Author: Peter StahleckerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
A Multivariate Principal-agent Model with Random Sampling
Author: Peter Stahlecker˜Aœ Multivariate Principle Agent Model with Random Sampling
Author: Peter StahleckerEnvironmental Systems and Economics
Author: Alexander KarmannPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
Book Description
Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis (Classic Version)
Author: Richard A. JohnsonPublisher: Pearson
ISBN: 9780134995397
Category : Multivariate analysis
Languages : en
Pages : 808
Book Description
This title is part of the Pearson Modern Classics series. Pearson Modern Classics are acclaimed titles at a value price. Please visit www.pearsonhighered.com/math-classics-series for a complete list of titles. For courses in Multivariate Statistics, Marketing Research, Intermediate Business Statistics, Statistics in Education, and graduate-level courses in Experimental Design and Statistics. Appropriate for experimental scientists in a variety of disciplines, this market-leading text offers a readable introduction to the statistical analysis of multivariate observations. Its primary goal is to impart the knowledge necessary to make proper interpretations and select appropriate techniques for analyzing multivariate data. Ideal for a junior/senior or graduate level course that explores the statistical methods for describing and analyzing multivariate data, the text assumes two or more statistics courses as a prerequisite.
Bibliographie der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Author: Risk Analysis in Theory and Practice
Author: Jean-Paul ChavasPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0121706214
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
The objective of Risk Analysis in Theory and Practice is to present this analytical framework and to illustrate how it can be used in the investigation of economic decisions under risk. In a sense, the economics of risk is a difficult subject: it involves understanding human decisions in the absence of perfect information. How do we make decisions when we do not know some of events affecting us? The complexities of our uncertain world and of how humans obtain and process information make this difficult. In spite of these difficulties, much progress has been made. First, probability theory is the corner stone of risk assessment. This allows us to measure risk in a fashion that can be communicated among decision makers or researchers. Second, risk preferences are now better understood. This provides useful insights into the economic rationality of decision making under uncertainty. Third, over the last decades, good insights have been developed about the value of information. This helps better understand the role of information in human decision making and this book provides a systematic treatment of these issues in the context of both private and public decisions under uncertainty. Balanced treatment of conceptual models and applied analysis Considers both private and public decisions under uncertainty Website presents application exercises in Excel
Applied Mixed Model Analysis
Author: Jos W. R. TwiskPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108480578
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
Emphasizing interpretation of results, this hands-on guide explains why, when, and how to use mixed models with your data.
Bibliographie der Staats-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Author: Essays on Principal-agent Models
Author: Nadide Banu OlcayPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency costs
Languages : en
Pages : 173
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters on principal-agent models. Chapter 2 studies an optimal contract design problem in a principal-framework whereas chapter 3 is an empirical investigation of the incentive contracts in the market of top executives. Chapter 4 is a theoretical chapter exploring welfare impacts of the structure in a top-level bureaucracy. In the first chapter, I consider a dynamic moral hazard model where the principal offers a series of short-run contracts. I study the optimal mix of two alternative instruments for incentive provision: a performance based wage (a "carrot") and a termination threat (a "stick"). At a given point in time, these instruments are substitutes in the provision of incentives. I am particularly interested in the dynamic interaction of these two instruments. Both carrot and stick are used more intensively as the agent approaches the end of her finite life. The sharing of the surplus of the relationship plays a key role: a termination threat is included in the optimal contract if and only if the agent's expected future gain from the relationship is sufficiently high, compared to the principal's expected future gain. Also, a termination threat is more likely to be optimal if output depends more on "luck" than on effort, if the discount factor is high, or if the agent's productivity is low. Having inspired from chapter 2, chapter 3 of the dissertation is an empirical study of the contracts of Chief Executive Officers (CEO). Direct pay for performance and a threat of termination when performance is low are two important instruments to incentivize CEOs. This chapter is an empirical analysis of the use of these two incentive devices and how they depend on tenure and managerial ability. For managers promoted from within a firm, ability is proxied by their age at the time of promotion. For managers hired from outside, I instead rely on constructed measures of "reputation", based on media citations over time windows of different length. Using a sample of firms, listed in S & P 1500 over the period 1998-2008, I find that CEO compensation and the threat of forced turnover are used as incentive devices throughout tenure. Even though the results indicate that pay increases as the CEO is more senior in her tenure, there is no strong evidence that termination threat follows a particular time pattern. For outsider CEOs, a better reputation increases pay and decreases the likelihood of forced turnover, with stronger effects for more current reputational measures. Regarding the impacts of reputation on the tenure-pay relationship, only more current measures have a significant and negative effect. Managerial ability, as proxied by age-at-promotion for insiders and as proxied by reputation for outsiders, decreases the likelihood of forced turnover. More current reputation measures, as in the case of total pay, have a larger impact of likelihood of turnover. Chapter 4 investigates the welfare implications of multiple principals in the highest level of bureaucracy. An agent has to carry out two separate tasks, which can either be organized by two separate principals, or combined under one principal. The relationship between the top level (the principals) and the lower level (agent) of the bureaucracy is a "principal-agent problem". The existence of multiple principals generates a "common agency". The analysis reveals that the optimal hierarchy depends on the existence of "rents" from office that the principals enjoy. If there are no rents, the two systems are equally welfare-efficient. A single-principal model dominates common agency otherwise.
21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook
Author: John T IshiyamaPublisher: SAGE
ISBN: 1412969018
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 937
Book Description
Offering full coverage of major subthemes and subfields within political science this reference handbook includes entries on topics from theory and methodology to international relations and institutions.