Competitive Limit Pricing Under Imperfect Information PDF Download

Author: Kyle Bagwell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 35

View

Book Description

Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521313810
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 302

View

Book Description
This book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information.

Author: Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 34

View

Book Description

Author: Ware, Roger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 16

View

Book Description

Author: Joan Robinson
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349153206
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 359

View

Book Description

Author: George R. Feiwel
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349086304
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 823

View

Book Description
This study and its companion, "Joan Robinson and Economic Theory" looks at Joan Robinson, her impact upon modern economics, her challenges and critiques, and the advances made in the science and art of economics. It studies her ideas, themes and concerns from many different perspectives.

Author: Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 856

View

Book Description
This collection of readings provides a broad overview of the major theoretical concepts in the field and includes papers on industry size, quantity and price competition, entry barriers, product differentiation, incomplete information and general equilibrium with imperfect competition.

Author: Antoine Augustin Cournot
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 242

View

Book Description

Author: Sneha Bakshi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 204

View

Book Description
These essays examine how imperfect information amongst buyers in homogeneous goods markets affect sellers' incentives to compete, collude, and choose pricing rules. The first essay focuses on the price matching policy in a duopoly market when sellers have different marginal costs of production and some buyers know only one price in the market. It illustrates the incredibility of a seller price matching below its cost, which helps restore the low cost seller's incentive to price competitively, if the cost gap between the two sellers is large. Characterizing the equilibria of the model without price matching, I find that when the proportion of fully informed buyers is low, posting monopoly prices is the unique equilibrium. Market power of this kind is eliminated by price matching, because a seller adopting it promises to buyers unaware of its price to sell at their known price. Price matching thus reduces prices in equilibria if either the cost gap is large or if there are a large proportion of imperfectly informed buyers. The second essay investigates the endogenous choices of pricing rules by sellers with different costs in large markets, where buyers vary in their information regarding market prices. Inviting buyers to quote bids is ruled out because of adverse selection, and I find that price matching cannot be used by sellers with costs in the upper tail of the distribution of seller costs. The range of prices in equilibrium and the extent of the adoption of price matching to separate buyer types are found to depend on the price of the lowest cost seller in the market. The third essay examines how a distribution of imperfectly informed buyers affects (posted) price competition between identical sellers. I find that finite markets have multiple prices, as the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies with positive profits. The support of equilibrium prices is bounded below by a function of the size of the market, such that a larger market reduces profits. Only in the limit as the market becomes infinitely large, can a single price prevail, equaling marginal cost, where sellers earn zero profits.

Author: Maxim Peter Engers
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cost
Languages : en
Pages : 47

View

Book Description