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Author: School of Advanced Military Studies Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781502774286 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 104
Book Description
This book utilizes select elements of operational art from ADRP 3-0 to examine how General Lewis Walt employed operational art as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) commander in Vietnam from June 1965-June 1967. This book addresses a significant shortfall in literature focused on Corps-level operational commanders during the Vietnam War. In combat, III MAF faced a hybrid threat of North Vietnamese regular forces and entrenched Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units. Apart from the significant challenges of combat operations, General Walt found himself confronted by vague and restricting U.S. policy, ineffective U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and governmental agencies, a complex South Vietnamese civilian and military operating environment, and competing warfighting strategies and interservice rivalries between his U.S. Army combat chain-of-command and internal Marine Corps leadership. Despite these challenges, Walt developed and executed an effective operational approach which addressed substantial enemy threats while supporting the government of South Vietnam and its military forces.
Author: School of Advanced Military Studies Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781502774286 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 104
Book Description
This book utilizes select elements of operational art from ADRP 3-0 to examine how General Lewis Walt employed operational art as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) commander in Vietnam from June 1965-June 1967. This book addresses a significant shortfall in literature focused on Corps-level operational commanders during the Vietnam War. In combat, III MAF faced a hybrid threat of North Vietnamese regular forces and entrenched Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units. Apart from the significant challenges of combat operations, General Walt found himself confronted by vague and restricting U.S. policy, ineffective U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and governmental agencies, a complex South Vietnamese civilian and military operating environment, and competing warfighting strategies and interservice rivalries between his U.S. Army combat chain-of-command and internal Marine Corps leadership. Despite these challenges, Walt developed and executed an effective operational approach which addressed substantial enemy threats while supporting the government of South Vietnam and its military forces.
Author: United States Army Command and General S Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781503189447 Category : Languages : en Pages : 74
Book Description
This book explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in order to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the operational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military Assistance Command-Vietnam's ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government's aims with the tactical maneuver of subordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the equivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field Force during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS/ JUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN THANG, and II Field Force's reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the case studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is addressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices faced in an asymmetric conflict.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 60
Book Description
This monograph discusses operational art in Vietnam. The research question used to focus this study effort was how did the United States perform in conducting operational art in Vietnam? Since operational art is the vital link between strategy and tactics, this title captures the essence of the monograph. After a brief introduction, the monograph reviews and analyzes the Army's doctrine for the Vietnam war, FM 100-5 (1962). That doctrine was found to be sound. It was particularly strong in describing unconventional warfare, military operations against irregular forces, situations short of war, the spectrum of war and limited war. It was noticeably weak in describing infiltration and the articulation of theater operations. Current doctrine and contemporary writings were reviewed in order to establish and define operational art and the operational level of war. Operational level of war; Operational art; Campaigns; Theater of operations; Major operations. (jes).
Author: Major Jeremy G. Swenddal Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786251922 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 140
Book Description
This study investigates the significant effect of mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and topographic engineering on the American Civil War Campaign of Chancellorsville. The operations occurred near Fredericksburg, Virginia, in April and May of 1863. In the battle, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia decisively defeated the Union Army of the Potomac. Engineer-related considerations contributed immensely to the Confederate victory. Engineer battlefield functions influenced the operations of both armies. The Union Engineer Brigade constructed numerous pontoon bridges to overcome the river obstacles prior to and following the battle. This capability allowed the Union Army to initially surprise and envelop the Confederate Army. The natural obstacles of the rivers and forests and manmade obstacles of abatis hindered maneuver. Survivability was a significant factor during the fighting. At Chancellorsville, the Confederates used entrenchments for the first time in open operations. This strengthened their economy of force in front of the Union Army and gave “Stonewall” Jackson mass during his successful enveloping attack. Finally, topographic engineering was important through map production and reconnaissance by engineers. This study concludes that the Confederate Army integrated the engineer battlefield functions more effectively than the Union Army. In part, this explains the decisive Confederate victory.
Author: Major Dale S. Ringler Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786252856 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 97
Book Description
This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military. First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.
Author: Clayton S. Wilcox Publisher: ISBN: Category : Counterinsurgency Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
"Operational art was applied during the American counterinsurgency campaign in the Vietnam War. The campaign reflected the employment of operational art in the coordination and conduct of a variety of programs designed to achieve the pacification of the rural population and the destruction of the enemy's means to make war both militarily and politically. Operational art was not uniformly applied to the pacification program, and it was only after the formation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development and Support organization that it could be applied. The pacification program became effective only after this operational level coordinating body provided coherency to a program long plagued by a lack of focus and resources. U.S. efforts in the operational level planning of a comprehensive pacification program taught that the military must possess flexibility, a wide repertoire of skills, and an ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Strict reliance on firepower, mobility, and technology ignores the primacy of the political element of counterinsurgency and in so doing may yield the initiative to the enemy."--Abstract.
Author: Major Ian J. Townsend Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786250187 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 93
Book Description
In Vietnam, the III Marine Amphibious Force used Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) as one part of its operational level counterinsurgency campaign. These platoons provided security assistance to the South Vietnamese Popular Forces and civic action to the village based population. To measure the operational effectiveness and the current relevancy of this specific type of combined action their activities are evaluated against current Army counterinsurgency doctrine. This monograph demonstrates the value of the CAPs as one element in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign, and how this form of combined action may serve as a tool for Army commanders conducting operational art in future. Independent operations are not the future of American warfare in the 21st Century. Contemporary thought about the future of American warfare is that the “conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries.” Some form of combined action will be a required in American military operations for the foreseeable future. Given this truth, CAPs provide a practical historical example of a combined action technique that can serve as a tool for the future.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 58
Book Description
This monograph analyzes the American practice of the operational art during the Vietnam War. It focuses on Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) from 1965 to 1968. This question provides valuable relevant lessons to current military operations because of the difficulty in practicing operational art during the Vietnam War. The monograph is organized into four parts. The first part is the introduction. The second part discusses what the operational art is according to current doctrine. It finds that operational art is the critical link between strategy and tactics. Operational art has two major components, linkage and design. For the operational art to be adequately practiced, both must be present. The third part analyzes MACV's conduct of the war. It traces U.S. strategic interests to tactical employment of military forces and reviews MACV's objectives and strategy. The fourth part is the conclusion. It compares MACV's conduct of the war from part three with current doctrine for the conduct of the operational art from part II. The monograph finds that MACV did not adequately practice the operational art from 1965-1968. It determines that although there was linkage between U.S. strategic objectives and the tactical employment of troops, operational design lacked synchronization and integration. The monograph concludes that this failure to practice the operational art by MACV was a major contributing factor to the U.S. military failure in Vietnam, and subsequently U.S. strategic failure.
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781500748272 Category : Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
General Abrams presents a sound historical example of the practical application of operational art as viewed through the lens of the Army Design Methodology. When General Abrams assumed command of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), he was able to frame his environment enabling him to enact measures to solve the correct problem which was, how to equip and train the ARVN while simultaneously focusing on population centric efforts in counterinsurgency-ultimately eliminating the need for U.S. presence in Vietnam. Under his authority, American forces were broken up into small units that would live with and train the South Vietnamese civilians to defend their villages from guerrilla or conventional Northern incursions. Not only did he successfully frame the problem in 1968 but he was able to re-frame in 1970 in accordance with the Nixon administration's abrupt announcement of a rapid withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. These efforts proved successful as evidenced by the ability of ARVN forces to repel a full-scale NVA Easter Offensive in 1972. This study validates the Army Design Methodology as a framework for the assessment operational art.
Author: School of Advanced Military Studies
Author: School of Advanced Military Studies
Author: United States Army Command and General S
Author: 
Author: Major Jeremy G. Swenddal
Author: Major Dale S. Ringler
Author: 
Author: Clayton S. Wilcox
Author: Major Ian J. Townsend
Author: 
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll