Author: Hyungju ChaPublisher:
ISBN: 9781321295535
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Monetary Policy Committees, Learning and Communication
Author: Anke WeberPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451982631
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 43
Book Description
This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.
Committee Decision Making in Monetary Policy
Author: Hyungju ChaPublisher:
ISBN: 9781321295535
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy
Author: Henry W. Chappell, Jr.Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262262200
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Book Description
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions. In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices. To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
An Analysis of Central Bank Decision-making
Author: Maria DemertzisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The process by which central banks take decisions has evolved over the years, with a tendency towards independence and decisions taken by committees rather than individuals. Monetary policy committees can be set up formally in different ways, traditionally falling into one of two categories: individualistic or collegial. Individualistic committees reach decisions by voting and publish the votes of each of their members, while in collegial committees, decisions are typically reached collectively. The European Central Bank is an example of the latter, while the Bank of England follows an individualistic approach. Focusing on decision-making, a relevant question is whether the formal set-up in practice leads to different ways of deliberating and reaching monetary policy decisions. We look at decisions taken by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over more than 20 years to evaluate how different the decision-making process is in these three central banks. The results indicate that, irrespective of the committee type, their approach to consensus building when they take decisions is similar. The three central banks seem to value reaching decisions by unanimity, both on interest rates - the prime monetary policy instrument by definition - and on asset purchases. Decisions to tighten monetary policy are more often taken unanimously than decisions to ease monetary policy. When maintaining policy unchanged, decisions are usually backed by most committee members.
Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design
Author: Jérôme VandenbusschePublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.
Communication, Decision-Making and the Optimal Degree of Transparency of Monetary Policy Committees
Author: Anke WeberPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
This paper develops a theoretical model of dynamic decision-making of a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members. It investigates the optimal transparency, and the optimal way of transmitting information of committees, by analysing the effects different communication strategies have on financial markets. It is shown that the communication strategy of the central bank committee has a significant effect on the predictability of monetary policy decisions when there is asymmetric information between the committee and market agents. Transparency about the diversity of views of the committee surrounding the economic outlook makes future monetary policy more predictable. However, communicating the diversity of views regarding monetary policy decisions may lead to less predictability of monetary policy in the short term. In addition, it is shown that communication in the form of voting records has the greatest effect on market participants' near term policy expectations. These results support findings of the empirical literature and have strong implications for the optimal communication strategies of committees including the question whether individual voting records should be published.
Monetary Policy Decision-Making by Committees Under Risk and Uncertainty
Author: Alexander JungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
Monetary policy-makers face various types of uncertainty and these uncertainties are exacerbated during episodes of a financial crisis. Blinder (2004) suggests that monetary policy committees help to make better decisions in the presence of uncertainty. In this paper, we explore monetary policy decision-making under risk and uncertainty within an insurance model with expected utility-maximizing policy-makers. We assume that policy-makers are different in terms of their backgrounds, experience and skills and they may disagree on the appropriate policy response. In a monetary policy committee, they share information and decide on interest rates by means of an agreed voting rule. We derive under what condition committees are expected to take better monetary policy decisions than single policy-makers. We also show that, in the presence of risk and search costs, it would be optimal for policy-makers to fully insure against the expected loss from a potential policy error. In practice, whether a monetary policy committee sufficiently hedges against this risk, may depend on several factors such as the skills of policy-makers, members' beliefs, and the committee's (statutory) voting rule.
Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design
Author: Jerome VandenbusschePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.
Author: Clare LOMBARDELLI
Author: Jan Marc Berk