Agency Problems and Financial Contracting PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Agency Problems and Financial Contracting PDF full book. Access full book title Agency Problems and Financial Contracting by Amir Barnea. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

Agency Problems and Financial Contracting

Agency Problems and Financial Contracting PDF Author: Amir Barnea
Publisher: Prentice Hall
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

Book Description


Agency Problems and Financial Contracting

Agency Problems and Financial Contracting PDF Author: Amir Barnea
Publisher: Prentice Hall
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

Book Description


Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation

Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation PDF Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cash flow
Languages : en
Pages : 32

Book Description


Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint)

Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) PDF Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: Forgotten Books
ISBN: 9780666208293
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44

Book Description
Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation We conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Multiperiod Agency Problems and Financial Contracting

Multiperiod Agency Problems and Financial Contracting PDF Author: Subramanyam Venkataraman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 488

Book Description


Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives PDF Author: Günter Bamberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642750605
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 538

Book Description
Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Handbook of the Economics of Finance PDF Author: G. Constantinides
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444513632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 698

Book Description
Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.

Role of Financial Contracts and Managerial Compensation in Resolving Agency Problems

Role of Financial Contracts and Managerial Compensation in Resolving Agency Problems PDF Author: Huiyan Qiu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 272

Book Description


Financial intermediation and corporate finance : an analysis of agency problems and optimal contracts

Financial intermediation and corporate finance : an analysis of agency problems and optimal contracts PDF Author: Joris Petrus Josephus Franciscus Scheepens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 152

Book Description


A Financial-agency Analysis of Privatization

A Financial-agency Analysis of Privatization PDF Author: John S. Walker
Publisher: Lehigh University Press
ISBN: 9780934223447
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 276

Book Description
The authors argue that resolution of the CEO selection and financial-contracting problems can accelerate efficiency gains realized by the enterprise.

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure PDF Author: Oliver Hart
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191521728
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 244

Book Description
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.