Capital Structure, Prices and Tacit Collusion PDF Download

Author: Jane Hobson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 24

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Author: Margaret Jane Hobson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital budget
Languages : en
Pages : 444

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Author: Gerald Leon Wallace
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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The United States acute care hospital (ACH) market provides a unique environment in which to examine questions about market structure and performance. The ACHs operate in a mature market of health services that is highly regulated and has one dominant primary consumer of services. The uncharacteristic industry structure offers the opportunity to analyze pervasive agency relationships and capital structure issues in a new setting. In addition, the policies of the U.S. Government have created an environment in which tacit collusion is likely to flourish, which leads to market buyer power (monopsony, or buyers acting as one monopoly buyer). A key question is the extent to which monopsony and agency affect capital structure decisions. Agency is defined by Ross (1973, p.134) as a relationship formed between a principle and their agents, "when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems." This thesis extends the agency framework provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976), along with the econometric understanding of monopsony in healthcare via tacit collusion, as suggested by Pauly (1998) and Sevilla (2005), and the research constraints of monopsony under an all-or-nothing contract, as outlined by Taylor (2003). Using data on ACHs from the period of 1995 to 2007 for approximately 5,000 ACHs, which was derived from the Medicare Cost Report and medical payments for a sub-population of 1,500, this research examines the determinants of capital structure in a distorted market. Building upon this initial analysis, the research seeks to examine the effects of market distortions upon free cash flow, and ultimately, capital structure. Two theories of distortion are presented that would affect free cash flow: The first is that of the agency cost of free cash flow and signaling, and the second is a theory of monopsony via tacit collusion between buyers. A model of the agency relationship between ACHs and the U.S. Government is proposed, promoting agency cost (signaling and the agency cost of free cash flows) as a causal relation with free cash flows and capital structure (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Empirical models of agency are constructed, examining the dependence on government business and the relation to the leverage (signaling) and free cash flows (agency cost of free cash flows) for ACHs. In addition, a complementary theory of capital structure determinant via market power (monopsony) is formulated, suggesting that monopsony conditions within the ACH market affect free cash flows and capital structure. The analysis provides a framework for understanding the environments in which ACHs operate and the strength of bargaining within the market. The research concludes with a review of the determinants of capital structure in light of the inefficiencies and distortions of the industry and the relationships observed.

Author: Marc Lars Lipson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate debt
Languages : en
Pages : 262

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Author: Giancarlo Spagnolo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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The paper presents a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders - such as hiring managers with valuable reputations or quot;conservativequot; incentives - besides reducing the agency costs of debt finance also greatly facilitate tacit collusion in product markets. Concentrated or collusive credit markets, interlinked banking groups, or simply large banks can ensure the credibility of such commitments (renegotiation-proofness), thereby quot;exportingquot; collusion through leverage in otherwise competitive downstream product markets. The results appear relevant to the debate on the relative efficiency of quot;Anglo-Saxonquot; vs. quot;Continental-Japanesequot; financial practices. Implications for competition policy in the credit market and the regulation of the banking industry are discussed.

Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536

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The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Author: David Gilo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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This paper examines the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: International Economic Association
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262690935
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 588

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These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta

Author: Riemer Pieter Faber
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9036101654
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157

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