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Author: Hideaki Miyajima Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate governance Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
We examine the turnover of top executives in Japanese firms throughout the period from 1990 to 2013. During this time, the presence of a main bank has been weakened, the ownership of institutional investors has dramatically increased, and independent outside directors have been introduced in many firms. We find that top executive turnover sensitivity to corporate performance has not changed, although return on equity (ROE) and stock returns displace return on assets (ROA) as performance indicators that turnover is most sensitive to. The evidence also indicates that instead of the main bank, foreign institutional investors have begun to play an important governance role in Japan. However, the main bank does not abandon its governance role. While the scope of the main bank’s authority may have substantially contracted, main banks continue to perform a certain role in disciplining management.
Author: Hideaki Miyajima Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate governance Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
We examine the turnover of top executives in Japanese firms throughout the period from 1990 to 2013. During this time, the presence of a main bank has been weakened, the ownership of institutional investors has dramatically increased, and independent outside directors have been introduced in many firms. We find that top executive turnover sensitivity to corporate performance has not changed, although return on equity (ROE) and stock returns displace return on assets (ROA) as performance indicators that turnover is most sensitive to. The evidence also indicates that instead of the main bank, foreign institutional investors have begun to play an important governance role in Japan. However, the main bank does not abandon its governance role. While the scope of the main bank’s authority may have substantially contracted, main banks continue to perform a certain role in disciplining management.
Author: Benjamin Maury Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper empirically investigates how corporate governance forces and firm performance affect top executive turnover in Finnish listed companies. I document an increase in CEO, top management, and board turnover in response to poor stock price performance and operating income losses. The sensitivity of the relation between stock price performance and CEO turnover is significantly higher in firms with a two-tier board structure (when the CEO is not the Chairman), but significantly lower when the CEO or a board member is the controlling shareholder. These results suggest that both the ownership structure and the board design have implications for the disciplining of managers.
Author: Ruud A.I. van Frederikslust Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1134136056 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 780
Book Description
Pt. 1. Alternative perspectives on corporate governance systems -- pt. 2. Equity ownership structure and control -- pt. 3. Corporate governance, underperformance and management turnover -- pt. 4. Directors' remuneration -- pt. 5. Governance, performance and financial strategy -- pt. 6. On takeover as disciplinary mechanism.
Author: Anup Agrawal Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Anecdotal evidence suggests that top managers of firms that are investigated for fraud lose their jobs. Fraud scandals plausibly create incentives to change managers, in an attempt to improve the firm's performance, recover lost reputational capital, or limit the firm's exposure to liabilities that arise from the fraud. It also is possible that fraud creates incentives to change the composition of the firm's board, to improve the external monitoring of managers or to rent new directors' valuable reputational or political capital. Despite such claims, we find little systematic evidence that firms suspected or charged with fraud have unusually high turnover among senior managers or directors. In univariate comparisons, there is some evidence that firms committing fraud have higher managerial and director turnover. But in multivariate tests that control for other firm attributes, such evidence disappears. These findings indicate that the revelation of fraud does not, in general, increase the net benefits to changing managers or the firm's leadership structure.
Author: Michael Useem Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 9780674273986 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 322
Book Description
A quiet revolution came to corporate America during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large shareholders - pension funds, insurance companies, money managers, and commercial banks - exercised new-found muscle, pressuring senior managers to improve disappointing financial results by reshaping their organizations. Michael Useem reveals how those investor pressures have transformed the inside structures of many corporations, better aligning them with shareholder interests. Useem draws on numerous sources, including interviews with senior managers and intensive studies of seven large corporations representing a range of restructuring experiences and industries - including pharmaceuticals, transportation, chemicals, retailing, and financial services. He shows that organizational changes have affected many areas of corporate life: headquarters staffs have been reduced, authority has filtered down to operating units, and compensation has become more closely tied to performance. Change also extends to corporate governance, where managers have fought back by seeking legal safeguards against takeovers and by staggering board terms. They've also put significant resources into building more effective relations with shareholders. As Useem demonstrates, this revolution has reached beyond the corporation, influencing American politics and law. As increasing ownership concentration has caused companies to focus more attention on shareholders, corporate political agendas have shifted from fighting government regulation to resisting shareholder intrusion. This book will be important reading for managers, economists, lawyers, financial analysts, and all observers of American business.
Author: Sabri Boubaker Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642315798 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 445
Book Description
The current crisis has rocked the financial system worldwide and has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the existing regulatory regime. Thousands of firms have gone bankrupt and many financial institutions were bailed out by governments. The effects of the crisis have shaken emerging and developing markets alike and have not spared neither small nor large businesses. Many scholars and practitioners attribute the roots of the crisis to failures and weaknesses in the way corporate governance has been practiced since the mid-1990s. Lax board oversight of top management, short-termism and self-interested behavior have been fingered as the culprits behind recent financial turmoil. This book highlights the recent developments and new trends in corporate governance. The eighteen chapters, written by leading academics and experts, can assist corporate executives, governance bodies, investors, market regulators, and policymakers in having a global picture of major corporate governance issues. This book highlights the recent developments and new trends in corporate governance. The eighteen chapters, written by leading academics and experts, can assist corporate executives, governance bodies, investors, market regulators, and policymakers in having a global picture of major corporate governance issues.
Author: Rajeswarar S. Chaganti Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA ISBN: 0313007837 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 172
Book Description
The ability to implement change quickly is crucial to an organizations's success—not only in traditionally sedate industries, but also in today's fast-moving hi-tech ones. Sherman and Chaganti, from their study of 100 American corporations, half in stable industries, half in volatile ones, find that a firm's structure of governance bears heavily on the speed with which the firm can reorient itself. What are the characteristics of firms that change quickly? What inhibits others? And what, precisely, is the impact of a firm's stockholders, board and top management on its ability to adapt? Sherman and Chaganti provide answers to these and other questions, in the first book yet to focus entirely on the determinants of time in corporate reorientations. In order for a firm to develop or sustain a competitive advantage, it must not only adapt correctly to environmental change, but also adapt quickly. This study examines the factors associated with the time a firm takes to initiate reorientation. The results of the research indicate that even in relatively large organizations, reorientations are not rare and occur routinely. Further, deterioration of a firm's financial condition tends to hasten its initiation of reorientation. However, the determinants of time taken to initiate reorientation differ in firms with relatively high prior performance and firms with relatively low prior performance.
Author: Hideaki Miyajima
Author: Hideaki Miyajima
Author: Benjamin Maury
Author: Ruud A.I. van Frederikslust
Author: Paolo Volpin
Author: Anup Agrawal
Author: Michael Useem
Author: Steven J. Johnson
Author: Sabri Boubaker
Author: Ashay Bhalchandra Desai
Author: Rajeswarar S. Chaganti