Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Book Description
The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to 'Operation Sea Lion, ' the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle Battle of Britain.
Analysis of German Operation Art Failures, The Battle of Britain, 1940
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Book Description
The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to 'Operation Sea Lion, ' the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle Battle of Britain.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Book Description
The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to 'Operation Sea Lion, ' the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle Battle of Britain.
Analysis Of German Operation Art Failures, The Battle Of Britain, 1940
Author: Lieutenant Colonel John Turner
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782897518
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to “Operation Sea Lion,” the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782897518
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to “Operation Sea Lion,” the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle.
Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 [Illustrated Edition]
Author: Williamson Murray
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178625770X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 883
Book Description
Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178625770X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 883
Book Description
Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.
Invasion, 1940
Author: Derek Robinson
Publisher: Da Capo Press
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 352
Book Description
"What stopped Hitler in 1940 - why did he not attempt to invade Britain? And if he had, would he have been successful? Most of us would answer that "The Few" of Fighter Command saved Britain from certain invasion, because every historian of World War Two, from Winston Churchill onwards, has said so. Yet in this fresh look, Derek Robinson argues that the Battle of Britain alone could not have been why Operation Sealion, the planned German invasion, was scrapped. The greater obstacle was a force that both Churchill and Hitler failed to acknowledge." "Robinson suggests that most accounts of 1940 are written as if the Channel and the Royal Navy did not exist. In fact, an inadequate German fleet was relying on the use of 1,000 flat-bottomed barges as landing craft - which even in a flat calm would have taken ten days to effect the complete landing. These cumbersome vessels would also have been sitting ducks for the Royal Navy, which at that time was still massive - 70 to 80 destroyers were ready and waiting in home waters." "The skill and courage of the Spitfire and Hurricane pilots who fought the Battle of Britain are not in question, and Robinson never downplays the extent of their sacrifice - he is the author of many acclaimed books depicting the lives of fighter pilots in both world wars. Here he challenges a verdict that has been in place for 50 years and his views will be unwelcome to some. But as well as relating the Battle of Britain with his trademark realism, Robinson now presents clear evidence to make us question our easy acceptance of the old story."--BOOK JACKET.
Publisher: Da Capo Press
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 352
Book Description
"What stopped Hitler in 1940 - why did he not attempt to invade Britain? And if he had, would he have been successful? Most of us would answer that "The Few" of Fighter Command saved Britain from certain invasion, because every historian of World War Two, from Winston Churchill onwards, has said so. Yet in this fresh look, Derek Robinson argues that the Battle of Britain alone could not have been why Operation Sealion, the planned German invasion, was scrapped. The greater obstacle was a force that both Churchill and Hitler failed to acknowledge." "Robinson suggests that most accounts of 1940 are written as if the Channel and the Royal Navy did not exist. In fact, an inadequate German fleet was relying on the use of 1,000 flat-bottomed barges as landing craft - which even in a flat calm would have taken ten days to effect the complete landing. These cumbersome vessels would also have been sitting ducks for the Royal Navy, which at that time was still massive - 70 to 80 destroyers were ready and waiting in home waters." "The skill and courage of the Spitfire and Hurricane pilots who fought the Battle of Britain are not in question, and Robinson never downplays the extent of their sacrifice - he is the author of many acclaimed books depicting the lives of fighter pilots in both world wars. Here he challenges a verdict that has been in place for 50 years and his views will be unwelcome to some. But as well as relating the Battle of Britain with his trademark realism, Robinson now presents clear evidence to make us question our easy acceptance of the old story."--BOOK JACKET.
Government Reports Annual Index
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government reports announcements & index
Languages : en
Pages : 1688
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government reports announcements & index
Languages : en
Pages : 1688
Book Description
Standing Fast
Author: Timothy A. Wray
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780394244
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780394244
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
To Lose a Battle
Author: Alistair Horne
Publisher: Penguin UK
ISBN: 0141937726
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 1243
Book Description
In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).
Publisher: Penguin UK
ISBN: 0141937726
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 1243
Book Description
In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).
Invasion
Author: Kenneth Macksey
Publisher: Pen and Sword
ISBN: 147387761X
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 227
Book Description
The WWII historian’s bracingly accurate analysis of what might have happened if Hitler ordered Operation Sea Lion to breech the shores of England. In June 1940, German troops gathered just across the English Channel, poised for the invasion of Britain. With France defeated and Britain cowed, Hitler seemed ready for his greatest gamble. In this compelling alternative history, the Germans launch the invasion that, in reality, was never more than a plan. Landing between Dover and Hythe, German troops push inland supported by the Luftwaffe and the impregnable panzers, and strike out towards London. The British, desperate to defeat the invaders, rally and prepare for a crucial confrontation at Maidstone. Realistic, carefully researched and superbly written, Invasion is a classic of alternate history and a thought-provoking look at how Britain’s war might have been. “Macksey’s blend of what actually happened and what might have been makes for a piece of writing comparable to Frederick Forsyth at his best.” —Jack Higgins “Convincingly described and excellently illustrated.” —The Daily Telegraph, UK
Publisher: Pen and Sword
ISBN: 147387761X
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 227
Book Description
The WWII historian’s bracingly accurate analysis of what might have happened if Hitler ordered Operation Sea Lion to breech the shores of England. In June 1940, German troops gathered just across the English Channel, poised for the invasion of Britain. With France defeated and Britain cowed, Hitler seemed ready for his greatest gamble. In this compelling alternative history, the Germans launch the invasion that, in reality, was never more than a plan. Landing between Dover and Hythe, German troops push inland supported by the Luftwaffe and the impregnable panzers, and strike out towards London. The British, desperate to defeat the invaders, rally and prepare for a crucial confrontation at Maidstone. Realistic, carefully researched and superbly written, Invasion is a classic of alternate history and a thought-provoking look at how Britain’s war might have been. “Macksey’s blend of what actually happened and what might have been makes for a piece of writing comparable to Frederick Forsyth at his best.” —Jack Higgins “Convincingly described and excellently illustrated.” —The Daily Telegraph, UK
Government Reports Announcements & Index
Strange Victory
Author: Ernest R. May
Publisher: Hill and Wang
ISBN: 1466894288
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 604
Book Description
Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.
Publisher: Hill and Wang
ISBN: 1466894288
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 604
Book Description
Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.