Author: CAN WE WIN IN VIETNAM.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Barbara W. Tuchman
Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks
ISBN: 0345308239
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 530

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Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Barbara W. Tuchman, author of the World War I masterpiece The Guns of August, grapples with her boldest subject: the pervasive presence, through the ages, of failure, mismanagement, and delusion in government. Drawing on a comprehensive array of examples, from Montezuma’s senseless surrender of his empire in 1520 to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Barbara W. Tuchman defines folly as the pursuit by government of policies contrary to their own interests, despite the availability of feasible alternatives. In brilliant detail, Tuchman illuminates four decisive turning points in history that illustrate the very heights of folly: the Trojan War, the breakup of the Holy See provoked by the Renaissance popes, the loss of the American colonies by Britain’s George III, and the United States’ own persistent mistakes in Vietnam. Throughout The March of Folly, Tuchman’s incomparable talent for animating the people, places, and events of history is on spectacular display. Praise for The March of Folly “A glittering narrative . . . a moral [book] on the crimes and follies of governments and the misfortunes the governed suffer in consequence.”—The New York Times Book Review “An admirable survey . . . I haven’t read a more relevant book in years.”—John Kenneth Galbraith, The Boston Sunday Globe “A superb chronicle . . . a masterly examination.”—Chicago Sun-Times

Author: Frank E. Armbruster
Publisher: New York : Praeger
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 456

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Author: Sophie Quinn-Judge
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 9780520235335
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 388

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"A thoroughly researched and elegantly written account of what is arguably the most important topic in modern Vietnamese political history. [Quinn-Judge's] sources allow her to sketch a vivid, nuanced portrait of Ho Chi Minh and to unravel the complex interplay of domestic and international forces that shaped the historical emergence and development of Vietnamese Communism."--Peter Zinoman, University of California, Berkeley

Author: Kevin M. Boylan
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700623523
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 376

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Book Description
Americans have fought two prolonged battles over Vietnam—one in southeast Asia and one, ongoing even now, at home—over whether the war was unnecessary, unjust, and unwinnable. Revisionist historians who reject this view have formulated many contra-factual scenarios for how the war might have been won, but also put forward one historically testable hypothesis—namely that the war actually was won after the 1968 Tet Offensive, only to be thrown away later through a failure of political will. It is this “Lost Victory” hypothesis that Kevin M. Boylan takes up in Losing Binh Dinh, aiming to determine once and for all whether the historical record supports such a claim. Proponents of the “Lost Victory” thesis contend that by 1972, President Richard Nixon's policy of “Vietnamization” had effectively eliminated South Vietnamese insurgents, “pacified” the countryside, and prepared the South Vietnamese to defend their own territory with only logistical and financial support from Americans. Rejecting the top-down approach favored by Revisionists, Boylan examines the facts on the ground in Binh Dinh, a strategically vital province that was the second most populous in South Vietnam, controlled key transportation routes, and contained one of the nation's few major seaports as well as the huge US Air Force base at Phu Cat. Taking an in-depth look at operations that were conducted in the province, Boylan is able to uncover the fundamental flaw in the dual objectives of “Vietnamization” and “Pacification”—namely, that they were mutually exclusive. The inefficiency and corruption of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces was so crippling that progress in pacification occurred only when Americans took the lead—which, in turn, left the South Vietnamese even more dependent on US support.

Author: Thomas L. Ahern
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813139333
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 442

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This insider’s account of CIA operations in the Vietnam War is “a major contribution to scholarship” on US counterinsurgency programs (John Prados, author of Lost Crusader). Vietnam Declassified is a detailed account of the CIA's effort to help South Vietnamese authorities win the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasantry and suppress the Viet Cong. Covering the CIA engagement from 1954 to mid-1972, it provides a thorough analysis of the agency and its partners. Retired CIA operative and intelligence consultant Thomas L. Ahern Jr. is the first to comprehensively document the CIA's role in the rural pacification of South Vietnam, drawing from secret archives to which he had unrestricted access. In addition to a chronology of operations, the book explores the assumptions, political values, and cultural outlooks of not only the CIA and other US government agencies, but also of the peasants, Viet Cong, and Saigon government forces competing for their loyalty. “This long-awaited volume, finally cleared for open publication and filled with fascinating detail, insider perspective, and controversial judgments, is a must-read for all students of the Vietnam War.” —Lewis Sorley, author of Westmoreland

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 427

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Author: Peter Tilman Schuessler
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638157563
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 10

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Essay from the year 2002 in the subject History of Germany - Postwar Period, Cold War, grade: A, University of St Andrews (Department of Modern History), course: America and Vietnam, language: English, abstract: The discussion of this question starts with the definition of "victory". Surprisingly John Kennedy perceived the definition of the victory as difficult when he mentioned: "how can we tell if we ́re winning?" (Herring,1981,p.606). The possible range of victories stretches from setting an end to guerrilla attacks to a complete non-communist Vietnam. The original aim of the U.S. government was most plausibly a situation in which North Vietnam was no threat any more to the South, and the "Communist danger" was banned. Due to various reasons it was impossible to reach that goal. I will show that it was not only the guerrilla warfare that defeated the U.S. Army, it was this special type of insurgency war in this special region under these special circumstances that made this war unwinnable only with military means. If the American generals would have made different decisions they also would have been proven wrong. The war could not end in a victory for the U.S. because there were plenty of constraints which could not be solved in either one way or another. In this context information and trust play an important role. The United States was used to fighting wars that took place in distant regions they were not familiar with before. The difference with this war was that knowledge about this conflict and this land was important. One plausible possibility to gain this information would have been a "combined command" between American and South Vietnam forces as general Westmoreland sought (Herring,1990,p.6). But this was not possible because "the South Vietnamese resisted such an arrangement [...] perceiving it as a form of neo-colonialism" (ibid.) and the U.S. did not trust the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) fearing that they could be infiltrated by communists. It is understandable that the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) were afraid of spies within the army of their ally as the "cells" of the North Vietnamese were practising for subversion and sabotage (Thompson,1969,p.32-33). The American leaders on the other hand enforced Saigon to organise its divisions the same as the U.S. ones to be able to "receive [...] logistical support" (Tran Van Don,1987,p.149). Consequently the Southern troops again lost something of their own structure and self confidence. So there did not exist an alliance strategy the Americans could join in, and their strategy was not suitable for the country.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 4

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Author: David L. Anderson
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813145627
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 376

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More than three decades after the final withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia, the legacy of the Vietnam War continues to influence political, military, and cultural discourse. Journalists, politicians, scholars, pundits, and others have used the conflict to analyze each of America's subsequent military engagements. Many Americans have observed that Vietnam-era terms such as "cut and run," "quagmire," and "hearts and minds" are ubiquitous once again as comparisons between U.S. involvement in Iraq and in Vietnam seem increasingly appropriate. Because of its persistent significance, the Vietnam War era continues to inspire vibrant historical inquiry. The eminent scholars featured in The War That Never Ends offer fresh and insightful perspectives on the continuing relevance of the Vietnam War, from the homefront to "humping in the boonies," and from the great halls of political authority to the gritty hotbeds of oppositional activism. The contributors assert that the Vietnam War is central to understanding the politics of the Cold War, the social movements of the late twentieth century, the lasting effects of colonialism, the current direction of American foreign policy, and the ongoing economic development in Southeast Asia. The seventeen essays break new ground on questions relating to gender, religion, ideology, strategy, and public opinion, and the book gives equal emphasis to Vietnamese and American perspectives on the grueling conflict. The contributors examine such phenomena as the role of women in revolutionary organizations, the peace movements inspired by Buddhism, and Ho Chi Minh's successful adaptation of Marxism to local cultures. The War That Never Ends explores both the antiwar movement and the experiences of infantrymen on the front lines of battle, as well as the media's controversial coverage of America's involvement in the war. The War That Never Ends sheds new light on the evolving historical meanings of the Vietnam War, its enduring influence, and its potential to influence future political and military decision-making, in times of peace as well as war.