Author: Matthew ElliottPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Decentralized Bargaining in Matching Markets
Author: Matthew ElliottOn decentralized two-sided matching markets
Author: Maria Joana Dantas Vaz PaisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
Paying to Match
Author: Marina AgranovPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.
Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries
Author: Decentralized Matching Markets
Author: Joana PaisThe Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Author: H. Peyton YoungRandom Matching and Trade Relationships in Decentralized Markets
Author: Dorothea K. HerreinerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Markets
Languages : en
Pages : 198
Book Description
Dynamics of Decentralized Matching Markets
Author: Florian BiermannIncentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets
Author: A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets Without Transfers, with an Application to Surge Pricing
Author: Alfred GalichonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numéraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?