Bank Fundamentals, Bank Failures and Market Discipline PDF Download

Author: Marco Arena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank deposits
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Eduardo Levy Yeyati
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Bank failures
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
"Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk. This paper--a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study market discipline"--World Bank web site.

Author: Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.This paper - a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study market discipline.

Author: Gerard Caprio
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 9780821342022
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 396

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Trata de como prevenir a crise nos bancos, estudando vários casos de bancos que quebraram no mundo.

Author: George G. Kaufman
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780762310807
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 464

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Book Description
Contains papers which consider the basic role of market discipline, how it may be applied to banking and more broadly to large financial institutions of various types.

Author: Eduardo Levy-Yeyati
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
The authors show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.

Author: Amy Sterling Casil
Publisher: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc
ISBN: 1448808219
Category : Juvenile Nonfiction
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Book Description
With the recent credit crisis there is a renewed interest in how banks operate and sometimes fail. This book offers an understandable explanation of the complex banking system and how to prevent unreasonable risk.

Author: Gary H. Stern
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0815796366
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 247

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Book Description
The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries—developed and less developed, democratic and autocratic—respond by protecting bank creditors from all or some of the losses they otherwise would face. Failing banks are labeled "too big to fail" (or TBTF). This important new book examines the issues surrounding TBTF, explaining why it is a problem and discussing ways of dealing with it more effectively. Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, officers with the Federal Reserve, warn that not enough has been done to reduce creditors' expectations of TBTF protection. Many of the existing pledges and policies meant to convince creditors that they will bear market losses when large banks fail are not credible, resulting in significant net costs to the economy. The authors recommend that policymakers enact a series of reforms to reduce expectations of bailouts when large banks fail.

Author: Adolfo Barajas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank deposits
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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This study examines how depositors choose among different banks and over time in Colombia, focusing on whether they discipline bank behavior. By controlling for a more comprehensive set of risk/return factors, the study improves upon conventional market discipline tests. Panel data estimations for 1985-99 show that depositors prefer banks with stronger fundamentals, and that banks tend to improve their fundamentals after being "punished" by depositors. Banks with stronger fundamentals benefit from lower interest costs and higher lending rates. Market (or "regulatory") discipline therefore appears to exist in Colombia, perhaps thanks to certain key design features of the deposit insurance scheme

Author: Michael Koetter
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451962495
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30

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Book Description
Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant. With the benefit of hindsight, we exclude banks that eventually exit the market due to restructuring mergers. Our results remain intact, thus providing no evidence of "bad" bank selection for intervention purposes on the side of regulators. More transparent publication requirements of public incorporation that indicate more exposure to market discipline are barely or not at all significant. Increasing earnings and cleaning credit portfolios are consistently of importance to increase recovery likelihood, whereas earnings growth accelerates the timing of recovery. Macroeconomic conditions also matter for bank recovery. Hence, concerted micro- and macro-prudential policies are key to facilitate distressed bank recovery.