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Author: Friederike Heiny Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper analyzes consumers' privacy choice concerning their private data and firms' ensuing pricing strategy. The General Data Protection Regulation passed by the European Union in May 2018 allows consumers to decide whether to reveal private information in the form of cookies to an online seller. By incorporating this endogenous decision into a duopoly model with behavior-based pricing, we find two contrasting equilibria. Under revelation to both firms, consumers disclose their information. Under revelation to only one firm, consumers hide their information. Based on the model, we design a laboratory experiment. We find that there is a large share of consumers who reveal their private data. Particularly, less privacy-concerned subjects and subjects in the setting where only one firm receives information are more likely to reveal information.
Author: Friederike Heiny Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper analyzes consumers' privacy choice concerning their private data and firms' ensuing pricing strategy. The General Data Protection Regulation passed by the European Union in May 2018 allows consumers to decide whether to reveal private information in the form of cookies to an online seller. By incorporating this endogenous decision into a duopoly model with behavior-based pricing, we find two contrasting equilibria. Under revelation to both firms, consumers disclose their information. Under revelation to only one firm, consumers hide their information. Based on the model, we design a laboratory experiment. We find that there is a large share of consumers who reveal their private data. Particularly, less privacy-concerned subjects and subjects in the setting where only one firm receives information are more likely to reveal information.
Author: Friederike Heiny Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study a duopoly model of behavior-based pricing where consumers decide whether they reveal their data or remain anonymous. We contrast two data policies: in an open data policy, revealed data is accessible by both sellers in the market. The unique equilibrium displays that all consumers reveal their data, while firms price discriminate causing welfare losses due to poaching. In an exclusive data policy, revealed data is only accessible by the one firm a consumer bought from. In equilibrium, consumers anonymize, prices are uniform and the market is efficient. We test these contrasting predictions in an experiment. In the open data treatment, subjects predominantly act as predicted. In the exclusive data treatment, buyers initially reveal their data as sellers reward loyalty. Subsequently, buyers adjust more towards anonymization, when sellers begin to employ poaching strategies.
Author: Rosa Branca Esteves Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper offers a complete picture of the impact of behavior-based price discrimination on profits, consumer surplus, and welfare in markets with a general demand function, where consumers and firms can discount the future at different discount factors. Regardless of the demand function considered, in comparison to uniform pricing, BBPD reduces firmsí second-period prices and profits. In contrast, we show that new results arise regarding the impact of BBPD on first-period prices. Under perfectly inelastic and CES demand, the firm-side e§ect is null and the consumer-side e§ect fully explains the increase in first-period prices. This is no longer the case when the price elasticity of demand varies with price level. Specifically, we show that the firm-side effect can lead firms to raise first-period prices, even when consumers are myopic. We also show that, depending on the demand function considered, the consumer side effect can act to reduce or increase first-period prices. The overall impact of BBPD on first-period prices depends on the interplay between these two effects. Our analysis reveals that the output effect and consumer switching play an important role in explaining the impact of BBPD on welfare. When discount factors are equal, BBPD may have a positive or negative impact on consumer surplus and social welfare, which contrasts with the result that BBPD is beneficial for consumers under a unit and CES demand. For a linear demand function, we identify the regions for firms and consumers discount factors where BBPD can simultaneously enhance or reduce total discounted profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare.
Author: Stefano Colombo Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In this article, we develop a model encompassing behavior-based discriminatory pricing as a limit case of a more general framework where firms have incomplete information about consumers' purchase histories. We show that information accuracy has a nonmonotonic impact on profits and the worst situation for firms is when information accuracy is intermediate. We also discuss welfare and consumer surplus implications of information accuracy. Although welfare monotonically decreases with the level of information accuracy, there is an inverse U-shape relationship between consumers surplus and information accuracy.
Author: Stefano Colombo Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We develop a model of behavior- and characteristic-based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior- and characteristic-based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers' heterogeneity.
Author: Chongwoo Choe Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
We study a two-period model of behavior-based price discrimination in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) but allow firms to make product choice in the first period. We show that the only possible equilibrium involves maximal differentiation. This is in contrast to Choe et al. (2018) where equilibrium features less than maximal differ- entiation when competition is in personalized pricing. Thus, our result highlights an important interplay between the type of price competition and product choice.
Author: Hoe Sang Chung Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper examines the profitability of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) by duopolists producing horizontally differentiated experience goods. Considering a three-stage game in which the firms first make price discrimination decisions followed by two-stage pricing decisions, the two main results we obtain are the following: (i) if consumers underestimate the quality of the products at a level that is not very low, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria where both firms do not collect information about consumers' purchase histories so that neither firm price discriminates and where both firms collect consumer information to practice BBPD; (ii) BBPD is more profitable than uniform pricing if consumers overestimate at a more than moderate level.
Author: Haggai Porat Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The legal literature on price discrimination focuses primarily on consumers' immutable features, like when higher interest rates are offered to black borrowers and higher prices to women at car dealerships. This paper examines a different type of discriminatory pricing practice: behavior-based pricing (BBP), where prices are set based on consumers' behavior, most prominently their prior purchasing decisions. The increased use of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to set prices has facilitated the growing penetration of BBP in various markets. Unlike race-based and sex-based discrimination, with BBP, consumers can strategically adjust their behavior to impact the prices they will be offered in the future. Sellers, in turn, can adjust prices in early periods to influence consumers' purchasing decisions so as to increase the informational value of these decisions and thereby maximize profits. This paper analyzes possible legal responses to BBP and arrives at three surprising policy implications: One, when non-BBP discrimination is efficient but with potentially problematic distributional implications, BBP can either increase or decrease efficiency. Two, even if BBP is desirable, mandating its disclosure may reduce overall welfare even though this would reduce informational asymmetry in the market. Three, a right to be forgotten (a right to erasure) may be desirable even though it increases informational asymmetry.
Author: Friederike Heiny
Author: Friederike Heiny
Author: Friederike Heiny
Author: Rosa Branca Esteves
Author: Andrew Cohen
Author: Stefano Colombo
Author: Charlotte B. Evensen
Author: Stefano Colombo
Author: Chongwoo Choe
Author: Hoe Sang Chung
Author: Haggai Porat