Asymmetric Oligopolies PDF Download

Author: Robert J. Waldmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Author: Malgorzata Knauff
Publisher: Presses univ. de Louvain
ISBN: 9782874630118
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 168

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Book Description
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.

Author: Robert Waldmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 19

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Author: Marco Wulff
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783899638349
Category : Unternehmenskooperation - Forschung und Entwicklung - Marktzugang - Strategisches Management
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Author: Hassan Benchekroun
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782893825687
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 25

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Author: Martin Kent Perry
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 54

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Author: Sajal Lahiri
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Author: Andreas Wellmann
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638255948
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 17

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Essay from the year 2004 in the subject Economics - Micro-economics, grade: 72%, University of Bradford (-), course: Micro-Economics, language: English, abstract: The phrase oligopoly is derived from the Greek language and means “few sellers”. Sloman & Sutcliffe (2001) defines an oligopoly as a type of imperfect market in which a ‘few firms between them share a large proportion of the industry.’ (p.236). Thus, industries like oligopolies are dominated by a small number of manufacturers that may produce either differentiated or nearly identical products. It is necessary to distinguish between two types of oligopoly structures. Therefore Harrison, Smith & Davies (1992) suggests the distinction between perfect oligopoly and imperfect oligopoly. Perfect oligopolies feature market players that produce nearly identical products such as sugar or CD’s whereas imperfect oligopolies distinguish themselves by differentiated products like cars or airplanes. [...]

Author: Y. S. Katsoulacos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026272040X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.