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Author: Pierluigi Bologna Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1484346696 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to study the determinants of banks’ net interest margin with a particular focus on the role of maturity transformation, using a new measure of maturity mismatch; second, to analyse the implications for banks from the relaxation of a binding prudential limit on maturity mismatch, in place in Italy until mid-2000s. The results show that maturity transformation is a relevant driver of the net interest margin, as higher maturity transformation is typically associated with higher net interest margin. However, ‘excessive’ maturity transformation— even without leading to systemic vulnerabilities— increases banks’ interest rate risk exposure and lowers their net interest margin.
Author: Pierluigi Bologna Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1484346696 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to study the determinants of banks’ net interest margin with a particular focus on the role of maturity transformation, using a new measure of maturity mismatch; second, to analyse the implications for banks from the relaxation of a binding prudential limit on maturity mismatch, in place in Italy until mid-2000s. The results show that maturity transformation is a relevant driver of the net interest margin, as higher maturity transformation is typically associated with higher net interest margin. However, ‘excessive’ maturity transformation— even without leading to systemic vulnerabilities— increases banks’ interest rate risk exposure and lowers their net interest margin.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: 9789294720160 Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to study the determinants of banks' net interest margin with a particular focus on the role of maturity transformation, using a new measure of maturity mismatch; second, to analyse the implications for banks of the relaxation of a binding prudential limit on maturity mismatch, in place in Italy until the mid-2000s. The results show that maturity transformation is an important driver of the net interest margin, as higher maturity transformation is typically associated with higher net interest margin. However, there is a limit to this positive relationship as 'excessive' maturity transformation - even without leading to systemic vulnerabilities - has some undesirable implications in terms of higher exposure to interest rate risk and lower net interest margin.
Author: Anatoli Segura Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank liquidity Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. As in Stein (2012), pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The assessment is based on the calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006. Lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion.
Author: Oliver Entrop Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
This paper explores the extent to which interest risk exposure is priced in bank margins. Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we present an extended model of Ho and Saunders (1981) that explicitly captures interest rate risk and returns from maturity transformation. Banks price interest risk according to their individual exposure separately in loan and deposit rates, but reduce these charges when they expect returns from maturity transformation. Second, using a comprehensive dataset covering the German universal banks between 2000 and 2009, we test the model-implied hypotheses not only for the commonly investigated net interest income, but additionally for interest income and expenses separately. Controlling for earnings from bank-individual maturity transformation strategies, we find all banks to charge additional fees for macroeconomic interest volatility exposure. Microeconomic on-balance interest risk exposure from maturity transformation, however, only affects the smaller savings and cooperative banks, but not private commercial banks. Returns are only priced in income margins.
Author: Itamar Drechsler Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank loans Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
We show that maturity transformation does not expose banks to significant interest rate risk -- it actually hedges banks' interest rate risk. We argue that this is driven by banks' deposit franchise. Banks incur large operating costs to maintain their deposit franchise, and in return get substantial market power. Market power allows banks to charge depositors a spread by paying deposit rates that are low and insensitive to market rates. The deposit franchise therefore works like an interest rate swap where banks pay the fixed-rate leg (the operating costs) and receive the floating-rate leg (the deposit spread). To hedge the deposit franchise, banks must therefore hold long-term fixed-rate assets; i.e., they must engage in maturity transformation. Consistent with this view, we show that banks' aggregate net interest margins have been highly stable and insensitive to interest rates over the past six decades, and that banks' equity values are largely insulated from monetary policy shocks. Moreover, in the cross section we find that banks match the interest-rate sensitivities of their income and expenses one-for-one, and that banks with less sensitive interest expenses hold substantially more long-term assets. Our results imply that forcing banks to hold only short-term assets ("narrow banking") would make banks unhedged and, more broadly, that the deposit franchise is what allows banks to lend long term.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: 9789295081307 Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. As in Stein (2012), pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The assessment is based on the calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006. Lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion.
Author: Andrada Bilan Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030268446 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 221
Book Description
The traditional role of a bank was to transfer funds from savers to investors, engaging in maturity transformation, screening for borrower risk and monitoring for borrower effort in doing so. A typical loan contract was set up along six simple dimensions: the amount, the interest rate, the expected credit risk (determining both the probability of default for the loan and the expected loss given default), the required collateral, the currency, and the lending technology. However, the modern banking industry today has a broad scope, offering a range of sophisticated financial products, a wider geography -- including exposure to countries with various currencies, regulation and monetary policy regimes -- and an increased reliance on financial innovation and technology. These new bank business models have had repercussions on the loan contract. In particular, the main components and risks of a loan contract can now be hedged on the market, by means of interest rate swaps, foreign exchange transactions, credit default swaps and securitization. Securitized loans can often be pledged as collateral, thus facilitating new lending. And the lending technology is evolving from one-to-one meetings between a loan officer and a borrower, at a bank branch, towards potentially disruptive technologies such as peer-to-peer lending, crowd funding or digital wallet services. This book studies the interaction between traditional and modern banking and the economic benefits and costs of this new financial ecosystem, by relying on recent empirical research in banking and finance and exploring the effects of increased financial sophistication on a particular dimension of the loan contract.
Author: Pierluigi Bologna
Author: Pierluigi Bologna
Author: 
Author: Pascal Paul
Author: Anatoli Segura
Author: Oliver Entrop
Author: Itamar Drechsler
Author: 
Author: Martin M. Andreasen
Author: Andrada Bilan
Author: