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Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642041531 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 141
Book Description
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642041531 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 141
Book Description
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
Author: Henry W. Chappell, Jr. Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262262200 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 340
Book Description
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions. In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices. To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Author: Hao Li Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision-making. A committee consists of self-interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre-specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision-making process such as over-cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems. (Cet article passé en revue certains développements récents dans la théorie de la prise de décision en comité. Un comité est défini comme un groupe de membres qui ont des intérêts particuliers et qui prennent une décision publique en agrégeant une information imparfaite et dispersée à travers le groupe selon une règle de decision pré-établie. Les auteurs portent leur attention sur lacquisition coûteuse dinformation, lagrégation de linformation stratégique, et les règles et procédures qui accroîssent la qualité de la decision en comité. Ce qui apparaît comme des inefficacités du processus de prise de décision en comité (sur-précaution, votes, délais) savère être des remèdes partiels aux problèmes dincitation.).
Author: Frank M. Häge Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 0415689678 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 242
Book Description
The Council of Ministers is one of the most powerful institutions of the European Union (EU) and plays a major role in the European policy-making process. Drawing on formal theory and combining quantitative and qualitative methods in an innovative fashion, this book provides novel insights into the role of national bureaucrats in legislative decision-making of the Council of the EU. The book examines and describes the Council of Ministers' committee system and its internal decision-making process. Relying on a wide quantitative dataset as well as six detailed case studies in the policy areas of Agriculture, Environment, and Taxation, it provides a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the extent to which national bureaucrats act as law-makers in the Council. It also examines the degree to which theories on collective decision-making, delegation, and international socialization can account for variation in the involvement of bureaucrats. Investigating how often and why national officials in working parties and committees, rather than ministers, make legislative decisions in the EU, this book addresses the implications of bureaucratic influence for the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making. The author finds that ministers play a generally more important role in legislative decision-making than often assumed, alleviating, to some extent, concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decisions. Bureaucrats as Law-Makers will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners in the field of European Union politics and policy-making, legislative decision-making, intergovernmental negotiations and international socialization.
Author: John E. Tropman Publisher: SAGE ISBN: 9780761900214 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 164
Book Description
This book shows that the value of group decision making lies in its ability to bring together people with a variety of different expertise and experiences. These techniques are applied to problems such as health care, homlessness and family violence.
Author: Oliver Lindegger Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis analyzes committee decision making with imperfect information in order to give advice on how communication and voting in committees is best organized. Committee decision making, which is an application of information aggregation theories, is an integral part of the research on institutional design and collective choice. A Bayesian framework introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks is used to study the relationship between voting behavior, voting rules, communication protocols and final group outcome. The thesis theoretically compares voting rules and communication protocols on the two relevant levels: individual behavior and collective group choice. Furthermore, an experiment that serves to compare the performance of communication protocols is described. Studied are communication protocols that are in between the two polar specifications, simultaneous (one-shot) communication and unrestricted (free-form) communication. The thesis argues that voting rules and communication organization are important instruments in institutional design. An effective communication protocol improves the information aggregation process and thus makes collectively desirable outcomes more likely.
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser
Author: Henry W. Chappell, Jr.
Author: Hao Li
Author: Susan Martin
Author: Richard Lee Hall
Author: Frank M. Häge
Author: John E. Tropman
Author: Daniel Scott Ward
Author: 
Author: Oliver Lindegger