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Author: Sylvain Sorin Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9783540430285 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 228
Book Description
This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.
Author: Sylvain Sorin Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9783540430285 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 228
Book Description
This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.
Author: Fouad Sabry Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 349
Book Description
What is Zero Sum Game A zero-sum game is a mathematical model of a situation that involves two sides, where the result is an advantage for one side and an equivalent loss for the other side. This representation is used in game theory and economic theory where the scenario involves two sides. In other words, the gain that player one receives is comparable to the loss that player two receives, which results in the fact that the overall improvement in benefit that the game provides is zero. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Zero-sum game Chapter 2: Game theory Chapter 3: Minimax Chapter 4: Nash equilibrium Chapter 5: Coordination game Chapter 6: Matching pennies Chapter 7: Strategy (game theory) Chapter 8: Non-cooperative game theory Chapter 9: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Chapter 10: Bayesian game Chapter 11: Backward induction Chapter 12: Strategic dominance Chapter 13: Fictitious play Chapter 14: Economy of India Chapter 15: Repeated game Chapter 16: Quantal response equilibrium Chapter 17: Risk dominance Chapter 18: Epsilon-equilibrium Chapter 19: Stochastic game Chapter 20: Simultaneous game Chapter 21: Jean-François Mertens (II) Answering the public top questions about zero sum game. (III) Real world examples for the usage of zero sum game in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Zero Sum Game.
Author: Jean-François Mertens Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1316060985 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 597
Book Description
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
Author: Petyon Young Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 0444537678 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 1025
Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: George J. Mailath Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0195300793 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 664
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Frank Thuijsman Publisher: Birkhäuser ISBN: 3319280147 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 330
Book Description
This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 16th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. They discuss theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, issues relating to lack of information, and applications in areas such as biological or economical competition, stability in communication networks, and maintenance decisions in an electricity market, just to name a few. Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Author: Ata Atay
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Author: Fouad Sabry
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Author: Petyon Young
Author: George J. Mailath
Author: Frank Thuijsman
Author: Tsz-Chiu Au