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Author: Douglas J. Fairhurst Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
We explore the sources of gains in horizontal mergers by exploiting heterogeneity between the merging firms' geographic footprints. We calculate the geographic overlap between the bidder, target, and their rivals and customers to identify variation in the competitive impact of horizontal mergers. We document significantly positive rival reactions and negative customer reactions when the bidder and target operate in similar geographic regions, consistent with anticompetitive effects in these deals. We also exploit staggered changes in the political affiliation of state Attorneys General (AGs) to identify variation in local antitrust enforcement. We show that bidders avoid concentrating mergers when they operate in a high proportion of states with Democratic AGs, and Democratic AGs moderate the effects of concentrating mergers on local rivals and customers. Our evidence supports the argument that geographically-concentrating horizontal mergers are more likely to be anticompetitive. We also document a significant role of state-level AGs in the M&A regulatory process.
Author: Douglas J. Fairhurst Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
We explore the sources of gains in horizontal mergers by exploiting heterogeneity between the merging firms' geographic footprints. We calculate the geographic overlap between the bidder, target, and their rivals and customers to identify variation in the competitive impact of horizontal mergers. We document significantly positive rival reactions and negative customer reactions when the bidder and target operate in similar geographic regions, consistent with anticompetitive effects in these deals. We also exploit staggered changes in the political affiliation of state Attorneys General (AGs) to identify variation in local antitrust enforcement. We show that bidders avoid concentrating mergers when they operate in a high proportion of states with Democratic AGs, and Democratic AGs moderate the effects of concentrating mergers on local rivals and customers. Our evidence supports the argument that geographically-concentrating horizontal mergers are more likely to be anticompetitive. We also document a significant role of state-level AGs in the M&A regulatory process.
Author: C. Edward Fee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
We investigate the upstream and downstream product-market effects of a large sample of horizontal mergers and acquisitions from 1980-1997. We construct a dataset that identifies the corporate customers, suppliers, and rivals of the firms initiating horizontal mergers and use this dataset to examine announcement-related stock market revaluations and post-merger changes in operating performance. We find little evidence consistent with increased monopolistic collusion. However, we do find evidence consistent with improved productive efficiency and buying power as sources of gains to horizontal mergers. The nature of the buying power gains, i.e., rents from monopsonistic collusion or improved purchasing efficiency, is also investigated.
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 272
Book Description
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Author: William Blumenthal Publisher: American Bar Association ISBN: 9780897072403 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 356
Book Description
Number 14 in the Antitrust law Section monograph series, this work summarizes the state of the law in every area affecting semihorizontal, conglomerate and vertical mergers, and was prepared as a companion to Monograph 12.
Author: Douglas J. Fairhurst
Author: Douglas J. Fairhurst
Author: George A. Hay
Author: Daniel Gore
Author: C. Edward Fee
Author: 
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston
Author: Richard J. Gilbert
Author: National Association of Attorneys General
Author: William Blumenthal
Author: Massimo Motta