Author: David Arthur Malueg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Bounding the Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel P. O'Brien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Daniel Patrick O'Brien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets
Author: Michael L. Katz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in a Differentiated Oligopoly
Author: Takanori Adachi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands.
Welfare Effects of Third-degree Price Discrimination
Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-degree Price Discrimination
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price discrimination
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
Third-Degree Price Discrimination Revisited
Author: Youngsun Kwon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper solves a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands and discusses the effects of price discrimination on monopoly profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, using a simple model, this paper shows that the probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous. The virtual aggregated demand curve of the price-discriminating monopoly, corresponding to its aggregated marginal revenue curve, is derived. The curve is non-linear and lies above the aggregated demand curve of simple monopoly. The results of this paper may be used to explain to students the effects of third-degree price discrimination on market outcomes.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper solves a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands and discusses the effects of price discrimination on monopoly profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, using a simple model, this paper shows that the probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous. The virtual aggregated demand curve of the price-discriminating monopoly, corresponding to its aggregated marginal revenue curve, is derived. The curve is non-linear and lies above the aggregated demand curve of simple monopoly. The results of this paper may be used to explain to students the effects of third-degree price discrimination on market outcomes.
Quality Differences, Third-Degree Price Discrimination, and Welfare
Author: Francisco Galera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher-quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare-decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare-increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher-quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare-decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare-increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination.