Author: Annick Laruelle Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139474294 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 184
Book Description
Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
Author: Oliver Lindegger Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis analyzes committee decision making with imperfect information in order to give advice on how communication and voting in committees is best organized. Committee decision making, which is an application of information aggregation theories, is an integral part of the research on institutional design and collective choice. A Bayesian framework introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks is used to study the relationship between voting behavior, voting rules, communication protocols and final group outcome. The thesis theoretically compares voting rules and communication protocols on the two relevant levels: individual behavior and collective group choice. Furthermore, an experiment that serves to compare the performance of communication protocols is described. Studied are communication protocols that are in between the two polar specifications, simultaneous (one-shot) communication and unrestricted (free-form) communication. The thesis argues that voting rules and communication organization are important instruments in institutional design. An effective communication protocol improves the information aggregation process and thus makes collectively desirable outcomes more likely.
Author: Louise I. Gerdes Publisher: Greenhaven Publishing LLC ISBN: 0737768649 Category : Young Adult Nonfiction Languages : en Pages : 113
Book Description
The passage of Citizens United by the Supreme Court in 2010 sparked a renewed debate about campaign spending by large political action committees, or Super PACs. Its ruling said that it is okay for corporations and labor unions to spend as much as they want in advertising and other methods to convince people to vote for or against a candidate. This book provides a wide range of opinions on the issue. Includes primary and secondary sources from a variety of perspectives; eyewitnesses, scientific journals, government officials, and many others.
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642041531 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 141
Book Description
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
Author: Henry M. Robert III Publisher: PublicAffairs ISBN: 9781541797710 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 848
Book Description
The only current authorized edition of the classic work on parliamentary procedure--now in a new updated edition Robert's Rules of Order is the recognized guide to smooth, orderly, and fairly conducted meetings. This 12th edition is the only current manual to have been maintained and updated since 1876 under the continuing program established by General Henry M. Robert himself. As indispensable now as the original edition was more than a century ago, Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised is the acknowledged "gold standard" for meeting rules. New and enhanced features of this edition include: Section-based paragraph numbering to facilitate cross-references and e-book compatibility Expanded appendix of charts, tables, and lists Helpful summary explanations about postponing a motion, reconsidering a vote, making and enforcing points of order and appeals, and newly expanded procedures for filling blanks New provisions regarding debate on nominations, reopening nominations, and completing an election after its scheduled time Dozens more clarifications, additions, and refinements to improve the presentation of existing rules, incorporate new interpretations, and address common inquiries Coinciding with publication of the 12th edition, the authors of this manual have once again published an updated (3rd) edition of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised In Brief, a simple and concise introductory guide cross-referenced to it.
Author: Hao Li Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision-making. A committee consists of self-interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre-specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision-making process such as over-cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems. (Cet article passé en revue certains développements récents dans la théorie de la prise de décision en comité. Un comité est défini comme un groupe de membres qui ont des intérêts particuliers et qui prennent une décision publique en agrégeant une information imparfaite et dispersée à travers le groupe selon une règle de decision pré-établie. Les auteurs portent leur attention sur lacquisition coûteuse dinformation, lagrégation de linformation stratégique, et les règles et procédures qui accroîssent la qualité de la decision en comité. Ce qui apparaît comme des inefficacités du processus de prise de décision en comité (sur-précaution, votes, délais) savère être des remèdes partiels aux problèmes dincitation.).
Author: David Austen-Smith Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 354027295X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 332
Book Description
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.
Author: Andrea Mattozzi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Committees Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alternatives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or abstain. The interaction between career concern and bias affects the voting behavior of members depending on transparency of individual votes. We show that transparency attenuates the pre-existing biases of competent members and exacerbates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We provide experimental evidence supporting our theoretical conclusions.
Author: Annick Laruelle
Author: Oliver Lindegger
Author: Louise I. Gerdes
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser
Author: John W. Kingdon
Author: Henry M. Robert III
Author: Hao Li
Author: John V. Sullivan
Author: David Austen-Smith
Author: Andrea Mattozzi