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Author: Messod D. Beneish Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
The paper investigates how auditor resignations affect capital market participants' perception of firms from which the auditors resign (quot;former clientsquot;) and of firms that continue as clients of the resigning auditor (quot;continuing clientsquot;). We find that resignation announcements result in significant negative abnormal returns for former clients and in significant positive abnormal returns for a sample of continuing clients (matched on industry, time period, and recent stock-price performance). As in prior work on auditors' actions, these effects are most pronounced when the news media reports the resignation. We investigate continuing clients because in recent years auditors have adopted a portfolio approach to risk management that includes centralized risk-based screening. We propose that the absence of resignation signals that, despite its poor performance, the continuing client has satisfied the auditor's unobservable risk-screening process. Therefore, the positive abnormal returns observed for the continuing clients suggest that despite their poor recent performance, the auditor believes the continuing clients' accounting methods and financial reporting choices are not misleading. We rule out a competition-based intra-industry information transfer as an alternative explanation for the positive abnormal returns.
Author: Messod D. Beneish Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
The paper investigates how auditor resignations affect capital market participants' perception of firms from which the auditors resign (quot;former clientsquot;) and of firms that continue as clients of the resigning auditor (quot;continuing clientsquot;). We find that resignation announcements result in significant negative abnormal returns for former clients and in significant positive abnormal returns for a sample of continuing clients (matched on industry, time period, and recent stock-price performance). As in prior work on auditors' actions, these effects are most pronounced when the news media reports the resignation. We investigate continuing clients because in recent years auditors have adopted a portfolio approach to risk management that includes centralized risk-based screening. We propose that the absence of resignation signals that, despite its poor performance, the continuing client has satisfied the auditor's unobservable risk-screening process. Therefore, the positive abnormal returns observed for the continuing clients suggest that despite their poor recent performance, the auditor believes the continuing clients' accounting methods and financial reporting choices are not misleading. We rule out a competition-based intra-industry information transfer as an alternative explanation for the positive abnormal returns.
Author: Kannan Raghunandan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper examines the market for audit services when the incumbent auditor of an SEC registrant has resigned from the engagement. While many previous studies of auditor changes have examined auditor dismissals by the client, only a few studies have specifically focused on auditor resignations. Auditor resignations constitute a unique setting because they may indicate increased likelihood of possible future losses to the new auditor, and provide an opportunity to test the demand-and-supply side incentives in the market for audit services.Results from analyses of 156 auditor resignations and a control sample of 375 auditor dismissals indicate that Big 6 firms were less likely to serve as the successor auditor when the predecessor has resigned, after controlling for three other factors identified as proxies for litigation risk to the auditor (client?s financial stress, industry membership and proportion of total assets in receivables and inventory). The effects were especially pronounced for the subset of resignees in financial stress. These results support suggestions that the implications of auditor resignations are different from auditor dismissals, and provide supporting evidence for the suggestions that supply-side incentives should be considered in examining the market for audit services.
Author: Aloke Ghosh Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
Although auditor litigation risk is considered as a leading explanation for auditor resignations, audit risk, and business risk might also trigger resignations. Auditor litigation risk is defined as the risk of the auditor being involved in a lawsuit, audit risk is defined as the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated, and, finally, business risk is defined as the risk associated with the client's survival and profitability. Because the three risk factors are not mutually exclusive, we examine their relevance and incremental importance using measures from the pre- and post-resignation periods. Using summary indices from the pre-resignation period, we find that all the three ex-ante risk indices are incrementally important for resignations, especially when the predecessor auditor is a Big 4 firm. Because the ex-ante risk factors are prone to measurement errors and are less likely to capture auditor's proprietary information about the client, we analyze data from the post-resignation period when the auditor's proprietary information is likely to become publicly known. We find that within a three-year period following an auditor's resignation, clients are more likely to: (1) be involved in class-action lawsuits (ex-post litigation risk), (2) have internal control problems (ex-post audit risk), and (3) to be delisted from a national stock exchange (ex-post business risk). Our research demonstrates that auditors consider all three risk factors, and not just litigation risk, in resignation decisions.
Author: Ying (Julie) Huang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Financial restatements have significant implications for auditor-client relationships. We estimate that a restatement increases the odds of an auditor resignation dramatically. Restatements involving fraud, reversing profit to loss and those disclosed in press releases appear to drive the increased resignation likelihood. Further, companies with relatively severe restatements are more likely to hire smaller auditors following a resignation. Collectively, these results are consistent with auditors interpreting restatements as an indication of increased client risk.
Author: Jayanthi Krishnan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Auditors can offset litigation risk in a number of ways, including improved audit quality and planning, increases in audit fees and increases in the issuance of modified opinions. Auditors can also adjust their client portfolios by becoming more selective in their choice of new clients and by withdrawing from high-risk engagements. We test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client companies that dismissed their auditors: one matched with the resignation companies on industry and year, and the other matched on year alone. We find resignation companies differ from dismissal companies along dimensions that capture the probability of litigation: financial distress, variance of abnormal returns, auditor independence, tenure and a modified (particularly going-concern) opinion. We also construct a litigation proxy based on a prior litigation-prediction model and find that the proxy is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be dismissed from the engagement. Our analysis is consistent with concerns expressed by the accounting profession that litigation pressures lead to the withdrawal of audit services for a segment of the market.
Author: Paul A. Griffin Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper offers new findings on the relation between auditor dismissals and resignations and audit fees. Unlike the prior research, which studies the fees of auditors after an auditor change, we focus on audit fees before an auditor change. Our evidence shows that incumbent auditors charge unusually higher fees at least one year prior to an auditor change event. The existence of unusual fee adjustments by incumbents may serve as a precursor of such events. In the case of dismissals, we reason that if clients perceive the presence of unusually higher audit fees as an indication that their costs are excessive, this should prompt a switch in auditors. We find evidence consistent with this view. For resignations, we interpret unusually higher incumbent fees not as a sign of client-perceived excess but as a signal by auditors that resignation companies reflect higher levels of audit risk or liability, which incumbents capture as additional fees. Eventually, however, the additional fees are insufficient, and the auditor resigns. While our results are based mostly on the audit fee disclosures after Sarbanes-Oxley, we control for and find similar results for periods not dominated by the legislation. Our results are similar for each of the Big 4 firms.
Author: Jeff P. Boone Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This study addresses whether an auditor change (a resignation or a dismissal) mitigates information asymmetry as measured by market liquidity or trading activity. For auditor dismissals our results show no effect on our sample firms' market liquidity or trading activity. By contrast, for auditor resignation firms, the market liquidity tests indicate that the 12 month period preceding the 8K filing is characterized by rising information asymmetry. Also, our trading activity analysis suggests that the 8K auditor resignation filing is informative for individual investors but fails to support such informativeness for institutional investors. Our findings lend support for the SEC's decision to differentiate between auditor resignations and dismissals in the 8K. However, the resignation announcement does not appear to decrease information asymmetry subsequent to the 8K filing, which is inconsistent with the presumed SEC objective of maintaining public confidence in the securities markets as a level playing field by mitigating information asymmetry.
Author: Messod D. Beneish
Author: Messod D. Beneish
Author: Kannan Raghunandan
Author: Aloke Ghosh
Author: Donald Wayne Wells
Author: Ying (Julie) Huang
Author: Susan Zhan Shu
Author: Jayanthi Krishnan
Author: Paul A. Griffin
Author: Sue Woolley Scholz
Author: Jeff P. Boone