An Analysis of the Effect of the U. S. Marine Corps' Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions PDF Download
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Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr. Publisher: ISBN: 9781423523772 Category : Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr. Publisher: ISBN: 9781423523772 Category : Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,
Author: David L. Ross Publisher: ISBN: 9781423538820 Category : Languages : en Pages : 93
Book Description
This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.
Author: David L. Ross Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.
Author: Anita U. Hattiangadi Publisher: ISBN: Category : United States Languages : en Pages : 132
Book Description
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is the primary tool for shaping the career force. The first-term, or Zone A, SRB is key because it is the only point at which recommended and eligible Marines can be denied reenlistment in a skill area (PMOS) if their numbers would exceed requirements. In this paper, we find that SRB multiples have a large effect on reenlistment rates by occupation. Additionally, lump-sum SRBs have a larger effect on reenlistment rates than those paid in timed installments. We estimate a model that includes factors influencing the reenlistment decision separately for Zones A, B, and C. Results suggest that SRBs significantly raise reenlistment rates in all zones. Furthermore, the switch to lump-sum SRBs had fairly dramatic effects on program costs. We estimate the Marine Corps saved $8 million in Zone A and $10.4 to $25.7 million in Zone B by offering lump-sum rather than timed bonuses in FYO3. We estimate predicted reenlistment rates by occupational field and bonus level and a decision model that strength planners can use to set Zone A SRB levels by PMOS. Finally, we compare the relative costs and benefits of SRBs versus lateral moves for filling boatspaces in undermanned areas.
Author: David S. Barber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Deployment (Strategy) Languages : en Pages : 143
Book Description
This thesis explores the predictive effects of the Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) on first-term retention while controlling for varying levels of deployment tempo. In order to successfully predict reenlistment decisions in the current era, the model must control for conditions that affect a Marine' choice to reenlist, none being more influential than deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom. Adding deployment tempo variables to the logit prediction model enables Marine Corps manpower planners to properly account for changing conditions in the "Long War." The results of this analysis find the increased deployment tempo in recent years has had a negative affect on reenlistments. To counter this effect the Marine Corps has steadily increased its SRB budget and subsequent SRB offers to all Marines. In order to improve the accuracy of reenlistment predictions, this thesis estimated a model with alternative indicators of deployment tempo. The model developed is parsimonious, yet predicts accurately. Validation results show that if the model was utilized to predict FY07 reenlistment rates, it would have average prediction errors of 12 percent for the 27 high-density MOSs, who make up nearly 61 percent of the first-term population.
Author: Aline Quester Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"First term reenlistment decisions for recommended and eligible Marine in FY 1980 through FY 1990 are analyzed in this research memorandum. Particular attention is given to the retention effects of selective reenlistment bonuses on Marines in different Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) score categories. Additionally, reenlistment behavior for marines of different marital statuses, grade, and length of initial enlistment contracts are analyzed. In the recent past, there have been substantial changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines, as well as change in Marine Corps personal policy. First, enlisted Marines today are both smarter and better educated than they were in the earlier years of the 1980s. Second, although the percentage of recruits who enter the Marine Corps married or with dependents has remained virtually unchanged over time, the Marine Corps has experience substantial increases in the marriage and dependency rate for enlisted personal. Third, first-term enlistment contracted have been lengthened so that marine now average more years of service at the first reenlistment point. Finally, there has been an increase in both time in service (TIS) and time (TIG) for promotions to corporal (Cpl) and sergeant (Sgt). The impact of these changes on reenlistment decisions of first term enlisted personal (zone A decisions) is the subject of this research memorandum."--Abstract
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 87
Book Description
The Marine Corps uses its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program to influence Marines to reenlist for a designated term into certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) to reach planned manpower goals. The bonus amount is determined by selecting an "SRB multiplier" for each combination of MOS and Zone (MOSZ), where "Zone" corresponds to length of service. A higher multiplier means a larger bonus and leads to a higher percentage of Marines reenlisting. That percentage, predicted by an existing forecasting model, is assumed exact here. The "SRB multiplier model" assigns multipliers to minimize a sum of weighted squared deviations from MOSZ targets subject to a budget constraint. This model is implemented as a generalized assignment problem, and it is solved approximately on a personal computer using Lagrangian relaxation and a secondary heuristic. (The algorithm is programmed in Visual Basic for Applications and has an Excel interface.) Data for FY04 shows 491 bonus-eligible MOSZs. With up to 11 possible multiplier values, this yields a model with 5,401 0-1 variables and 491 constraints. A solution within 0.0018% of optimality is reached in 1.4 seconds on a 1.58 GHz personal computer. Standard integer-programming software verifies the correctness of the solution.
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr.
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr.
Author: 
Author: David L. Ross
Author: David L. Ross
Author: Anita U. Hattiangadi
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Author: David S. Barber
Author: Aline Quester
Author: 
Author: Aline Quester