Agency and Answerability PDF Download

Author: Gary Watson
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191569232
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 388

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Author: Gary Watson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199272271
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 388

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Book Description
Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?.

Author: David Shoemaker
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198715676
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281

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David Shoemaker develops a novel pluralistic theory of responsibility, motivated by our ambivalence to cases of marginal agency--such as those caused by clinical depression or autism, for instance. He identifies three distinct types of responsibility, each with its own set of required capacities: attributability, answerability, and accountability.

Author: Gary Watson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780191709968
Category : Agent
Languages : en
Pages : 377

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Book Description
Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?

Author: Mark Alznauer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107078121
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 229

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Book Description
The first book-length treatment of a central concept in Hegel's practical philosophy - the theory of responsibility. This theory is both original and radical in its emphasis on the role and importance of social and historical conditions as a context for our actions.

Author: Michael M. Harmon
Publisher: SAGE Publications, Incorporated
ISBN:
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 256

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Book Description
Exploring the concept of responsible government and administration, this book creates a new paradigm for looking at the issue. Michael M Harmon rejects the current predominant `rationalist' theory, which holds that responsibility involves an intractable conflict between the potential free will of an actor and the restrictions of the institution within which the actor operates. He suggests that public administration must undergo a paradigm shift in which institutional restrictions and individual free will create a healthy and dynamic tension and are not completely incompatible.

Author: David Shoemaker
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192844644
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 324

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Book Description
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: - What does it mean to be an agent? - What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? - What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? - What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? - How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? - What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.

Author: Agnes Callard
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190639504
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 303

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Book Description
Becoming someone is a learning process; and what we learn is the new values around which, if we succeed, our lives will come to turn. Agents transform themselves in the process of, for example, becoming parents, embarking on careers, or acquiring a passion for music or politics. How can such activity be rational, if the reason for engaging in the relevant pursuit is only available to the person one will become? How is it psychologically possible to feel the attraction of a form of concern that is not yet one's own? How can the work done to arrive at the finish line be ascribed to one who doesn't (really) know what one is doing, or why one is doing it? In Aspiration, Agnes Callard asserts that these questions belong to the theory of aspiration. Aspirants are motivated by proleptic reasons, acknowledged defective versions of the reasons they expect to eventually grasp. The psychology of such a transformation is marked by intrinsic conflict between their old point of view on value and the one they are trying to acquire. They cannot adjudicate this conflict by deliberating or choosing or deciding-rather, they resolve it by working to see the world in a new way. This work has a teleological structure: by modeling oneself on the person he or she is trying to be, the aspirant brings that person into being. Because it is open to us to engage in an activity of self-creation, we are responsible for having become the kinds of people we are.

Author: Michelle Ciurria
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000024849
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 377

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Book Description
This book develops an intersectional feminist approach to moral responsibility. It accomplisheses four main goals. First, it outlines a concise list of the main principles of intersectional feminism. Second, it uses these principles to critique prevailing philosophical theories of moral responsibility. Third, it offers an account of moral responsibility that is compatible with the ethos of intersectional feminism. And fourth, it uses intersectional feminist principles to critique culturally normative responsibility practices. This is the first book to provide an explicitly intersectional feminist approach to moral responsibility. After identifying the five principles central to intersectional feminism, the author demonstrates how influential theories of responsibility are incompatible with these principles. She argues that a normatively adequate theory of blame should not be preoccupied with the agency or traits of wrongdoers; it should instead underscore, and seek to ameliorate, oppression and adversity as experienced by the marginalized. Apt blame and praise, according to her intersectional feminist account, is both communicative and functionalist. The book concludes with an extensive discussion of culturally embedded responsibility practices, including asymmetrically structured conversations and gender- and racially biased social spaces. An Intersectional Feminist Approach to Moral Responsibility presents a sophisticated and original philosophical account of moral responsibility. It will be of interest to philosophers working at the crossroads of moral responsibility, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, queer theory, critical disability studies, and intersectionality theory.

Author: R. Jay Wallace
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 069126483X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Book Description
A new way of understanding the essence of moral obligation The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.