Author: Major Robert Timothy Howard
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178289506X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg General Grant, leading a Union army engaged General Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant military successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863...Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant’s initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant’s army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton’s subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton’s failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.
Confederate Defense Of Vicksburg: A Case Study Of The Principle Of The Offensive In The Defense
Author: Major Robert Timothy Howard
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178289506X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg General Grant, leading a Union army engaged General Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant military successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863...Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant’s initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant’s army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton’s subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton’s failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178289506X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg General Grant, leading a Union army engaged General Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant military successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863...Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant’s initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant’s army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton’s subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton’s failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.
The Confederate Defense of Vicksburg
Author: Robert Timothy Howard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defensive (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defensive (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
The Confederate Defense of Vicksburg
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781511761673
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 108
Book Description
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The problem in the study was to determine if Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton ever applied tho principle of the offensive during his defense of Vicksburg and to determine why he failed to gain any freedom of action during the Vicksburg Campaign. The important conclusions are: 1. Pemberton applied the principle prior to May 1, 1863. 2. He did not apply the principle during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg, mainly because of the lack of cavalry and of intelligence.
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781511761673
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 108
Book Description
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The problem in the study was to determine if Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton ever applied tho principle of the offensive during his defense of Vicksburg and to determine why he failed to gain any freedom of action during the Vicksburg Campaign. The important conclusions are: 1. Pemberton applied the principle prior to May 1, 1863. 2. He did not apply the principle during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg, mainly because of the lack of cavalry and of intelligence.
The Confederate Defense of Vicksburg
Author: Robert Timothy Howard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Unified operations (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 108
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Unified operations (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 108
Book Description
The Operational Level of War
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915745
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915745
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
Reevaluation Of Pemberton At Vicksburg
Author: Major Malcolm G. Haynes
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253003
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
Historians have largely agreed that Pemberton should shoulder the blame for the poor Confederate performance during the Vicksburg campaign. General consensus exists among American Civil War historians that Pemberton proved a confused, indecisive, and incompetent commander and his poor leadership led to the Confederate defeat. However, an examination of the Vicksburg campaign conducted at the operational level of war shows that throughout the campaign, Pemberton led a capable and competent defense not just of Vicksburg, but of the Mississippi Department he commanded. He relied on an operational approach that involved fighting from prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain deep in his own territory and anchored by natural obstacles. To attack such a position, Pemberton knew an opponent would need a large force operating over an extended line of communications (LOC). Pemberton intended to interdict his opponent’s LOC using a strong cavalry force, thus preventing the enemy from achieving the offensive momentum necessary to break through Vicksburg’s defenses. This was a sound operational approach. However, it failed because of an ineffective Confederate command structure that, among other failures, denied Pemberton the resources, particularly adequate cavalry forces, required to implement his operational approach.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253003
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
Historians have largely agreed that Pemberton should shoulder the blame for the poor Confederate performance during the Vicksburg campaign. General consensus exists among American Civil War historians that Pemberton proved a confused, indecisive, and incompetent commander and his poor leadership led to the Confederate defeat. However, an examination of the Vicksburg campaign conducted at the operational level of war shows that throughout the campaign, Pemberton led a capable and competent defense not just of Vicksburg, but of the Mississippi Department he commanded. He relied on an operational approach that involved fighting from prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain deep in his own territory and anchored by natural obstacles. To attack such a position, Pemberton knew an opponent would need a large force operating over an extended line of communications (LOC). Pemberton intended to interdict his opponent’s LOC using a strong cavalry force, thus preventing the enemy from achieving the offensive momentum necessary to break through Vicksburg’s defenses. This was a sound operational approach. However, it failed because of an ineffective Confederate command structure that, among other failures, denied Pemberton the resources, particularly adequate cavalry forces, required to implement his operational approach.
Military Review
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Quarterly Review of Military Literature
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 758
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 758
Book Description
Professional Journal of the United States Army
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 760
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 760
Book Description
Historic Vicksburg
Author: William Titus Rigby
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vicksburg (Miss.)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vicksburg (Miss.)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description