FM 3-90.12 Combined Arms Gap-Crossing Operations PDF Download
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Author: U S Army Publisher: Independently Published ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 212
Book Description
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.The doctrine of gap-crossing operations focuses on the support provided by engineer and other capabilities to the combined arms team that enhances mobility of the force by projecting elements across an obstacle, wet or dry, in support of assured mobility. It is also applicable to joint, interagency, or multinational forces and is specifically written as a dual manual between the United States (U.S.) Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). Although other branches contribute to gap-crossing operations and are included in the discussions, this manual focuses on the engineer contribution to gap-crossing operations, while acknowledging the significant role of other branches and capabilities. This manual follows the principles and tenets found in Field Manual (FM) 3-90, FM 3-34, and FM 3-34.2 that continues the discussion of mobility and gap-crossing operations. It recognizes the contribution of the entire combined arms team to gap-crossing operations and the multi-Service capabilities that exist to support gap-crossing operations at both the tactical and operational levels. Finally, it addresses the specifics associated with gap crossing in support of combat maneuver and line of communications (LOC) gap crossing, integrating the considerations created by the significant changes to doctrine and force structure that have occurred since FM 90-13 was published in 1998.
Author: U S Army Publisher: Independently Published ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 212
Book Description
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.The doctrine of gap-crossing operations focuses on the support provided by engineer and other capabilities to the combined arms team that enhances mobility of the force by projecting elements across an obstacle, wet or dry, in support of assured mobility. It is also applicable to joint, interagency, or multinational forces and is specifically written as a dual manual between the United States (U.S.) Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). Although other branches contribute to gap-crossing operations and are included in the discussions, this manual focuses on the engineer contribution to gap-crossing operations, while acknowledging the significant role of other branches and capabilities. This manual follows the principles and tenets found in Field Manual (FM) 3-90, FM 3-34, and FM 3-34.2 that continues the discussion of mobility and gap-crossing operations. It recognizes the contribution of the entire combined arms team to gap-crossing operations and the multi-Service capabilities that exist to support gap-crossing operations at both the tactical and operational levels. Finally, it addresses the specifics associated with gap crossing in support of combat maneuver and line of communications (LOC) gap crossing, integrating the considerations created by the significant changes to doctrine and force structure that have occurred since FM 90-13 was published in 1998.
Author: United Army Publisher: ISBN: 9781494240356 Category : Languages : en Pages : 212
Book Description
the combined arms team that enhances mobility of the force by projecting elements across an obstacle, wet ordry, in support of assured mobility. It is also applicable to joint, interagency, or multinational forces and isspecifically written as a dual manual between the United States (U.S.) Army and the U.S. Marine Corps(USMC). Although other branches contribute to gap-crossing operations and are included in the discussions,this manual focuses on the engineer contribution to gap-crossing operations, while acknowledging thesignificant role of other branches and capabilities. This manual follows the principles and tenets found in FieldManual (FM) 3-90, FM 3-34, and FM 3-34.2 that continues the discussion of mobility and gap-crossingoperations. It recognizes the contribution of the entire combined arms team to gap-crossing operations and themulti-Service capabilities that exist to support gap-crossing operations at both the tactical and operationallevels. Finally, it addresses the specifics associated with gap crossing in support of combat maneuver and lineof communications (LOC) gap crossing, integrating the considerations created by the significant changes todoctrine and force structure that have occurred since FM 90-13 was published in 1998.This FM is the tactical commander's and engineer staff planner's manual and primary resource forunderstanding gap-crossing operations. This manual follows the mobility concepts and fundamentals outlinedin FM 3-34.2 and is intended for use by commanders and their staff at both the operational and tactical levels. Itrelates the engineer-focused aspects of gap crossing to the functional area of combined arms mobilityoperations, incorporating new concepts associated with the expansion of the existing Army task (ART)Conduct Gap-Crossing Operations and the advent of the modular force structure.
Author: U. S. Military Publisher: ISBN: 9781520493022 Category : Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
Throughout history, opposed river crossing operations have proven to be some of the bloodiest and most complex endeavors for any military force. However, due to a sixty-year lull in having to cross a river in the face of the enemy, the United States Army has shown a trend of diminishing its resource capacity necessary to conduct these crossings, and is losing doctrinal focus for the task. Most significantly, doctrine does not provide an appreciation for the large impacts a river crossing has on the remainder of an operation. This analysis looks at three large-scale, opposed river crossing operations in the mechanized warfare era. All three cases involve a successful opposed river crossing, but vary in the level of operational reach or time before culmination. The variance in each case stems from the preparation for and execution of the river crossing. The analysis identifies three elements that had the greatest impact on the operational reach of units after the river crossing: the rapid employment of overwhelming strength, a deliberate plan to provide assault crossing resources regardless of existing bridges, and a detailed plan that included the transition from bridgehead to breakout operations. The recorded history of ground combat has shown that river crossing operations have always been a focal point for planners. The great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz himself devoted a chapter of his masterpiece On War to this subject. In it, he referred to the "respect in which an attack on a defended river is held by most generals." While evidence in past military theory and history repeatedly demonstrated the importance of this tactical task, the recent history of the United States Army reveals a decrease in the frequency of attacks over well-defended rivers. The United States Army has not conducted an opposed, deliberate wet gap crossing since World War II. Future combat operations, however, could require gap crossings and the Army must remain proficient in planning for and conducting them. Rivers that would require non-hasty crossing methods exist in every geographic region, meaning that any future Army operation against a conventional force could require a deliberate gap crossing. History demonstrates the importance of the tactical task of gap crossing to overall mission accomplishment. Some of the most successful gap crossings in history involved entire armies of multiple corps focused on nothing but establishing a bridgehead, as with the spring 1945 Rhine crossing's in World War II and Operation Badr in the Arab-Israeli War. History also demonstrates that operations can fail in spite of a successful gap crossing. The Allied failure in Operation Market-Garden during World War II showed that successfully crossing a river such as the Waal does not necessarily lead to operational success. If in planning and execution, commanders and their staffs do not integrate the gap crossing with other tactical actions effectively, the operation may culminate earlier than expected. Despite historical evidence that demonstrates the challenges associated with gap crossings, after a seventy-year lull in US experience with opposed crossings the United States Army gradually diminished its efforts to prepare for gap crossing operations. Army leaders reduced the number of units and associated equipment that specialize in gap crossing. Most recently, they approved updated doctrine that relegates gap crossing-once the topic of a dedicated field manual-to a single chapter of the 2011 Combined Arms Mobility manual. Training centers have noted that current units struggle to plan and execute gap crossing operations.
Author: Major Kristen N., Kristen Dahle, US Army Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781480022614 Category : Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
The focus of this thesis is to determine how U.S. Army corps and divisions ensure deliberate gap crossings, a type of combined arms operations, are planned using operational art. Examination of doctrine for gap crossings shows gap crossing to be tactical problems. Corps, division, and operational art doctrine does not directly address the need to incorporate gap crossings as part of an overall campaign. This paper compares two case studies from World War II in their strategic context with tactical outcomes using operational art. The failed crossing of the Rapido River in Italy and the successful crossing of the Irrawaddy in Burma are the two historical case studies examined. Operational art considered for each campaign shows the importance of the planners' and commanders' understanding and communication of not only the tactical requirements of a gap crossing but also how the crossing is part of the larger operation to achieve the strategic goal. Current gap crossing doctrine is tactically focused and should remain tactically focused. This monograph determined operational planners and commanders at the division and corps must understand operational art and incorporate it into the planning of a gap crossing like any other tactical action to facilitate the success of a campaign.
Author: Major John Ordonio Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782898123 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 93
Book Description
Crossing a river against a defending enemy force is a difficult and complex task for any army. History has shown that preparation is necessary to avoid disasters during this type of operation. In 2003, the Third Infantry Division crossed the Euphrates River because it was prepared for this task and possessed the necessary equipment. Since then, no other divisions or corps has executed river crossing operations. While the United States Army focused on counterinsurgency operations during the last twelve years, it underwent significant changes to adapt to meet the adversities on the battlefield. It transformed its war-fighting organizations, trained its corps and divisions with computer simulations, and relegated field training to brigade and below units. In addition, its current doctrine now refers to river crossings as the deliberate wet gap crossing. Because of these changes, many questions arose as to the present corps and divisions’ preparedness to do large-scale operations, to include its ability to plan, prepare, and execute the deliberate wet gap crossing. If called today, could these organizations conduct this complex operation? Examining river crossings in Europe during the Second World War was appropriate for insight into how the previous generation of corps and divisions prepared and executed such a complex task. After analyzing how these units were able to cross the numerous waterways in Europe, the present Army should consider reassessing its doctrine, training, and organization and equipment to prepare its units for future deliberate wet gap crossings.
Author: Michael K. Collmeyer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military engineering Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
The 'E-FORCE' concept for restructuring engineer forces will provide to the heavy divisions the organic combat engineer forces necessary to satisfy the mobility, countermobility, and survivability requirements in forward combat areas. During the past several years, the broad, basic thrust of the E-FORCE concept has been studied and the general organizational architecture has been critically examined. This study seeks to bring into sharper focus one of the peripheral issues: the E-FORCE ribbon bridge company that is part of the Division Engineer element that is proposed for the heavy divisions. It looks at a variety of issues that affect the requirement for river crossing support within the divisions. The issues analyzed include: the frequency and predictability of river crossing operations; the effective use of critical bridge assets; the responsiveness of the gap crossing support; the deployability and maneuverability of the heavy divisions; the vulnerability of critical river crossing assets; maintenance support; the delineation of responsibility for providing engineer support for river crossing operations; and the conduct of combined arms training in deliberate river crossing operations. The interrelationships of the individual issues is examined.
Author: Peter J Schifferle Editor Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781727842913 Category : Languages : en Pages : 218
Book Description
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
Author: U S Army
Author: U S Army
Author: United Army
Author: 
Author: U. S. Military
Author: Major Kristen N., Kristen Dahle, US Army
Author: Major John Ordonio
Author: Michael K. Collmeyer
Author: Jonathan Mallory House
Author: Peter J Schifferle Editor
Author: