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Author: Gerald W. Scully Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400862833 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
In this provocative work, Gerald Scully develops and empirically tests a theory about how a nation's constitutional setting affects its economic growth. Modern growth theory links the rise in the standard of living to capital formation, both physical and human, and to technological progress, and development economists continue to believe that the transformation of the less developed world cannot occur without massive government control of the economy. Scully, on the other hand, maintains that material advancement is as much affected by the choice of the economic, legal, and political institutions under which people live and work as it is by resource endowment and technological progress. Nothing in the neoclassical theory of growth considers the "rules of the game" under which capital is accumulated and innovation is made. Redressing this neglect, Scully proposes ways of measuring the economic, civil, and political freedom within a society's institutional framework, and he reveals that freedom, or the lack thereof, powerfully and demonstrably influences not only economic progress but also income distribution. Politically open societies grow at nearly three times the rate of those where freedom is more circumscribed, and they also have a more equitable distribution of income. Finally, Scully measures the effect of the size of the state on economic progress, showing that the larger the amount of government expenditures out of gross domestic product, the lower the rate of economic progress. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Gerald W. Scully Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400862833 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
In this provocative work, Gerald Scully develops and empirically tests a theory about how a nation's constitutional setting affects its economic growth. Modern growth theory links the rise in the standard of living to capital formation, both physical and human, and to technological progress, and development economists continue to believe that the transformation of the less developed world cannot occur without massive government control of the economy. Scully, on the other hand, maintains that material advancement is as much affected by the choice of the economic, legal, and political institutions under which people live and work as it is by resource endowment and technological progress. Nothing in the neoclassical theory of growth considers the "rules of the game" under which capital is accumulated and innovation is made. Redressing this neglect, Scully proposes ways of measuring the economic, civil, and political freedom within a society's institutional framework, and he reveals that freedom, or the lack thereof, powerfully and demonstrably influences not only economic progress but also income distribution. Politically open societies grow at nearly three times the rate of those where freedom is more circumscribed, and they also have a more equitable distribution of income. Finally, Scully measures the effect of the size of the state on economic progress, showing that the larger the amount of government expenditures out of gross domestic product, the lower the rate of economic progress. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Michael Conant Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351298305 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 536
Book Description
This study uses basic economic analysis as a technique to comment critically on the original meaning and the interpretation of those clauses of the Constitution that have particular bearing on the economy. Many new conclusions are markedly different from those of the Supreme Court and earlier commentators. Conant's view is that the commerce clause and the equal protection clause, if they had been construed consistently with their comprehensive original meanings, would have given much greater federal protection against state laws that impaire free markets. Economic policy for the nation was vested in Congress. To the extent that special interests could buy congressional favor for their anticompetitive activities, free markets were impaired within constraints as interpreted by the court. These decisions have been criticized for their failure to incorporate the antimonopoly tradition in the Ninth Amendment and their failure to recognize equal protection of laws incorporated into the Fifth Amendment. Conant holds that statutory controls of the economy are justifiable in economic theory if they are designed to remedy market failures and thereby increase efficiency. If statutes are passed to interfere with markets and create market inefficiencies for the benefit of special interest groups, they should be condemned under the standards of normative microeconomics. There are four main classes of market failure: monopoly, externalities, public goods, and informational asymmetry. This masterful analysis examines all four reasons for market failure in depth. Litigation costs are analogous to transaction costs. If legal principles and rules are clearly and precisely defined by the Supreme Court when they are first appealed, litigation and its costs should be minimized. Conant claims that if legal principles or rules are uncertain because they lack definable standards, the number of legal actions filed and litigation costs will be much greater. This promotes additional litigation challenging the many statutes enacted to remedy asserted market failures in an expanding industrial economy. This work brilliantly addresses the danger to the economy in court rulings seeking to legislate standards of reasonableness.
Author: Charles Rowley Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9401157286 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 340
Book Description
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.
Author: Richard B. McKenzie Publisher: Lexington Books ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 280
Book Description
Based on papers from a conference sponsored by the Heritage Foundation."A Heritage Foundation book"--Jacket. Includes bibliographical references.
Author: Laurie Thomas Vass Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Introduction: The late James Buchanan, a professor of constitutional economics, at George Mason University, explained the relationship between a nation's rate of economic growth and the institutional rules that govern financial transactions in a free competitive economy. It was clear from his entire contributions that he believed that there was a single configuration of constitutional rules that would lead society to a social optimum rate of welfare. While his work hinted at what this specific constitutional framework looked like, he never wrote out his entire constitution. This article extends Buchanan's work by placing his theoretical framework into a natural rights constitution. The single constitutional configuration that leads to maximum economic welfare begins by protecting the natural rights of citizens to pursue happiness.
Author: Torsten Persson Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262661928 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 324
Book Description
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
Author: Stefan Voigt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
There is growing evidence that economic freedom enhances economic growth. In order to safeguard economic freedom, integrating economic rights into the constitution almost seems to suggest itself. Constitutional rules, though, are not self-enforcing and thus suffer credibility problems. Many constitutional economists argue that the inadequacy of the constitutional document is a major reason for the unsatisfactory development of societies in terms of political stability and economic growth. In this paper, it is argued that there are extra-constitutional conditions on which the enforceability of constitutional provisions depend. Starting with the observation that many Latin American countries largely copied the U.S. Constitution but did not experience a similar development, three possible causes for the low enforcement of constitutions are analyzed: (1) the possible relevance of individual attitudes, (2) the possible relevance of organized interest groups, and (3) the possible relevance of "constitutional culture". With regard to the first possible cause, it is argued that if certain individual attitudes are absent, chances for enforcement of constitutions formally compatible with the rule of law are slim. With regard to the second possible cause, it is argued that chances that a rule of constitutional law will be enforced depend on the presence of a sufficiently large number of organized interest groups with sufficiently heterogeneous interests that command a considerable threat potential. A paradox thus evolves: interest groups are needed in order to maintain the rule of law; simultaneously, their existence threatens its maintenance to the degree to which they are successful in their rent seeking endeavors. With regard to the third possible cause, a distinction is made between two constitutional cultures, one in which the constitution is conceptualized as a "book of hopes" and another where it is seen as a legal document to be enforced.
Author: Stefan Voigt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Analysis of the economic effects of constitutional rules has made substantial progress over the last decade. This survey provides an overview of this rapidly growing research area and also discusses a number of methodological issues and identifies underresearched areas. It argues that the next logical step of Positive Constitutional Economics is to endogenize constitutional rules.
Author: Gerald W. Scully
Author: Gerald W. Scully
Author: Michael Conant
Author: Ram Mudambi
Author: Charles Rowley
Author: Richard B. McKenzie
Author: Laurie Thomas Vass
Author: Torsten Persson
Author: International Society for the Study of Comparative Public Law. Conference
Author: Stefan Voigt
Author: Stefan Voigt