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Author: Ellen Geesje Schraa Publisher: ISBN: 9780494279809 Category : Languages : en Pages : 212
Book Description
Two interpretations are possible. Ontario hospital boards may be trading-off the difficulties in implementing a formal pay-for-performance incentive plan with a more subjective and comprehensive evaluation process. This supports the claim that monitoring and bonus plans can both be used as an executive motivational device. Another interpretation, a criticism expressed in current business literature, is that agency problems are unaddressed in current CEO contracting arrangements, and the use of peer comparison and competitive benchmarking simply ratchets up year-to-year CEO compensation. Corporate governance entails monitoring, evaluating and rewarding the performance of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the corporation. An economic approach to understanding CEO compensation predicts that financial incentives will be written into the CEO's compensation contract to align the goals of the owners of the firm with those of the top executive of the firm. At the same time, economic theory predicts that not-for-profit organizations, which have multiple stakeholders, complex multidimensional missions and hard to observe and measure outputs, may be unable to write similar incentive contracts for the CEO and hence suffer from enhanced agency problems. This thesis is an exploratory investigation into the CEO compensation policies employed by the Board of Directors of Ontario public not-for-profit hospitals. A survey of CEOs and boards finds that the majority of Ontario hospitals do base CEO compensation in part on performance, this performance evaluation being a comprehensive review of CEO specific performance goals and objectives, including specific hospital targets. These surveys also highlighted that Ontario hospital boards have had difficulties in establishing formal pay-for-performance systems due in large part to hospital outcomes being perceived as largely beyond the control of the CEO. Guided by equity theory, an empirical model investigates how pay comparisons with peer hospital CEOs influence subsequent CEO compensation adjustments, and finds that changes in CEO compensation are significantly related to the relative inequity position of a CEO compared to its peers.
Author: Ellen Geesje Schraa Publisher: ISBN: 9780494279809 Category : Languages : en Pages : 212
Book Description
Two interpretations are possible. Ontario hospital boards may be trading-off the difficulties in implementing a formal pay-for-performance incentive plan with a more subjective and comprehensive evaluation process. This supports the claim that monitoring and bonus plans can both be used as an executive motivational device. Another interpretation, a criticism expressed in current business literature, is that agency problems are unaddressed in current CEO contracting arrangements, and the use of peer comparison and competitive benchmarking simply ratchets up year-to-year CEO compensation. Corporate governance entails monitoring, evaluating and rewarding the performance of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the corporation. An economic approach to understanding CEO compensation predicts that financial incentives will be written into the CEO's compensation contract to align the goals of the owners of the firm with those of the top executive of the firm. At the same time, economic theory predicts that not-for-profit organizations, which have multiple stakeholders, complex multidimensional missions and hard to observe and measure outputs, may be unable to write similar incentive contracts for the CEO and hence suffer from enhanced agency problems. This thesis is an exploratory investigation into the CEO compensation policies employed by the Board of Directors of Ontario public not-for-profit hospitals. A survey of CEOs and boards finds that the majority of Ontario hospitals do base CEO compensation in part on performance, this performance evaluation being a comprehensive review of CEO specific performance goals and objectives, including specific hospital targets. These surveys also highlighted that Ontario hospital boards have had difficulties in establishing formal pay-for-performance systems due in large part to hospital outcomes being perceived as largely beyond the control of the CEO. Guided by equity theory, an empirical model investigates how pay comparisons with peer hospital CEOs influence subsequent CEO compensation adjustments, and finds that changes in CEO compensation are significantly related to the relative inequity position of a CEO compared to its peers.
Author: Frederick D. Lipman Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 9780470283035 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 336
Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 9780674020634 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Luis Gomez-Mejia Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135974284 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 247
Book Description
Part of Routledge’s Global HRM series, this unique new text gives an in-depth and detailed analysis of the key themes and emerging topics faced by global enterprises when dealing with compensation issues today
Author: Steven Balsam Publisher: Academic Press ISBN: 9780120771264 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 410
Book Description
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Author: Benjamin Hermalin Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 0444635408 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 762
Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Author: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1317473957 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 366
Book Description
This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.
Author: Alice Friedl Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3346376222 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, language: English, abstract: The objective of the present thesis is the presentation of the most important theoretical ideas to determine an adequate compensation for top managers and their empirical verification. Basis of the empirical assessment are the remunerations of the CEOs of five German companies and business units with diverse sizes and ownership structures. The principal-agent theory has proven most relevant, concluding a pay-per-performance remuneration structure that aligns the financial interests of the company and its executives. The balance between short-term goals and sustainable growth is achieved by a mix of selected short- and long-term incentives. Empirical evidence shows that recently size has become a major determinant of management remuneration and the pay-for-performance link is increasingly weak. Overall the empirical results of the thesis imply that the principal-agent theory is still seen as a valid instrument to create a balanced and for both parts favorable pay package. However, the use of long-term rewards to create sustainable growth is neglected in smaller companies. Size is seen as a relevant factor. The CEO-worker pay ratio is estimated unsuited and insignificant for determining executive compensation.
Author: Luis Gomez-Mejia Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135974276 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 331
Book Description
Compensation is a systematic approach to providing monetary value and other benefits to employees in exchange for their work and service. But pay and conditions becomes a more complicated issue for multinational companies which operate across different locations and cultures, and who employ an increasingly diverse range of personnel. This unique new text gives in-depth analysis of the key themes and emerging topics faced by global enterprises when dealing with compensation issues. The first section, ‘Foundation Concepts’, looks at the design of compensation packages for a number of different employee groups; from supply chain management to research and development, as well as ethical considerations when dealing with a global context, and the concept of performance related pay. The second section, ‘Global Applications’, looks at current debates in the field, including the influence of national cultures on compensation schemes, discrepancies in CEO pay, and contrasts in wages between industry types. Part of Routledge’s Global HRM, this is is an invaluable text for any student of HRM, Business and Management, or any practitioner working in this area.
Author: Lucian Bebchuk Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 067426195X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Ellen Geesje Schraa
Author: Ellen Geesje Schraa
Author: Frederick D. Lipman
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Author: Luis Gomez-Mejia
Author: Steven Balsam
Author: Benjamin Hermalin
Author: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Author: Alice Friedl
Author: Luis Gomez-Mejia
Author: Lucian Bebchuk