Author: Stijn ClaessensPublisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Conditionality (International relations)
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
Conditionality and Debt Relief
Author: Stijn ClaessensPublisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Conditionality (International relations)
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
Making Debt Relief Conditionality Pro-poor
Author: Oliver MorrisseyPublisher:
ISBN: 9789291901272
Category : Conditionality (International relations)
Languages : en
Pages : 17
Book Description
Conditionality, debt relief, and the developing country debt crisis
Author: Jeffrey D. SachsConditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis
Author: Jeffrey SachsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Debt relief
Languages : en
Pages : 86
Book Description
This paper raises several cautionary notes regarding high-conditionality lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the context of international debt crisis. It is argued that the role for high-conditionality lending is more restricted than generally believed, because enforcement of conditionality is rather weak. Moreover, the incentives for a country to abide by conditionality terms are also likely to be reduced by a large overhang of external indebtedness. Given the limited ability to enforce conditionality agreements, modesty and realism should be a cornerstone of each program. The experience with conditionality suggests two major lessons for the design of high-conditionality lending. First, debt forgiveness rather than mere debt rescheduling may increase a debtor country's compliance with conditionality, and thereby increase the actual stream of repayments by the indebted countries. Second, given the complexity of the needed adjustments, and the difficulty of enforcing conditionality agreements, programs are most likely to be successful when macroeconomic stabilization is given priority over large-scale liberalization.
Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis
Author: Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality
Author: Mr.Rodney RamcharanPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451859783
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors of credit and monitors of reform may help explain these negative outcomes. When debt levels rise, the IFIs reforms goals may become subordinated to its creditor's interest, compromising the enforcement of conditionality. Attracted by this prospect, malevolent governments strategically reform, enhancing their reputation in order to maintain lending and build their debt stock. Once debt levels are sufficiently large, such governments can stop policy reforms, assured that lending will continue.
Debt and conditionality : Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and opportunities for expanding policy space
Author: Celine TanPublisher:
ISBN: 9789832729853
Category : Debt relief
Languages : en
Pages : 24
Book Description
Voluntary Approaches to Debt Relief
Author: John WilliamsonPublisher: Peterson Institute
ISBN:
Category : Debt equity conversion
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
Debt Relief for Poor Countries
Author: Almuth SchollPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government, and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. In contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt, optimal incentive-compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants. The optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient's access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest. Incentive-compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains. If the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only, then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications. In contrast, transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only.
Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs
Author: Tito CordellaPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing."