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Author: Marius Gramb Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study congestion problems in decentralized, two-sided matching markets. The main focus is on the impact of market thickness on these congestion problems. We find that it is often not optimal to make an offer to the best observed agent when the likelihood of acceptance is very low. We derive the optimal offering strategies for firms depending on market thickness and analyze who benefits when the market becomes thicker. We also investigate which market participants would benefit from a centralized market with assortative matching.
Author: Marius Gramb Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study congestion problems in decentralized, two-sided matching markets. The main focus is on the impact of market thickness on these congestion problems. We find that it is often not optimal to make an offer to the best observed agent when the likelihood of acceptance is very low. We derive the optimal offering strategies for firms depending on market thickness and analyze who benefits when the market becomes thicker. We also investigate which market participants would benefit from a centralized market with assortative matching.
Author: Qingyun Wu (Researcher in game theory and market design) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the algebraic structure of matching markets and the stabilization dynamics in decentralized markets. Chapter 2 is based on Wu and Roth (2018). It studies envy-free matchings that naturally arise from workers retiring or companies expanding. We show that the set of envy-free matchings forms a lattice that has a Conway-like join, but not a Conway-like meet. Furthermore, a job hopping process in which companies make offers to their favorite blocking workers, and workers accept their favorite offers, producing a sequence of vacancy chains, is a Tarski operator on this lattice. The fixed points of this Tarski operator correspond to the set of stable matchings; and the steady state matching starting from any given initial state is derived analytically. Chapter 3 is based on Wu (2020). The goal of this chapter, is to provide a systematic approach for analyzing entering classes in the college admissions model. When dealing with a many-to-one matching model, we often convert it into a one-to-one matching problem by assigning each seat of a college to a single student, instead of matching each college to multiple students. The preferences in this new model are significantly correlated and severely restrict the possible changes to entering classes. Through the so-called "rotations" that correspond to the join-irreducible elements in the lattice of stable matchings, we present a unified treatment for several results on entering classes, including the famous "Rural Hospital Theorem". We also show that, the least preferred student in an entering class appears to play a very interesting role. For example, each entering class can be completely characterized by its worst student. Chapter 4 is based on Gu, Roth, and Wu (2020). The motivating question is that, how come some black markets, such as the market for hitmen are well-regulated, but many others like the market for drugs are far from being under our control, even though we try very hard to eliminate them. To understand this, we build a three-dimensional discrete time Markov chain to study how black markets evolve over time, focusing on social repugnance and search frictions. We borrow tools from Markov jump processes, random walks, exponential martingales and optional sampling theory to analyze both the steady state limit and the realizations along the way. In the first part of the chapter, we identify conditions that lead to market survival or extinction. And the second part studies speed of convergence. We show that if a market is going to die eventually, then it dies exponentially fast. This further implies if a market has survived for a long time, then it is likely to survive forever.
Author: John J. Siegfried Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 0674267338 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 324
Book Description
Better Living Through Economics consists of twelve case studies that demonstrate how economic research has improved economic and social conditions over the past half century by influencing public policy decisions. Economists were obviously instrumental in revising the consumer price index and in devising auctions for allocating spectrum rights to cell phone providers in the 1990s. But perhaps more surprisingly, economists built the foundation for eliminating the military draft in favor of an all-volunteer army in 1973, for passing the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1975, for deregulating airlines in 1978, for adopting the welfare-to-work reforms during the Clinton administration, and for implementing the Pension Reform Act of 2006 that allowed employers to automatically enroll employees in a 401(k). Other important policy changes resulting from economists’ research include a new approach to monetary policy that resulted in moderated economic fluctuations (at least until 2008!), the reduction of trade impediments that allows countries to better exploit their natural advantages, a revision of antitrust policy to focus on those market characteristics that affect competition, an improved method of placing new physicians in hospital residencies that is more likely to keep married couples in the same city, and the adoption of tradable emissions rights which has improved our environment at minimum cost.
Author: Rafael Wittek Publisher: Stanford University Press ISBN: 0804785503 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 625
Book Description
The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research offers the first comprehensive overview of how the rational choice paradigm can inform empirical research within the social sciences. This landmark collection highlights successful empirical applications across a broad array of disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics, history, and psychology. Taking on issues ranging from financial markets and terrorism to immigration, race relations, and emotions, and a huge variety of other phenomena, rational choice proves a useful tool for theory- driven social research. Each chapter uses a rational choice framework to elaborate on testable hypotheses and then apply this to empirical research, including experimental research, survey studies, ethnographies, and historical investigations. Useful to students and scholars across the social sciences, this handbook will reinvigorate discussions about the utility and versatility of the rational choice approach, its key assumptions, and tools.
Author: Federico Echenique Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1108935052 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 722
Book Description
The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.
Author: David H. Autor Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0226032906 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 456
Book Description
From the traditional craft hiring hall to the Web site Monster.com, a multitude of institutions exist to facilitate the matching of workers with firms. The diversity of such Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) encompasses criminal records providers, public employment offices, labor unions, temporary help agencies, and centralized medical residency matches. Studies of Labor Market Intermediation analyzes how these third-party actors intercede where workers and firms meet, thereby aiding, impeding, and, in some cases, exploiting the matching process. By building a conceptual foundation for analyzing the roles that these understudied economic actors serve in the labor market, this volume develops both a qualitative and quantitative sense of their significance to market operation and worker welfare. Cross-national in scope, Studies of Labor Market Intermediation is distinctive in coalescing research on a set of market institutions that are typically treated as isolated entities, thus setting a research agenda for analyzing the changing shape of employment in an era of rapid globalization and technological change.
Author: Alvin E. Roth Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt ISBN: 0544291131 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 275
Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Author: Marius Gramb
Author: Marius Gramb
Author: Joana Pais
Author: 
Author: Florian Biermann
Author: Qingyun Wu (Researcher in game theory and market design)
Author: John J. Siegfried
Author: Rafael Wittek
Author: Federico Echenique
Author: David H. Autor
Author: Alvin E. Roth