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Author: Steve Weber Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400862434 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 342
Book Description
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Steve Weber Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400862434 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 342
Book Description
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Steve Weber Publisher: ISBN: 9780691027661 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 350
Book Description
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Alexander L. George Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 774
Book Description
The first comprehensive and systematic analysis of American and Soviet security cooperation since World War II, this volume examines the pursuit of arms control, the search for stability, and the balance of power. Experts contribute twenty-one case studies that cast new light on the history of superpower relations.
Author: Publisher: Stanford University Press ISBN: 0804765928 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 364
Book Description
This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table. As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R. The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement? The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been. The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?
Author: Alan B. Sherr Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1000200701 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 321
Book Description
How does the Soviet Union view the costs and benefits of nuclear arms control? What factors motivate Soviet negotiations with the Western world on this crucial issue? And what, precisely, does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish through nuclear arms control? Originally published in 1988, The Other Side of Arms Control provides an in-depth examination of this too infrequently discussed aspect of the arms race and the ongoing negotiations to halt it. In The Other Side of Arms Control, Alan B. Sherr argues that the time is now right for significant substantive progress to be made on nuclear arms control: the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated greater flexibility and willingness to compromise on a number of difficult issues, including verification. But more important, circumstances within and outside the Soviet Union now make progress on arms control crucial to Soviet political and economic goals as well as foreign policy objectives. Written in accessible, nontechnical language, The Other Side of Arms Control will be of historical interest to students, teachers, policymakers, and others concerned with the future of nuclear arms control.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science Publisher: ISBN: Category : Arms control Languages : en Pages : 36
Author: Arnold Lawrence Horelick Publisher: ISBN: Category : Nuclear arms control Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
This paper, which is included as a chapter in [U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase] (Cornell University Press, 1986), analyzes the nuclear arms control dimension of U.S.-Soviet relations as it enters a new phase. It reviews the developments and forces that led to the present impasse, discusses the nuclear arms agenda before the leaderships of the two states, and considers the prospects for future agreements. It includes an analysis of the Soviet and American arms control proposals of October and November 1985 and discusses prospects for agreement in the light of congruent and divergent aspects of the two proposals. The authors suggest that an arrangement between the superpowers that provided the Soviet Union with assurances against a U.S. strategic defensive breakout during the lifetime of any new far-reaching arms reduction treaty might facilitate conclusion of such an agreement. Constraints on flight testing might slow down the pace of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), depending on precisely where the line was drawn between permitted research and forbidden testing and for how long. However, in the context of a new treaty reducing nuclear offensive arms, continued U.S. conduct of a vigorous SDI research program within agreed constraints would provide the Soviet Union with strong additional incentives to comply more punctiliously than it has in the past with treaty provisions.
Author: Steve Weber
Author: Steve Weber
Author: Steve Weber
Author: Steve Weber
Author: Steven Weber
Author: Alexander L. George
Author: Michael Mandelbaum
Author: 
Author: Alan B. Sherr
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science
Author: Arnold Lawrence Horelick