Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Goals of Macroeconomic Policy

Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Goals of Macroeconomic Policy PDF Author: Ralph C. Bryant
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 42

Book Description


Central Bank Independence

Central Bank Independence PDF Author: Jan Kleineman
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004481303
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 238

Book Description
In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.

Central Bank Independence

Central Bank Independence PDF Author: Ignacio Mas
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 7071614172
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description


Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility

Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility PDF Author: Francesco Lippi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782542971
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180

Book Description
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.

The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions

The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions PDF Author: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780894991967
Category : Banks and Banking
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance

On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance PDF Author: Mr.Alberto Musalem Borrero
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451843743
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints across institutions. Abstracting from long-run considerations, higher central bank independence increases fiscal discipline and results in lower inflation and growth, generating a short-run institutional Phillips curve. In the presence of sufficiently strong negative long-run externalities of inflation onto growth, higher CBI also increases fiscal discipline and generates lower inflation, however, it also yields higher growth and generates an inverted institutional Phillips curve. Strikingly, higher central bank independence is found to be frequently sub-optimal for a wide set of stylized economies. Whether these economies are empirically relevant is an open question.

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation PDF Author: Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475502915
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27

Book Description
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.

Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies PDF Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451844239
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33

Book Description
Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.

The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence

The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence PDF Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100

Book Description


Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency

Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency PDF Author: B. Laurens
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230282121
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290

Book Description
This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.