Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation PDF Download

Author: Franklin Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62

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Book Description
It is commonly believed that equity finance for banks is more costly than deposits. This suggests that banks should economize on the use of equity and regulatory constraints on capital should be binding. Empirical evidence suggests that in fact this is not the case. Banks in many countries hold capital well in excess of regulatory minimums and do not change their holdings in response to regulatory changes. We present a simple model of bank moral hazard that is consistent with this observation. In perfectly competitive markets, banks can find it optimal to use costly capital rather than the interest rate on the loan to guarantee monitoring because it allows higher borrower surplus.

Author: Franklin Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Credit control
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Author: Ms.Deniz O Igan
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484352173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 45

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Book Description
We examine the extent to which regulations of entry and credit access are related to competition using data on 28 manufacturing sectors across 64 countries. A robust finding is that bureaucratic and costly entry regulations tend to hamper competition, as proxied by the price-cost margin, in the industries with a naturally high entry rate. Rigid entry regulations are also associated with a larger average firm size. Conversely, credit information registries are associated with lower price-cost margin and smaller average firm size in industries that rely heavily on external finance—consistent with access to finance exerting a positive effect on competition. These results suggest that incumbent firms are likely to enjoy the rent and market share arising from strict entry regulations, whereas regulations enhancing access to credit limit such benefits.

Author: Douglas Darrell Evanoff
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814280488
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 404

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Book Description
I. Special addresses. Central banks and the financial turmoil / José Manuel González-Páramo. The implications of the credit crisis for public policy / Charles H. Dallara. Where are our leaders? / Kenneth W. Dam. Trust and financial markets / Paola Sapienza -- What happened, where? A view of the U.S. subprime crisis . Robert DiClemente and Kermit Schoenholtz. What has happened in Europe? Monetary policy, lending cycles, banking competition, risk-taking,and regulation / Jesús Saurina. The subprime crisis effects in the rest of the world / Laura E. Kodres -- III. How serious is the damage? Bank failures : the limitations of risk modeling / Patrick Honohan. Comments : how serious is the damage? / Christopher Kent -- IV. Why did it go undetected/underestimated for so long? Cliff risk and the credit crisis / Joseph R. Mason. The credit crunch of 2007 : what went wrong? why? What lessons can be learned? / John C. Hull. Overdependence on credit ratings was a primary cause of the crisis / Frank Partnoy -- V. Experience with crisis management. Liquidity management under market turmoil : experience of the European Central Bank in the first year of the 2007-2008 financial market crisis / Nuno Cassola, Cornelia Holthausen and Flemming Würtz. Crisis management and financial stability : some lessons from the United Kingdom / Nigel Jenkinson -- VI. Implications for Basel II and bank capital regulation. Risk management failures during the financial crisis / Michel Crouchy. A supervisor's view of the current financial turmoil / Cathy Lemieux and Steven VanBever. The subprime crisis : lessons about market discipline / Mark J. Flannery. Comments : implications for bank capital standards/regulation / Robert E. Litan -- VII. Implications for regulation of financial markets and instruments. Implications of the crisis for regulation / Mark Carey. The seven deadly frictions of subprime mortgage credit securitization / Adam B. Ashcraft and Til Schuermann -- VIII. Policy panel : where to from here? Where to from here? : lessons for research, policy and the industry / Philipp Hartmann. Tarp version 1 : a turning point in crisis management / Richard J. Herring. Financial crises : seeing patterns, limiting risks / Henry Kaufman.Addressing the credit market turmoil of 2007-08 / Sam Peltzman. Where to from here? / Lawrence R. Uhlick.

Author: Mr.Lev Ratnovski
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484366174
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 20

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Book Description
Traditional bank competition policy seeks to balance efficiency with incentives to take risk. The main tools are rules guiding entry/exit and consolidation of banks. This paper seeks to refine this view in light of recent changes to financial services provision. Modern banking is largely market-based and contestable. Consequently, banks in advanced economies today have structurally low charter values and high incentives to take risk. In such an environment, traditional policies that seek to affect the degree of competition by focusing on market structure (i.e. concentration) may have limited effect. We argue that bank competition policy should be reoriented to deal with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem. It should also focus on the permissible scope of activities rather than on market structure of banks. And following a crisis, competition policy should facilitate resolution by temporarily allowing higher concentration and government control of banks.

Author: Nicola Cetorelli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
"Empirical studies show that competition in the credit markets has important effects on the entry and growth of firms in nonfinancial industries. This paper explores the hypothesis that the availability of credit at the time of a firm's founding has a profound effect on that firm's nature. I conjecture that in times when financial capital is difficult to obtain, firms will need to be built as relatively solid organizations. However, in an environment of easily available financial capital, firms can be constituted with an intrinsically weaker structure. To test this conjecture, I use confidential data from the U.S. Census Bureau on the entire universe of business establishments in existence over a thirty-year period; I follow the life cycles of those same establishments through a period of regulatory reform during which U.S. states were allowed to remove barriers to entry in the banking industry, a development that resulted in significantly improved credit competition. The evidence confirms my conjecture. Firms constituted in post-reform years are intrinsically frailer than those founded in a more financially constrained environment, while firms of pre-reform vintage do not seem to adapt their nature to an easier credit environment"--Abstract page.

Author: Stijn Claessens
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Bank
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Book Description
Financial intermediation and financial services industries have undergone many changes in the past two decades due to deregulation, globalization, and technological advances. The framework for regulating finance has seen many changes as well, with approaches adapting to new issues arising in specific groups of countries or globally. The objectives of this paper are twofold: to review current international thinking on what regulatory framework is needed to develop a financial sector that is stable, yet efficient, and provides proper access to households and firms; and to review the key experiences regarding international financial architecture initiatives, with a special focus on issues arising for developing countries. The paper outlines a number of areas of current debate: the special role of banks, competition policy, consumer protection, harmonization of rules-across products, within markets, and globally-and the adaptation and legitimacy of international standards to the circumstances facing developing countries. It concludes with some areas where more research would be useful.

Author: Fabian Dittrich
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 9781847999504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180

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Book Description
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of credit rating economics and draws conclusions on the nature of regulation. It starts with an overview of the credit rating industry and introduces a framework that structures multiple rating agency functions. At the heart of the credit rating business model lies the reputation mechanism, which is analyzed in detail. After analyzing the reputation mechanism, the study takes a wider look at the industry and identifies the forces behind credit rating supply and demand. From an industrial organization perspective competition in the credit rating industry is limited. A comprehensive review of potential reasons for regulating the credit rating industry, however, reveals that there are only few compelling arguments. The regulatory approaches of the EU under the Capital Requirements Directive of 2005 and the USA under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 are contrasted against an optimal regulatory regime.

Author: Catherine England
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 146846714X
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 196

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Book Description
Risk-based capital standards presume a need for common capital standards across countries. The details of forging an agreement were left to the staffs of the primary bank regulators in each country, and compromises were inevitable. Although domestic constituencies' reactions to the proposals were invited, the arduous negotiations that led to the proposals generated intense pressure on the principals not to make changes. The European Community's approach to financial integration seems to be driven by a political desire to achieve an integrated market within Europe, despite significant institutional differences among countries. Underlying that desire is a belief that the market pressures that result from different regulatory systems operating in the same market will produce the right answer. The financial provisions of the U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement take a direction that, in my judgment, is more productive. The provisions are more limited in scope than are those of the European initiative. National treatment and national sovereignty are preserved. However, the delicate issue of national responsibility for failing institutions, and its relationship to monetary policies, is not addressed. A Better Alternative A productive basis for international regulation can be formulated around three principles: 1. free entry for foreign-owned subsidiaries chartered under the laws of the host country; 2. national treatment for those subsidiaries; and 3. national responsibility for (a) monetary policy, (b) prevention of unwarranted financial panics in domestically chartered institutions, whether foreign or domestically owned, and (c) supervision of all domestically chartered institutions, regardless of ownership.

Author: Raja Almarzoqi
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513505831
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
The paper analyzes the relationship between bank competition and stability, with a specific focus on the Middle East and North Africa. Price competition has a positive effect on bank liquidity, as it induces self-discipline incentives on banks for the choice of bank funding sources and for the holding of liquid assets. On the other hand, price competition may have a potentially negative impact on bank solvency and on the credit quality of the loan portfolio. More competitive banks may be less solvent if the potential increase in the equity base—due to capital adjustments—is not large enough to compensate for the reduction in bank profitability. Also, banks subject to stronger competitive pressures may have a higher rate of nonperforming loans, if the increase in the risk-taking incentives from the lender’s side overcomes the decrease in the credit risk from the borrower’s side. In both cases, country-specific policies for market entry conditions—and for bank regulation and supervision—may significantly affect the sign and the size of the relationship. The paper suggests policy reforms designed to improve market contestability and to increase the quality and independence of prudential supervision.