Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72
Book Description
Announcement of Selective Reenlistment Bonus/enlistment Bonus/normal Line of Progression/comparable/bonus Extension and Retraining MOS and Proficiency Pay Rates
Author: Announcement of Selective Reenlistment Bonus/enlistment Bonus/normal Line of Progression/comparable/bonus Extension and Retraining MOS and Proficiency Pay Rates
Author: Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 434
Book Description
Monthly Catalogue, United States Public Documents
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 906
Book Description
A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus
Author: Sheldon E. HaberFull Committee Consideration of H.R. 583 to Amend Chapter 5 of Title 37, United States Code, to Extend the Special Pay Provisions for Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed ServicesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The authors develop a theoretical model of profit maximization in which the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is treated as a wage premium payable to servicemen who are more productive, more costly to recruit and train, and less likely to continue in the Army in the absence of the SRB. Empirical estimation of the model is based on measuring a serviceman's productivity (in terms of his civilian counterpart's occupational wage), recruitment and training costs, and separation rates. Multiple regression equations are used to estimate civilian wages (a proxy for productivity) as a function of civilian occupation, education, and age of the worker. The empirical model groups Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) into three categories--Combat Arms, Technical, and Support Services. The results for servicemen in grade E-4 reveal that the average SRB calculated by the model ($5,247) should be about the same as the actual payments ($5,297) for servicemen in Combat Arms, but should be higher ($7,308) compared to the actual ($5,312) for Technical occupations, and lower ($1,942) compared to the actual ($3,757) payments in the Support Services. The research shows that retention rates in Technical MOS can be raised by increasing the SRB. The required increase in SRB expenditures can be funded by reducing SRB payments in the Support Services. Keywords: Economics; Retention; Military pay; Recruitment cost; Human capital; Training cost; Civilian pay; Economic analysis; Military essentiality code.
A System for Allocating Selective Reenlistment Bonuses
Author: Judith C. FernandezPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bonus system
Languages : en
Pages : 96
Book Description
Military Retention Incentives
Author: Justin JoffrionPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Book Description
The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Retention Bonuses: More Direction and Oversight Needed
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
This review was conducted to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is effectively managing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. The specific objectives were to (1) ascertain whether reenlistment bonuses were being paid to enlisted servicemembers in skill categories that were not experiencing significant personnel shortages or skills that were also receiving separation incentives and (2) assess the oversight of the program by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OsD). The SRB program is one means DOD is using to achieve its force manning objectives as the services downsize. The General Accounting Office has previously reported that the services have been successful in maintaining high aggregate personnel levels throughout the drawdown. This report looks below aggregate personnel levels and focuses on personnel levels within occupational specialties. The SRB program is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 308 to help maintain an adequate level of experienced and qualified enlisted personnel. The program authorizes bonuses of up to $45,000 to personnel in critical skills who have between 21 months and 14 years of active duty service and who reenlist or extend their reenlistments for at least 3 years. The intent of the program, according to DOD, is to focus reenlistment incentives on critical skills that are in short supply and have high training costs. (KAR) p. 2.