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Crisis Bargaining and the State

Crisis Bargaining and the State PDF Author: Susan Peterson
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472106288
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 220

Book Description
Examines the effect of domestic politics on the interstate bargaining in international crises

Crisis Bargaining and the State

Crisis Bargaining and the State PDF Author: Susan Peterson
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472106288
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 220

Book Description
Examines the effect of domestic politics on the interstate bargaining in international crises

The Power of Legitimacy

The Power of Legitimacy PDF Author: Christopher Gelpi
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691146713
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 223

Book Description
A major departure from mainstream security studies, this book mounts a thoughtful challenge to realist theories of crisis bargaining. It tests the proposition that normative standards of behavior influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, it examines the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent interactions over the same issue. Drawing on institutionalist arguments about the informational impact of norms, Christopher Gelpi contends that norms act as signals that give meaning to other states' behavior in at least two important ways. First, they provide a mutually acceptable focal point for limiting both demands and concessions. Second, security norms change the context in which coercive behavior is interpreted. That is, norms can cause coercive behavior to be interpreted as punishment rather than aggression. Gelpi tests this argument against its most prominent competitor--a realist model of crisis bargaining--in three stages. First, he uses a probit analysis to perform a quantitative test on the population of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. Second, he conducts detailed case studies of the Cienfuegos Submarine Conflict and the Six Day War. Finally, he conducts a second statistical analysis examining the conditions under which security norms will succeed or fail. While hypotheses derived from realist coercion theory receive only mixed support, Gelpi finds strong evidence that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises.

Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises

Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises PDF Author: Russell J. Leng
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472067039
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 356

Book Description
Study of the most prominent interstate rivalries in the second half of the century, and of the lessons that the leaders of the rival states drew from their recurring crises

Crisis bargaining

Crisis bargaining PDF Author: Brigitte S. Kelm
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


Crisis Bargaining

Crisis Bargaining PDF Author: Glenn Herald Snyder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Crisis management
Languages : en
Pages : 86

Book Description


Crisis Bargaining and War Initiation Before a Domestic Audience

Crisis Bargaining and War Initiation Before a Domestic Audience PDF Author: Ron Moti Gurantz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 192

Book Description
Studies of crisis bargaining have traditionally focused on the strategies for signaling resolve to other states, even when incorporating a domestic audience into the analysis. In this dissertation, I examine crisis bargaining strategies meant primarily to send signals to the domestic audience. Using game theoretic models, historical case studies and a survey experiment, I show that governments can successfully bait adversaries into minor incidents and deceive the public into authorizing war even though minor incidents can also be highly informative about an adversary's intentions under certain conditions. I also show that public opinion can lead governments to forgo preemptive strikes and preventive war, and that democracy can therefore reduce public welfare in some circumstances. I discuss the implications of these findings for the conventional wisdom on crisis behavior and on the value of democracy in foreign policy.

Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980

Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980 PDF Author: Russell J. Leng
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521391415
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 278

Book Description
The epilogue presents a provocative critique of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

Crime and Punishment

Crime and Punishment PDF Author: Christopher Gelpi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitration (International law)
Languages : en
Pages : 58

Book Description


Power and Legitimacy

Power and Legitimacy PDF Author: Christopher Francis Gelpi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 684

Book Description


Political Game Theory

Political Game Theory PDF Author: Nolan McCarty
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107438637
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.