Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Cost Growth in Major Weapon Systems [in The] Department of Defense
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Sources of Weapon System Cost Growth
Author: Joseph George Bolten
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042890
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 117
Book Description
Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042890
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 117
Book Description
Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.
Cost Growth in Weapon Systems
Author: Neil M. Singer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arms transfers
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arms transfers
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of Major Weapon Systems
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437936547
Category : Defense spending
Languages : en
Pages : 73
Book Description
Report examining growth in operating and support (O&S) costs of major DOD weapons systems, and identifying measures to improve DOD ability to manage and reduce O&S costs of weapons systems over their life cycle.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437936547
Category : Defense spending
Languages : en
Pages : 73
Book Description
Report examining growth in operating and support (O&S) costs of major DOD weapons systems, and identifying measures to improve DOD ability to manage and reduce O&S costs of weapons systems over their life cycle.
Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing?
Author: Obaid Younossi
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833041355
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
In recent decades, there have been numerous attempts to rein in the cost growth of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs. Cost growth is the ratio of the cost estimate reported in a program's final Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and the cost-estimate baseline reported in a prior SAR issued at a particular milestone. Drawing on prior RAND research, new analyses of completed and ongoing weapon system programs, and data drawn from SARs, this study addresses the following questions: What is the cost growth of DoD weapon systems? What has been the trend of cost growth over the past three decades? To address the magnitude of cost growth, it examines cost growth in completed programs; to evaluate the cost growth trend over time, it provides additional analysis of a selection of ongoing programs. This sample of ongoing programs permits a look at growth trends in the more recent past. Changes in the mix of system types over time and dollar-weighted analysis were also considered because earlier studies have suggested that cost growth varies by program type and the cost of the program. The findings suggest that development cost growth over the past three decades has remained high and without any significant improvement.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833041355
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
In recent decades, there have been numerous attempts to rein in the cost growth of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs. Cost growth is the ratio of the cost estimate reported in a program's final Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and the cost-estimate baseline reported in a prior SAR issued at a particular milestone. Drawing on prior RAND research, new analyses of completed and ongoing weapon system programs, and data drawn from SARs, this study addresses the following questions: What is the cost growth of DoD weapon systems? What has been the trend of cost growth over the past three decades? To address the magnitude of cost growth, it examines cost growth in completed programs; to evaluate the cost growth trend over time, it provides additional analysis of a selection of ongoing programs. This sample of ongoing programs permits a look at growth trends in the more recent past. Changes in the mix of system types over time and dollar-weighted analysis were also considered because earlier studies have suggested that cost growth varies by program type and the cost of the program. The findings suggest that development cost growth over the past three decades has remained high and without any significant improvement.
Sources of Weapon System Cost Growth. Analysis of 35 Major Defense Acquisition Programs
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work has concluded that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments historically have underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Analysis of the data in Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for a sample of 68 completed programs showed that the average total cost growth (after adjusting for procurement-quantity changes) was 46 percent over the baseline estimate made at Milestone B (MS B) and 16 percent over the baseline estimate made at MS C. The cost growth typically continued for about 75 percent of the time between the initiation of major development and the expending of 90 percent of program funding. Most of the cost growth occurred early in the acquisition phase, and the magnitude of development cost growth at completion for programs initiated in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s remained relatively steady. Although quantifying cost growth is important, the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To answer that question, this analysis examines 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) from the database of SARs that document the development and procurement of a variety of systems, including aircraft, missiles, electronics systems, launch vehicles, munitions, vehicles, and satellites. The programs were similar in type and complexity to those conducted by the Air Force. We analyzed a relatively small number of programs because of the labor-intensive nature of the work. We first examined the programs as a complete set and then analyzed Air Force and non Air Force programs separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differed.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work has concluded that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments historically have underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Analysis of the data in Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for a sample of 68 completed programs showed that the average total cost growth (after adjusting for procurement-quantity changes) was 46 percent over the baseline estimate made at Milestone B (MS B) and 16 percent over the baseline estimate made at MS C. The cost growth typically continued for about 75 percent of the time between the initiation of major development and the expending of 90 percent of program funding. Most of the cost growth occurred early in the acquisition phase, and the magnitude of development cost growth at completion for programs initiated in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s remained relatively steady. Although quantifying cost growth is important, the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To answer that question, this analysis examines 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) from the database of SARs that document the development and procurement of a variety of systems, including aircraft, missiles, electronics systems, launch vehicles, munitions, vehicles, and satellites. The programs were similar in type and complexity to those conducted by the Air Force. We analyzed a relatively small number of programs because of the labor-intensive nature of the work. We first examined the programs as a complete set and then analyzed Air Force and non Air Force programs separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differed.
Cost Growth in Major Weapon Systems [in The] Department of Defense
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Addressing Cost Growth of Major Department of Defense Weapons Systems
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 128
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 128
Book Description
Weapons Acquisition Policy and Procedures
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 70
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 70
Book Description
Historical Cost Growth of Completed Weapon System Programs
Author: Mark V. Arena
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833039253
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 74
Book Description
This report is one of a series from a RAND Project AIR FORCE project, "The Cost of Future Military Aircraft: Historical Cost Estimating Relationships and Cost Reduction Initiatives." The purpose of the project is to improve the tools used to estimate the costs of future weapon systems. It focuses on how recent technical, management, and government policy changes affect cost. This report focuses on the accuracy of cost estimates. For our analysis, we used a very specific sample of Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data, namely only programs that are complete or are nearly so. The analysis indicates a systematic bias toward underestimating the costs and substantial uncertainty in estimating the final cost of a weapon system. In contrast to the previous literature, the cost growth was higher than previously observed. We also found few correlations with cost growth, but observed that programs with longer duration had greater cost growth and electronics programs tended to have lower cost growth. Although there were some differences in the mean cost growth factors among the military departments, the differences were not statistically significant. While newer programs appear to have lower cost growth, this trend appears to be due to factors other than acquisition policies.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833039253
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 74
Book Description
This report is one of a series from a RAND Project AIR FORCE project, "The Cost of Future Military Aircraft: Historical Cost Estimating Relationships and Cost Reduction Initiatives." The purpose of the project is to improve the tools used to estimate the costs of future weapon systems. It focuses on how recent technical, management, and government policy changes affect cost. This report focuses on the accuracy of cost estimates. For our analysis, we used a very specific sample of Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data, namely only programs that are complete or are nearly so. The analysis indicates a systematic bias toward underestimating the costs and substantial uncertainty in estimating the final cost of a weapon system. In contrast to the previous literature, the cost growth was higher than previously observed. We also found few correlations with cost growth, but observed that programs with longer duration had greater cost growth and electronics programs tended to have lower cost growth. Although there were some differences in the mean cost growth factors among the military departments, the differences were not statistically significant. While newer programs appear to have lower cost growth, this trend appears to be due to factors other than acquisition policies.