Comment on Top-of-the-market Contract-pricing Clauses

Comment on Top-of-the-market Contract-pricing Clauses PDF Author: Sheldon Kimmel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 30

Book Description


Comment on Top-of-The-Market Contract-Pricing Clauses

Comment on Top-of-The-Market Contract-Pricing Clauses PDF Author: Sheldon Kimmel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Xia and Sexton find anti-competitive effects from contracts between meat-packers and ranchers that require delivery of all of a contracting rancher's cattle to the packer it contracted with at the highest price cattle wind up selling for in the spot market (i.e., the "Top-of-the-Market" price). While XS recommend banning such clauses, this comment shows that the SX model is too unrealistic to support such a conclusion. Since TOMP clauses can provide important benefits to society, and there is no particular reason to think that they are harmful, they should not be banned.

Evidence on Pricing from the Continental Airlines Code-share Agreement

Evidence on Pricing from the Continental Airlines Code-share Agreement PDF Author: Olivier Armantier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 44

Book Description


The Competitive Implications of Top-of-The-Market and Related Contract-Pricing Clauses

The Competitive Implications of Top-of-The-Market and Related Contract-Pricing Clauses PDF Author: Tian Xia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
This article examines the competitive implications of contract pricing arrangements, which link the contract price to the subsequent cash price. We focus on so-called "top-of-the-market pricing" (TOMP) in cattle procurement. The TOMP clause is shown to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the TOMP clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market. The TOMP clause reduces packers' incentives to compete aggressively in the spot market. Although TOMP pricing is not in producers' collective interest, rational sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts with little or no financial inducement.

An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts

An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts PDF Author: Patrick Greenlee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 50

Book Description


A Note on the Incidence and Possible Cost of "critical Circumstances" Penalties in U.S. Antidumping Enforcement

A Note on the Incidence and Possible Cost of Author: William W. Nye
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antidumping duties
Languages : en
Pages : 42

Book Description


Contracting Over Uncertain Property Rights

Contracting Over Uncertain Property Rights PDF Author: Dean V. Williamson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Eminent domain
Languages : en
Pages : 54

Book Description


Domestic Airline Alliances and Consumer Welfare

Domestic Airline Alliances and Consumer Welfare PDF Author: Olivier Armantier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 62

Book Description


Use of Econometrics at the U.S. Department of Justice

Use of Econometrics at the U.S. Department of Justice PDF Author: George A. Rozanski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Econometrics
Languages : en
Pages : 50

Book Description


The Determination of Antitrust Liability in U.S. V. Microsoft

The Determination of Antitrust Liability in U.S. V. Microsoft PDF Author: Wayne R. Dunham
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 160

Book Description