Author: Allen N. BergerPublisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0222120258
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Book Description
Bank Ownership Type and Banking Relationships
Author: Allen N. BergerPublisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0222120258
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Book Description
Bank Ownership Type and Banking Relationships
Author: Allen N. BergerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank ownership type - foreign, state-owned, and private domestic banks - in banking relationships. Our application uses data from India, an important developing nation. The empirical results are consistent with all of our hypotheses with regard to foreign banks. First, these banks tend to establish relationships with relatively transparent firms. Second, firms that have relationships with foreign banks are more likely to enter into multiple banking relationships and to maintain a larger number of such relationships. Finally, firms banking with foreign banks are more likely than others to diversify relationships across bank ownership types. The data are also consistent with the hypotheses that firms with relationships with state-owned banks are relatively unlikely to maintain multiple banking relationships, tend to interact with a smaller number of banks, and less often diversify across ownership types.
Bank Ownership Type and Banking Relationships
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
"The authors formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank ownership types-foreign, state-owned, and private domestic banks-in banking relationships, using data from India. The empirical results are consistent with all of their hypotheses with regard to foreign banks. These banks tend to serve as the main bank for transparent firms, and firms with foreign main banks are most likely to have multiple banking relationships, have the most relationships, and diversify relationships across bank ownership types. The data are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with state-owned main banks are relatively unlikely to diversify across bank ownership types. However, state-owned banks often do not provide the main relationship for firms they are mandated to serve (for example, small, opaque firms), and the predictions of negative effects on multiple banking and number of relationships hold for only one type of state-owned bank."--World Bank web site.
Bank ownership type and banking relationship
Author: Allen N. BergerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Sector bancario
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Bank Ownership
Author: Robert CullPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475588127
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
This paper presents recent trends in bank ownership across countries and summarizes the evidence regarding the implications of bank ownership structure for bank performance and competition, financial stability, and access to finance. The evidence reviewed suggests that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, promote competition in host banking sectors, and help stabilize credit when host countries face idiosyncratic shocks. But there are tradeoffs, since foreign-owned banks can transmit external shocks and might not always expand access to credit. The record on the impact of government bank ownership suggests few benefits, especially for developing countries.
Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk
Author: Gianni De NicolóPublisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
This paper presents a model of a banking industry with heterogeneous banks that delivers predictions on the relationship between banks' risk of failure, market structure, bank ownership, and banks' screening and bankruptcy costs. These predictions are explored empirically using a panel of individual banks data and ownership information including more than 10,000 bank-year observations for 133 non-industrialized countries during the 1993-2004 period. Four main results obtain. First, the positive and significant relationship between bank concentration and bank risk of failure found in Boyd, De Nicolò and Al Jalal (2006) is stronger when bank ownership is taken into account, and it is strongest when state-owned banks have sizeable market shares. Second, conditional on country and firm specific characteristics, the risk profiles of foreign (state-owned) banks are significantly higher than (not significantly different from) those of private domestic banks. Third, private domestic banks do take on more risk as a result of larger market shares of both state-owned and foreign banks. Fourth, the model rationalizes this evidence if both state-owned and foreign banks have either larger screening and/or lower bankruptcy costs than private domestic banks, banks' differences in market shares, screening or bankruptcy costs are not too large, and loan markets are sufficiently segmented across banks of different ownership.
Bank Ownership Type and Banking Realtionship
Author: Allen N. BergerBanking Relationships and Conflicts of Interest
Author: Uk SonMultiple Banking Relationships, Managerial Ownership Concentration and Firm Value
Author: Hai-Chin YuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This paper examines how the number of banking relationships affects the interaction between managerial ownership and firm performance, and sheds light on the conditions under which banking relationships play a role in alleviating shareholder-manager conflicts. Our results provide several interesting insights. We document that bank monitoring has substantial value when managers are improperly incentivized, but that it becomes less important when managers are properly incentivized. There is a substitution effect between the value-increasing benefits of managerial ownership and bank monitoring. We also find that any existing free-riding concerns from having too many banking relationships are problematical only when Tobin's Q is high and managerial ownership is high.
Bank Relationships, Ownership Concentration, and Investment Patterns of Spanish Corporate Firms
Author: Caroline FohlinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Book Description
A firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity is often considered evidence of financial constraints, but such sensitivity may also stem from agency problems of free cash flows (managers overinvest). Close banking relationships are thought to ameliorate financing constraints and possibly agency problems, while ownership concentration mostly serves to prevent the latter. In Spain, a civil-law (French) system, where banks play a prominent role and where capital markets remain underdeveloped, these effects could be magnified. We find that bank relationships (via equity ownership or via debt) have little effect on firms' investment-cash flow sensitivity. In contrast, we find significantly lower cash-flow sensitivity among firms with high ownership concentration. The findings bolster the managerial overinvestment interpretation of cash-flow sensitivity and suggest that bank relationships provide imperfect substitutes for the oversight of large stakeholders.