Author: Maria Vagliasindi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Competition Under Non-linear Pricing
Author: Maria Vagliasindi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Nonlinear Pricing
Author: Robert B. Wilson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195115826
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
Book Description
What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing. The work starts with a general non-mathematical discussion, followed by a more technical presentation intended for readers with a fairly advanced background. Thorough and detailed, this study has ample examples of case studies from a variety of industries.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195115826
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
Book Description
What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing. The work starts with a general non-mathematical discussion, followed by a more technical presentation intended for readers with a fairly advanced background. Thorough and detailed, this study has ample examples of case studies from a variety of industries.
Menu Competition
Author: Mario Epelbaum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing
Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm Under Competition
Author: Yong Chao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
Book Description
We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from the firms under complete information. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by the buyer choosing her purchases. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and the optimal mechanism in a “virtual” principal-agent model, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. Our analysis provides a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
Book Description
We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from the firms under complete information. Specifically, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by the buyer choosing her purchases. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and the optimal mechanism in a “virtual” principal-agent model, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. Our analysis provides a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.
Non-linear Pricing, Regulation and Competition
Author: Maria Vagliasindi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 172
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 172
Book Description
Competition, Non-linear Pricing and Rationing in Credit Markets
Author: Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
Author: Andrea Attardi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Many financial markets rely on a discriminatory limit-order book to balance supply and demand. We study these markets in a static model in which uninformed market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to trade with an informed insider, as in Glosten (1994), Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), and Back and Baruch (2013). We analyze the case where tariffs are unconstrained and the case where tariffs are restricted to be convex. In both cases, we show that pure-strategy equilibrium tariffs must be linear and, moreover, that such equilibria only exist under exceptional circumstances. These results cast doubt on the stability of even well-organized financial markets.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Many financial markets rely on a discriminatory limit-order book to balance supply and demand. We study these markets in a static model in which uninformed market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to trade with an informed insider, as in Glosten (1994), Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), and Back and Baruch (2013). We analyze the case where tariffs are unconstrained and the case where tariffs are restricted to be convex. In both cases, we show that pure-strategy equilibrium tariffs must be linear and, moreover, that such equilibria only exist under exceptional circumstances. These results cast doubt on the stability of even well-organized financial markets.
Non-Linear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
Author: Hamid Nazerzadeh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
We study a common agency model with informed principals consisting of two capacity-constrained suppliers and a single retailer. The capacity of each supplier is her private information. Conditioned on their capacities, the suppliers simultaneously and non-cooperatively offer quantity-price schedules to the retailer. Then, the retailer decides on the quantities to purchase from each supplier in order to maximize his own utility. We prove the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for this game. We show that at the equilibrium each (infinitesimal) unit of the supply is assigned a marginal price which is independent of the capacities and depends only on the valuation function of the retailer and the distribution of the capacities. In addition, the supplier with the larger capacity sells all her supply.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
We study a common agency model with informed principals consisting of two capacity-constrained suppliers and a single retailer. The capacity of each supplier is her private information. Conditioned on their capacities, the suppliers simultaneously and non-cooperatively offer quantity-price schedules to the retailer. Then, the retailer decides on the quantities to purchase from each supplier in order to maximize his own utility. We prove the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for this game. We show that at the equilibrium each (infinitesimal) unit of the supply is assigned a marginal price which is independent of the capacities and depends only on the valuation function of the retailer and the distribution of the capacities. In addition, the supplier with the larger capacity sells all her supply.
Estimating markups under nonlinear pricing competition
Author: Lars-Hendrik Röller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : de
Pages : 29
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : de
Pages : 29
Book Description