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Author: Major Roger N. Sangvic Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782899898 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.
Author: Major Roger N. Sangvic Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782899898 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.
Author: Roger N. Sangvic Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military assistence, American Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters." -- Abstract.
Author: Roger Sangvic Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781539302766 Category : Languages : en Pages : 102
Book Description
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters.
Author: John Maszka Publisher: Potomac Books ISBN: 1640121110 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 297
Book Description
As a scholar of terrorism, John Maszka has examined how politics, the media, and the War on Terror play off one another. His most startling claim is that the War on Terror is a war for natural resources—and that terrorism has little to do with it. Once the military became mechanized, oil quickly became the most sought-after commodity on the planet, and the race for energy was eventually framed as a matter of national security. Ironically, Maszka argues, the true threats to national security are the massive oil conglomerates themselves. Maszka delves into the repercussions of a government that capitalizes on an us versus them mentality, such as the demonizing of an entire religion, sensationalizing “radical” violent attacks, and loosely applying the word “terrorism.” Because the United States’ current approach to terrorism has led to the politicization and abuse of the term, Maszka suggests a need for a standardized definition of terrorism. Currently, too many acts of violence can be labeled terrorism, resulting in state and nonstate actors labeling their enemies as “terrorists,” yet claiming their own acts of violence as legitimate and retributive. Maszka argues that much of the violence labeled as terrorism today is not terrorism at all. In an ambitious attempt to connect seemingly unrelated events in politics and the media, Maszka offers an unflinching portrayal of the hypocrisy underlying our foreign policy.
Author: Lisa Hultman Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192584340 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 253
Book Description
Civil wars have caused tremendous human suffering in the last century, and the United Nations is often asked to send peacekeepers to stop ongoing violence. Yet despite being the most visible tool of international intervention, policymakers and scholars have little systematic knowledge about how well peacekeeping works. Peacekeeping in the Midst of War offers the most comprehensive analyses of peacekeeping on civil war violence to date. With unique data on different types of violence in civil wars around the world, Peacekeeping in the Midst of War offers a rigorous understanding of UN intervention by analysing both wars with and without UN peacekeeping efforts. It also directly measures the strength of UN missions in personnel capacity and constitution. Using large-n quantitative analyses, the book finds that UN peacekeeping missions with appropriately constituted force capacities mitigate violence in civil wars. The authors conclude by analyzing the broader context of UN intervention effectiveness, and conclude that peacekeeping is a more generally effective way to reduce the human suffering associated with civil war.
Author: Eric V. Larson Publisher: Rand Corporation ISBN: 0833040634 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 279
Book Description
The support of the American public is widely held to be a critical prerequisite for undertaking military action abroad. This monograph describes American public opinion toward wars and other large military operations over the last decade, to delineate the sources of support and opposition for each war or operation, to identify the principal fault lines in support, and to illuminate those factors that are consistent predictors of support for and opposition to military operations.
Author: Nicole Fox Publisher: University of Wisconsin Pres ISBN: 0299332209 Category : HISTORY Languages : en Pages : 274
Book Description
Nicole Fox investigates the ways memorials can shape the experiences of survivors decades after massacres have ended. She examines how memorializations can both heal and hurt, especially when they fail to represent all genders, ethnicities, and classes of those afflicted.
Author: John Maszka Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 1786344009 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 277
Book Description
Boko Haram is now the deadliest 'terrorist' organization operational in the world, by virtue of the sheer number of people the group have killed. Together with al-Shabaab, the two groups account for a substantial amount of carnage on the African continent. Analyzed here are the ideologies of these two infamous organizations. Utilizing information from breadcrumbs that they leave behind, in videos, media releases and various correspondence, this book searches for clues within the historical and contemporary social context that explain their existence. It explores the ideological roots the two organizations share and examines the goals and objectives of each group in order to calculate the nature of the threat posed in the broader international realm. It is argued that through applying strategic theory, and specifically the concept of strategic terrorism, it is possible to form a deeper understanding of two of the most dangerous militant organizations in operation today.
Author: Peter Baxter Publisher: Helion and Company ISBN: 1909384615 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 72
Book Description
The end of the Cold War introduced an altered global dynamic. The old bond of East/West patronage in Africa was broken, weakening the first crop of independent revolutionary leadership on the continent who no longer had the support of one or other of the superpowers. With collapse of the Soviet Union, all this changed. The question of global/strategic security devolved into regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, characterized primarily by the Balkans War, but also many other minor regional squabbles across the developing world that erupted as old regimes fell and nations sought to build unity out of the ashes. In Africa, the situation was exacerbated by an inherent tribalism and factionalism that had tended to be artificially suppressed by powerful, often military, dictatorships, generally unconcerned with the needs and requirements of an oppressed population. No more striking example of this can be found than Somalia. One of the only effective armed resistance movements mounted against European colonization in Africa took place in Somalia, which was suppressed only after enormous military expenditure. The crisis in Somalia that began to take shape with the ouster of military leader Mohammed Siad Barre during the early years of the 1990s forced both the United States and the United Nations to adapt their collective military policy toward the challenges of peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, in a human environment only dimly understood, extremely austere in terms of local infrastructure and with a warring clan leadership. This book tells the story of the international intervention that took place in Somalia, the successes, failures and lessons learned. Many broad assumptions were made based on an unclear understanding of the dynamics of a regional conflict, coupled with the necessity for the first time in modern military history to balance political necessities with military. The crisis in Somalia set the tone for military intervention in a post-Cold War world, and although the same mistakes have been depressingly often repeated, the complexion of global military organization changed dramatically as a consequence of this episode.
Author: Major Roger N. Sangvic
Author: Major Roger N. Sangvic
Author: Roger N. Sangvic
Author: Roger N. Sangvic
Author: Roger Sangvic
Author: John Maszka
Author: Lisa Hultman
Author: Eric V. Larson
Author: Nicole Fox
Author: John Maszka
Author: Peter Baxter