Audit Fees, Non-Audit Services and Auditor-Client Economic Bonding PDF Download

Author: Jeffrey Coulton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39

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Book Description
We investigate whether auditor independence is compromised by either the mix of audit and non audit services (NAS), or simply unusually large NAS or audit fees. The results help reconcile apparently conflicting evidence in prior studies linking NAS and indicators of earnings management, as well as providing new insights on the relation between the incentive structures faced by auditors and variation in audit quality. Using the unexpected accrual component of earnings as a proxy for the effect of impaired auditor independence, we initially find that client firms purchasing an unexpectedly large NAS fee mix (i.e., relative to audit fees) display some evidence of aggressive accounting. However, when we explicitly allow for the possibly endogenous nature of unexpected accruals and unexpected NAS, this result no longer holds. In contrast, similar evidence of a positive relation between the magnitude of unexpectedly large audit fees and positive unexpected accruals still occurs (albeit more weakly) after explicitly allowing for possible endogeneity. A significant positive association between unexpected total fees (audit plus NAS) and the magnitude of positive unexpected accruals is even more robust. However, further tests shows that these quot;resultquot; are confined to clients of Non-Big 6 auditors. We therefore conclude that for large audit firms, the incentive to protect larger than expected fees is outweighed by the importance of their reputation for providing high quality audits relative to smaller audit firms. The results also highlight how sensitive conclusions about possible quot;NAS effectsquot; are to the choice of proxy for economic bond as well as the precise experimental design.

Author: Richard M. Frankel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auditing
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
We examine the association between the provision of non-audit services and earnings quality. Because of concerns regarding the effect of non-audit services on financial reporting credibility, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently issued revised auditor independence rules requiring firms to disclose in their annual proxy statement the amount of fees paid to auditors for audit and non-audit services. Using data collected from proxy statements filed between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001, we present evidence that firms purchasing more non-audit services from their auditor are more likely to just meet or beat analysts' forecasts and to report larger absolute discretionary accruals. However, the purchase of non-audit services is not associated with meeting other earnings benchmarks. We also find that the unexpected component of the non-audit to total fee ratio is negatively associated with stock returns on the filing date. These results are consistent with arguments that the provision of non-audit services strengthens an auditor's economic bond with the client and that investors price this effect. Keywords: Auditor independence; Auditor fees; Earnings management; Discretionary accruals. JEL Classification: G12, M41, M43, M49, L84.

Author: Michael Firth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
There has been a strong growth in accounting firms' provisions of non-audit services to their audit clients. To date, however, there have been few studies into the determinants of this joint provision of audit and non-audit services. One reason for the paucity of research is the lack of publicly available data with which to empirically examine relationships and test theories. However, recent legislation in the United Kingdom requires disclosure of non-audit fees paid to a company's auditor and this provides data with which to investigate the joint provision of consultancy and audit services. A model is developed that seeks to explain a company's decision to hire non-audit services from the auditor. The model argues that companies that face potentially high agency costs purchase relatively smaller amounts of non-audit services from their auditor. High agency cost companies require independent audits in order to reassure investors and creditors; the provision of joint services, which increases the economic bonding of the auditor to the client, may jeopardize independence or the appearance of independence. The model is tested using data observations from 500 companies and the results indicate that companies that have higher agency costs proxies are associated with smaller purchases of non-audit services from their auditors.

Author: Kevin Holland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. The paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.

Author: Ariel J. Markelevich
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description
Our study examines fees paid to auditors for audit and non-audit services during the period 2000 to 2003. We document a statistically significant positive association between audit fees and the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals over all years. We also identify a significant positive association between non-audit fees and discretionary accruals in years 2000 and 2001, but no such association in later years (after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). This lack of association in 2002 and 2003 may be a result of legislation that limits the types of non-auditing services that auditors can provide to audit clients. To address the potential impact of fee composition and client importance on auditor independence, we extend our empirical analysis by incorporating predictions of abnormal audit and non-audit fees. We derive abnormal fees using a fee estimation model drawn from prior literature. We find evidence consistent with the view that clients with higher abnormal fees are more apt to exert influence on their auditors, which in turn may lead to a breach in auditor independence. Overall, our results are most consistent with economic bonding being the primary determinant of auditor behavior.

Author: Richard M. Frankel
Publisher: Forgotten Books
ISBN: 9780666794659
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 94

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Book Description
Excerpt from The Relation Between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between non-audit services and earnings quality. We test hypotheses concerning: (1) the association between a firm's purchase of non-audit services from its auditor and earnings management, and (2) the stock price reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees. In the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of fee revenue auditors derive from non-audit services, yet we know little about how non-audit services are related to earnings quality.1 Concern about the effect of non-audit services on the financial reporting process was a primary motivation for the Securities and Exchange Commission (sec) to issue revised auditor independence rules on November 15, 2000. The rules require firms to disclose the amount of all audit and non-audit fees paid to its auditor. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Author: Ismail Adelopo
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317177436
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241

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Book Description
In Auditor Independence, Ismail Adelopo argues that the importance of auditors' independence cannot be over-emphasised. Not only do auditors provide certification of the truth and fairness of the information prepared by managers, they also have a duty to express opinions on the degree of compliance with laws and regulations guiding a firm's operations. Theirs is a socially important responsibility. In all that has been proposed to mitigate the governance crisis and restore confidence in the market system, relatively little attention has been paid to auditor independence. Examining the historical role of auditing in corporate governance and the regulatory context, this book sets the function within a theoretical framework and then provides empirical analysis of the problem issues such as the relationship between audit committees and external auditors and the probity of providing non-auditing services to audit clients. The focus on matters that are damaging to market confidence and threatening to the reputation of the auditing profession, means the conclusions and recommendations in this book are important for key stakeholders, including policy makers, regulators, those running companies, and their investors and customers. This is also a book for those responsible for training in the auditing profession and for others with a research or academic interest in the matters addressed.

Author: Scott Whisenant
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
In this study, we investigate whether the characteristics of clients, auditors, and the auditor-client relationship simultaneously determine audit and non-audit fees. As done in prior studies, we maintain that fees proxy for the level of service provided and follow the physical flow of knowledge. Estimating single-equation models of audit and non-audit fee models, we confirm prior findings of an association between audit and non-audit fees. Studies have concluded such evidence is consistent with knowledge spillovers between the two services. However, we document empirically that audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined. Since the data indicate audit and non-audit fees are jointly determined, we then investigate whether previously documented associations between audit and non-audit fees are the result of biased estimation induced by using endogenous variables in single-equation models. In contrast to results from single-equation estimations, we find no association between audit and non-audit fees using a simultaneous specification of the fee system, suggesting that single-equation estimations suffer from simultaneous-equations bias. In sum, the findings are not consistent with the existence of economies of scope from the joint performance of audit and non-audit services after controlling for the joint behavior of audit and non-audit fees. Given the ongoing debate over the level of allowed non-audit services by auditors, the argument for the joint provision of audit and non-audit services is less justified than if joint-supply benefits had been documented.

Author: Ismail A. Adelopo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Current waves of corporate collapses have brought the discussions about auditor independence into spotlight. In this context, the debate about the propriety of auditors' joint provision of audit and non-audit services to their audit clients has featured considerably. One approach to this debate has been an economic modeling of interactions between audit and non-audit fees. While there are shades of opinions that the relationship can be captured using a single equation model, others are of the opinion that the relationships are better represented in a Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM). Also, there are concerns about the nature of data used in analyzing audit fees. Cross sectional data have been predominant; however, there are calls for more robust analyzes involving multi-period investigations and, precisely, the use of panel data approach. It has been argued that this affords more observations and enhances causal inferences. In this paper, using very recent data, we compared the result of a single equation model with a SEM of the relationship between audit and non-audit fee for listed companies in the UK and also highlighted the benefits of using panel data approach to the study of this relationships in the context of auditors' independence and improved audit and reporting quality. The issues addressed in this paper are very pertinent to better understanding of the role of the auditor in the corporate environment. The requirement for firms to disclose their audit and non-audit fees, the outright ban on the provision of certain non-audit services by the auditors to their audit clients, and the enhancements of the roles of the audit committees in determining the level of non-audit services that can be purchased from the incumbent and other auditors all underscore the seriousness of the issues relating to audit and non-audit services.

Author: Frankel Richard M
Publisher: Legare Street Press
ISBN: 9781019501573
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This groundbreaking study explores the relationship between auditors' fees for non-audit services and the quality of earnings reported by companies. Using data from a large sample of publicly traded firms, the authors show that there is a strong correlation between the two variables, and suggest that this could be a cause for concern for investors and regulators. The authors also provide recommendations for improving the transparency and reliability of financial reporting. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the intersection of accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.