Competing Principals PDF Download

Author: Forrest Maltzman
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472085811
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 220

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Book Description
The book discusses the role of congressional committees in the legislative process

Author: Susan Singleton
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1526511886
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 489

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Book Description
Examines the standard commercial agency agreement where an agent is self-employed and paid a commission on sales he or she generates for the principal as it is those agents that fall within the Regulations. It addresses the drafting of such agreements as well as termination and compensation and includes examples of agency contracts and coverage of the majority of UK judgments. The fifth edition has been updated to include: Ramsay v Typhoo Tea 2016 Software Incubator 2016 and application of the agency regulations to agency contracts Monk v Largo 2016 Invicta v International Brands 2013 Medsted Associates Ltd v Canaccord Genuity Wealth (International) Ltd (2119 Court of Appeal) relating to secret commissions and fiduciary duties of agents. W Nagel (a Firm) v Pluczenik Diamond Company NV 2018 Court of Appeal - about "commodity exchanges" and the agency regulations Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (2017 CJEU) Choice of law issues - Belgium and Turkey. One Money Mail Ltd. v (1) Ria Financial Services (2) Sebastian Wasilewski (Court of Appeal) - 2015 post termination restrictions on agents Brand Studio Ltd. v St. John Knits, Inc 2015 ( indemnity and compensation clauses) Bailey v Angove's Pty Limited [2016] Authority of agents to recover debts (Supreme Court decision)

Author: Michael N. Bastedo
Publisher: JHU Press
ISBN: 1421404486
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 375

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Book Description
Tierney, University of Southern California; and the late J. Douglas Toma, University of Georgia

Author: Hirokazu Kikuchi
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319901133
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 309

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Book Description
This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.

Author: United States. Interstate Commerce Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Carriers
Languages : en
Pages : 1552

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Author: Perrin Lefebvre
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009285599
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 104

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Book Description
Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus is linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size.

Author: Karsten Mause
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031443934
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378

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Book Description
Lobbying is not only the subject of ongoing, heated debates in politics and the public sphere but has also been a focus of the social sciences for decades. This edited volume provides an overview of the current state of research on lobbying from the perspective of Public Choice as a subfield of political science and economics. After a brief introduction to the field, Part I provides an overview of basic concepts and political-economic theories of lobbying from the standpoints of various subfields of Public Choice. Subsequently, Part II investigates the various channels used by interest groups to influence policymakers, such as party donations, informational lobbying, hiring politicians, etc. These chapters also discuss the possibilities and limits of regulating the respective channels. Lastly, Part III sheds light on lobbying in selected regions (i.e., the United States, European Union, Russia, and China).

Author: Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson
Publisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 027105056X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 250

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Book Description
Latin America’s flirtation with neoliberal economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s (the so-called Washington Consensus strategy) had the effect of increasing income inequality throughout the region. The aim of this economic policy was in part to create the conditions for stable democracy by ensuring efficient economic use of resources, both human and capital, but the widening gap between rich and poor threatened to undermine political stability. At the heart of the dilemma faced by these new democracies is the question of accountability: Are all citizens equally capable of holding the government accountable if it does not represent their interests? In this book, Michelle Taylor-Robinson investigates both the formal institutions of democracy (such as electoral rules and the design of the legislative and executive branches) and informal institutions (such as the nomination procedures of political parties and patron-client relationships) to see what incentives legislators have to pay attention to the needs of poor people and thereby adequately represent their interests.

Author: Andrew Cheon
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0197672884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 197

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Book Description
"Foreign investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil and gas sector began a dramatic climb in the late 1990s amid rising oil prices. These investments are widely perceived to be politically driven, raising concerns about resource mercantilism and asymmetric interdependence. The book begins with the premise that the investments are commercial ventures by ambitious SOEs seeking to become global players. Applying the principal agent model, the book argues that the realization of their global ambitions depends on two domestic structural factors. First, democracies can limit investments with questionable viability, as it can be politically costly for elected leaders to endorse SOE decisions that prove unprofitable for the state. Second, bureaucratic structures overseeing the SOEs can help prevent counterproductive behavior, conditional upon a clear line of authority among bureaucratic principals on matters pertaining to SOE operations. The argument differs from previous approaches by exploring a range of institutional alternatives to privatization for solutions to problems of oil sector governance"--

Author: Heike Klüver
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192899937
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
Many coalition cabinets negotiate lengthy coalition contracts outlining the agenda for the time in office. Not only does negotiating these agreements take up time and resources, but compromises have to be made, which may result in cabinet conflicts and electoral costs. This book explores why political parties negotiate such agreements, and argues that coalition agreements are important control devices that allow coalition parties to keep their partners in line. The authors show that their use varies with the preference configuration in cabinet and the allocation of ministerial portfolios. First, they posit that parties will only negotiate policy issues in a coalition agreement when they disagree on these issues and when they are important to all partners. Second, since controlling a ministry provides parties with important information and policy-making advantages, parties use agreements to constrain their partners particularly when they control the ministry in charge of a policy area. Finally, they argue that coalition agreements only work as effective control devices if coalition parties settle controversial issues in these contracts. The COALITIONAGREE Dataset is used to evaluate the expectations set out in the book; the dataset maps the content of 229 coalition agreements that were negotiated by 189 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 Western and Eastern European countries. The results show that coalition parties systematically use agreements to control their partners when policy issues are divisive and salient and when they are confronted with a hostile minister. These agreements only effectively contain conflicts, however, when parties negotiate a compromise on precisely the issues that divide them. Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu. The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.