little-known individual and small-unit combat action with the various facets of generating, deploying, and projecting power allows the reader to understand as never before the true significance of what took place. This book is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.