Bayesian Implementation in Transferable Utility Environments, and Other Essays in Microeconomic Theory PDF Download

Author: Chad Hogan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 204

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Author: Thomas R. Palfrey
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1000111555
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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Book Description
The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.

Author: Gabriel Alberto Martinez Roa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Chapter 1: Bayesian Persuasion in the Digital Age In digital platforms, agents have vast access to information, but the quality of it is unclear. This paper studies the impact of uncertainty about the quality of information as a Bayesian persuasion game with multiple senders. The model innovates by assuming the receiver samples only a small subset of the information available and whose quality uncertainty is endogenous. The receiver knows the signals chosen by each sender but randomly observes the realization of only one such signal. In equilibrium, senders can pool their signals, so the receiver is uncertain about the informativeness of the message received. Since pooling is prevalent, each sender chooses a signal to affect the average correlation between messages and states of the world. Thus, the strategies of other senders constrain each sender's ability to design information and may incentivize a sender to provide more or less information compared to the single-sender information design benchmark. The model suggests policies to improve the quality of the information on platforms such as social media. Chapter 2: Dynamic Trading in Decentralized Markets (with Marzena Rostek) Most financial assets are traded in multiple venues. We study a model of imperfectly competitive trading where agents have multiple opportunities to trade risky assets. We consider decentralized markets: the market comprises coexisting exchanges, each defined by a subset of traders and assets. We characterize the equilibrium dynamics of prices, trades, and price impact. Markets with the same prices, allocations, and price impact may differ in their dynamic efficiency properties depending on traders' participation in different exchanges. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions - based on trader participation alone - for markets to be dynamically efficient as trading becomes frequent. Decentralized markets for a single asset (or, more generally, standardized assets) are always dynamically efficient. For assets traded at low frequencies, even markets that are not dynamically efficient can give rise to higher total welfare than the centralized market. Increasing trading frequency can lower welfare due to the interaction of price impact and market incompleteness (i.e., limited participation in the exchanges). Chapter 3: Games among Groups (with Marzena Rostek and Ji Hee Yoon) In many social interactions, externalities and peer effects apply to groups rather than all agents. We model noncooperative games among a finite number of players who interact through any number of groups (a hypergraph). Groups endogenously change how the players value the interaction and contribute to it. Interaction through groups can realize a surplus that cannot be attained by a single group among the same players. Private clubs (interactions among some agents) can increase welfare if they are exclusive and not too prevalent. Different group interactions enhance equilibrium surplus through externality vs. risk-sharing motives.

Author: Vinit K. Jagdish
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Author: Thomas R. Palfrey
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780415269070
Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory
Languages : en
Pages : 104

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 816

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Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316781178
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 356

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Book Description
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Author: Nolan McCarty
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107438637
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

Author: A. Myrick Freeman
Publisher: Resources for the Future
ISBN: 9781891853623
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 516

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Book Description
Non-market valuation is becoming increasingly accepted as an evaluative tool of economics related to environmental and resource protection. Freeman (economics, Bowdoin College) presents an overview of the literature, introducing the principal methods and techniques of resource valuation. Chapters cover the measurement of welfare changes, revealed and stated preference models, nonuse models, aggregation of values across time, environmental quality as factor input, longevity and health valuation, property value models, hedonic wage models, and recreational uses of natural resource systems. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

Author: Pierre-André Chiappori
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691203504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262

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Book Description
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.