A Study of the Relationship Between Changes in the Corporate Governance Mechanism, CEO Turnover, and Performance in Declining Firms PDF Download

Author: Ashay Bhalchandra Desai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 174

View

Book Description

Author: _春燕、_田交_
Publisher: 西南財經大學出版社
ISBN: 7550423482
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : zh-CN
Pages : 161

View

Book Description
�公司治理__受到__界和__界人士的_泛_注。_有研究_注更多的是西方成熟__体的公司治理__。在新_市__家，_中小股__益的法律保_相比成熟__体有所欠缺，如何_解控股股__中小股__富的侵占__是公司治理的一_重要__。中_公司所有__构高度集中、存在非流通股，容易_生大股__中小股_利益的侵占__。由_春燕、_田交_著的《公司治理_构与治理机制研究--基于金融危机股_分置改革的_角》_用中__据研究公司治理机制如何保_中小股_利益的__。具体__，本_研究了以下三_方面的__：(1)在全球金融危机期_公司治理机制_公司市___的影_；(2)高管更替后公司市___的_期表_；(3)公司_金股利支付与公司所有__构之_的_系。已有文___了中_公司治理_公司__的影_，本_在受到更少治理_量內生性__影_的研究_置下再一次__中_公司治理_公司__的影_。 2007—2009年全球金融危机___公司__是不可__的，采用全球金融危机期_的_据__治理机制_公司__的影_可以避免治理_量的內生性__。研 究__在金融危机前表_差一些的_有企_在金融危机期_反而表_更好了，特_是那些公司所有__构集中和_行__多的_有企_。__果表明集中的_家所有__解了金融危机期__有企_的__困境。_研究___在控制了各种公司特征_量后，管理者持股与有企_金融危机期_的市___呈_著正相__系，表明管理者持股_解了_有企_的委托代理__。最后，___聘用有__的___事_所_任__的公司在全球金危机期___了更少的市___下降。 2005年，_了消除非流通股，中______了股_分置改革，__中_的公司治理_构__了巨大_化。本_分_探究了股_分置改革前后高管更替公司的市___表_，_果表明股_分置改革前高管更替_有改_公司市___，但在股_分置改革完成后，_那些投_者股票回___的公司的高管_行更替后，公司股票__取得了_著改善。_表明在股_分置改革后，公司控股股_有_力去_戒市___表_ 差的公司高管。 本_探究了中_上市公司_金股利支付相_的侵占__，具体研究了股_分置改革前后非流通比例的改_、控股股_持股比例的改_与公司_金股利支付_化的_系。本_研究表明，在中_，由于_中小股_保__不足，加上集中的所有__构，控股股_的_机非常重要。股_分置改革在一定程度上使控股股_与中小股_的利益__一致，但是只要控股股_有_机持有充足的股份以_到他_控制公司的目的，控股股_与中小股_之_的利益_突就不_完全消除。

Author: Matthew Tsamenyi
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 184855253X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 565

View

Book Description
Corporate governance reform has become an important global policy agenda driven by events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, corporate scandals (such as Enron and WorldCom) and the globalisation of capital markets. This book advances debate on corporate governance, accountability and transparency in less developed and emerging economies.

Author: Steven N. Kaplan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 33

View

Book Description
We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 678

View

Book Description

Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308

View

Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Author: Lixiong Guo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 203

View

Book Description

Author: Tih Koon Tan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 83

View

Book Description
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S & P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S & P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.

Author: Shveta Singh
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 9811924600
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 204

View

Book Description
This book begins by analysing the various corporate governance mechanisms explored in the extant literature and determining their effectiveness in enhancing the firm value using multivariate analysis. The findings are of global relevance as the corporate governance regulations of most countries focus on independent directors as the mainstay of good governance. The empirical evidence from the first objective of this study corroborates the claim that independent directors do not strengthen the firms’ governance quality. The book is one of the few works to have analysed the possible reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the independent directors. Also, in view of the famous concept of the bundle of governance mechanisms, it might be possible that the independent directors strengthen the firms’ governance quality indirectly by strengthening other governance mechanisms. This aspect too has little precedence. This study adopts a novel moderation and mediation approach to analyse the monitoring behaviour of independent directors in relation to other governance mechanisms. The work is a must read for corporate players as well as researchers and scholars studying this discipline.

Author: Steven N. Kaplan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35

View

Book Description
We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.